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Russia– EU Relations and the  
Common Neighborhood
Examining Russia– EU relations in terms of the forms and types of power 
tools they use, this book argues that the deteriorating relations between 
Russia and the EU lie in the deep differences in their preferences for the 
international status quo. These different approaches, combined with eco-
nomic interdependence and geographic proximity, means both parties experi-
ence significant difficulties in shaping strategy and formulating agendas with 
regards to each other.
The Russian leadership is well aware of the EU’s “authority orientation” 
but fails to reliably predict foreign policy at the EU level, whilst the EU realizes 
Russia’s “coercive orientation” in general, but cannot predict when and where 
coercive tools will be used next. Russia is gradually realizing the importance 
of authority, while the EU sees the necessity of coercion tools for coping with 
certain challenges. The learning process is ongoing but the basic distinction 
remains unchanged and so their approaches cannot be reconciled as long as 
both actors exist in their current form.
Using a theoretical framework and case studies including Belarus, Georgia 
and Ukraine, Busygina examines the possibilities and constraints that arise 
when the “power of authority” and the “power of coercion” interact with 
each other, and how this interaction affects third parties.
Irina Busygina is Professor of Politics at the National Research University 
“Higher School of Economics” in St. Petersburg. She was previously Professor 
of Comparative Politics at Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
(MGIMO) and European Studies Institute at MGIMO. She also heads the 
Centre for Regional Political Studies at MGIMO. Her main spheres of research 
include EU– Russia relations, regional development and regional policy in Russia 
and the EU (comparatively) and also federalism in the EU and Russia. Over 
the last several years she has conducted extensive research— both individually 
and with co- authors— connecting challenges of globalization for the Russian 
domestic and foreign policies with the need for political modernization. Her 
most recent book is Political Modernization of the State in Russia, published in 
2012 by Liberal Mission Foundation (in Russian, with Mikhail Filippov).
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To my parents, and to Sascha, Lisa, Sophia and Iliya
*****
The General and his troops march forth to battle,
The Sickling and the Timid stop at home,
The Rich Man purchases a costly dome.
The Proud Man falls, and Laughter mocks his fall,
The Crafty Man makes cat’s- paws of them all!
Friedrich Schiller, “The Game of Life”
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“This book by Irina Busygina offers a broad comparative analysis of con-
troversial and less than consistent policies pursued by Moscow and Brussels 
towards the ‘grey zone’ between them. Using the contraposition of coercion 
and authority, the author offers compelling conclusions about the roots and 
the dynamics of the current Russia–EU crisis. A balanced, highly readable 
volume which should be a reference book for policymakers and scholars on 
both sides of the European divide.”
Andrey Kortunov, Director General of the 
Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)
“Irina Busygina is one of the most thoughtful Russian experts on EU–Russia 
relations. In her new book, she takes up the challenging task of sorting out 
the once promising, but by now woefully broken relationship. Irina, however, 
is looking beyond the current alienation. She urges both sides to learn from 
their failure in order to build more viable ties going forward.”
Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center
“In her new book, Irina Busygina offers an elegant, theoretically informed 
analysis of EU–Russia relations that is much needed for grasping the nature 
of the present confrontation. Looking at their interaction as well as their poli-
cies in the common neighbourhood from the perspective of different forms of 
power, Busygina sheds light on both similarities and differences in their strate-
gies. Her insights are sobering: while coercion can work in the short-term, the 
EU’s mode of existence is better suited to build more stable authority rela-
tions although this has proven to be complicated in the time of crisis.”
Tuomas Forsberg, Professor of International Politics 
at the University of Tampere, Finland 
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Introduction
And yet another book
And yet another book on Russia– EU relations? Another repetition of the 
well- known story with a sad statement about the rupture of mutual relations, 
and, therefore, another confirmation of our unreasonably high expectations 
of the past and our present impotence to change at least something in the 
relations of two powers that seem to be doomed to partnership by object-
ive prerequisites, if  not to friendship? The future is unclear but so far there 
are no signs that the situation may suddenly change for the better. It is often 
claimed that the current situation is a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
in 2014 and the subsequent conflict in Eastern Ukraine. But this is not quite 
true: Russia– EU relations have been constantly deteriorating over at least 
the last ten years— the crisis in Ukraine was only the straw that broke the 
camel’s back.
The old security order in Europe has been broken, and uncertainty is pain-
ful. We want to “survive uncertainty,” even if  there is no possibility “to have 
the last word” as well (Taleb, 2012, p.3). Obviously, in Europe we cannot sur-
vive uncertainty either by ignoring it or by distancing ourselves from it. What 
we can do is try to explain it, and thus to incorporate it into our calculations, 
assessments and forecasts. This is what I have tried to do in this book, which 
represents the culmination of over ten years of research. That is why, yes, here 
is yet another book…
My childhood and early youth were spent in the Soviet Union, and, to be 
frank, in those days I did not ask many questions about why the relation-
ship of my country with the outside world looked the way it did, and not 
a different way. I took for granted the “greatness” of my country and con-
demned the aggressive US and West European capitalism, though at the same 
time I truly loved jeans, chewing gum and Coca- Cola alongside most of my 
peers. And when I finally started to ask questions, the Soviet Union suddenly 
collapsed— I fell asleep in the Soviet Empire, and woke up in a country which 
(as I thought then) had made a genuine choice in favor of democracy domes-
tically and in favor of Europe externally.
In the ’90s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, life did not get bet-
ter, though it did get much more interesting. A  lot then was copied “from 
Europe”— from institutions to “Euroremont” (house repairs according to 
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European quality standards), and much was copied quickly and, therefore, 
inaccurately and transiently. But the ’90s were a time of heated discussions, 
naïve ones, as I  see them today, though mostly honest. Ten years, only ten 
years passed, and the Russian people “woke up” in a new country that was 
now declared by the elite not a “European country,” but a “Eurasian power.” 
The questions multiplied, but fewer and fewer people were looking for the 
answers. The passionate discussions of the ’90s were completely forgot-
ten, and the whole period was labeled as “wild.” Russia’s relations with the 
European Union constantly deteriorated and now have turned into open con-
flict. This rupture of Russia– EU relations and its unpredictable consequences 
increased my incentives to look for answers to three questions: What has hap-
pened? Why did this happen? Were there any ways to prevent escalation of 
the conflict?
These questions on Russia and the EU have caused an avalanche of new, 
more ambitious ones. With regard to interstate relations, can we talk about 
the emergence (at least in some territories) of a new order, a new format 
of relations that is based on credible commitments, and where conflicts are 
solved by any means except war? Or do we still live in a world where brute 
force and coercion absolutely dominate, and there is no way to stop them? 
And are we seeing an expansion in the ranks of those who not only consider 
the use of force and unlimited coercion possible, but are fascinated by them 
and their effectiveness?
In other words, this book is not about Russia– EU relations as such, but 
about forms of power and power relations in global politics. We see that glo-
balization has led to the development of economic institutions and regimes 
shared by many states, though it has by no means led to a standardization of 
power types. On the contrary, the differences are growing. Only recently most 
experts believed that authority as the mode of interaction between states (“soft 
power” in particular) was gradually replacing the use of coercion, but now we 
are observing a rise in the revisionism and coercion that often accompany the 
state- building process. The Russian case is probably the best confirmation of 
this trend. On the other hand, the European Union is authority- based intern-
ally and adheres to the authority approach in external relations.
The main aim of this book is to examine the possibilities and constraints 
that arise when the “power of authority” and the “power of coercion” inter-
act with each other, and how this interaction affects third parties. In general 
terms, what I want is to compare the incentives of establishing authority and 
coercive relations, as well as their comparative benefits and costs, and the out-
comes they produce for third countries. I study all of these issues in the cases 
of Russia and the EU, as their interaction produces a unique situation. Both 
Russia and the EU are major powers in international relations (IR) which 
are principally different in terms of both preferences and modes of behavior 
in external relations. Thus, there are deep dissimilarities between the two in 
terms of preferences for the international status quo. In addition, in external 
relations the EU could be described as an “authority power,” while Russia 
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clearly behaves as a “coercive power.” At the same time, geographical prox-
imity and economic interdependence prevent them from maintaining distance 
from each other, and lead to direct collision.
Neither Russia nor the EU is a “status quo power,” though in very differ-
ent senses. Both are territorially “open” projects in the sense that the ultimate 
borders of these entities are unclear— they could gain more territory, but they 
could also lose it. At the same time, both systems are fragile, internally hetero-
geneous and at risk of failure and disintegration: Russia because its present 
state is one that only the current political regime is capable of maintaining, 
and the EU because there are (too) many power loci and solving the collective 
action problem involves great difficulties.
As for the third countries (that is, the countries in between), in this book 
I present the cases of Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey. The first three 
belong to the “post- Soviet space” and are weaker actors in IR (in compari-
son with Russia and the EU). Turkey is a different case as it is a strong actor 
with no Soviet past. However, in all four cases power relations (and not just 
“relations,” for instance, in trade) do exist between a particular country and 
both Russia and the EU, and the external policy choices of these countries are 
conditioned by geographical proximity and economic dependence on Russia 
and the EU as well as on the character of the relations between these two. 
Their internal dynamics are obviously relevant for understanding variation 
in their transformations, though external factors (the type of power relations 
with the neighboring major powers) also significantly affect the trajectory of 
transformation by breaking it, or accelerating it, or by changing its direction. 
In studying the cases, I proceeded from the assumption that Russia and the 
EU interact with these countries separately, meaning that the former do not 
agree either on doing things together (taking concerted action), or on separ-
ation according to spheres of influence (and not intervening in each other’s 
sphere), be it geographical or dimensional/ sectoral separation. As such, the 
four countries need to build their relations with one of the two on a compre-
hensive agenda.
The logic of  the book is divided into two. In the first five chapters I pre-
sent my theoretical framework, and then come to Russia’s and the EU’s 
internal development, and how they affect the types of  power relations that 
the two build with the outside world. I  then turn to Russia– EU relations, 
and the fifth chapter focuses on Russia and the EU within the “common 
neighborhood” area. The subsequent chapters are devoted solely to four 
country cases.
The opening chapter is critical for the book as it presents an analytical 
lens, through which I then look at Russia– EU relations and their projection 
across the “common neighborhood.” This lens is the distinction between the 
two major forms of power in IR, that is between (relational) authority and 
coercion, proposed by David Lake. I argue that the authority- coercion dis-
tinction allows us to learn more not only about the use of concrete power 
instruments in international relations, but also about the nature of relations 
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between nations (or groups of nations), as well as about the nations them-
selves, through the prism of the power relations that they can or want to build 
with the external world. This “point of entry” looks promising since there 
are numerous manifestations of authority and coercion in the modern world, 
the scope for using both of them is expanding, and these forms are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated with the passage of time.
According to Lake, relational authority premised on a social contract is 
based on an exchange between the superordinate and the subordinate: the 
former provides a political order of value to the latter, sufficient to offset the 
loss of freedom incurred in its subordination to the former; the latter confirms 
the right of the former to impose restraints on the behavior of the latter. In 
the chapter I indicate the three pillars of authority that define its nature (and 
thus allow us to distinguish authority from coercion), namely the legitimacy 
of relations for both actors, the voluntary character of relations, and credible 
commitments meaning that both parties not only assume initial obligations 
that constitute the essence of the authority “deal,” but are able and willing to 
maintain them during the whole period of the contract.
In international relations, coercion in broad terms is the power to use threats 
and implement them if  necessary in order to influence another’s behavior. At 
the same time, however, coercion is a process that happens during the use of 
force, or during the actual use of other punishments, for instance, economic 
sanctions. In this chapter, I explain the difference between democracies and 
nondemocracies with regard to using coercion.
The final section of this chapter focuses on economic sanctions as coercive 
tools that are available to all states— both ones with democratic and nondem-
ocratic political regimes. I argue that there are profound differences between 
democracies and nondemocracies with regard to the reasons for imposing 
sanctions, their success rate and the choice of target countries.
In Chapter 2 I attempt to find a domestic explanation for Russia’s inclin-
ation to use coercion in external relations. I argue that the explanation lies in 
the state- building process in Russia under Putin’s leadership, and is particu-
larly linked to the characteristics that this desired state should have. I start 
with some theoretical considerations on state- building by authoritarian rul-
ers, and then turn to Russia, examining Putin’s conception of the Russian 
state, Yeltsin’s legacy, Putin’s ways of accumulating resources, and nation- 
building as part of Russia’s state- building project. The last section is devoted 
to the external dimension of state- building and the use of coercion.
At the outset, Putin was— and after 15 years still is— deeply convinced 
that Russia has all the objective prerequisites to be a “great power.” But 
in order to make Russia “great” these objective prerequisites, in his view, 
needed to be combined with the “correct” mode of  government, wherein 
the immanent features of  such a mode are: a strong and beloved leader, the 
Sistema (the governance style that relies on indirectness and interpretation 
rather than command and control) managed by the leader, a central bur-
eaucracy and the siloviki as the leader’s main agents, in addition to a happy 
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populace subordinated to the state apparatus. Last but not least, a “great 
state” should be great in all things, so the “greatness” of  Putin’s foreign pol-
icy is a mandatory and natural element of  his state- building strategy— this 
means an independent foreign policy, (very) active involvement in world 
affairs, protection of  Russia’s national interests (as the Russian leadership 
understands them) and building a pro- Russian coalition. What is import-
ant is that demonstration of  considerable and visible successes is absolutely 
necessary to achieve these goals.
I conclude that from the state- building perspective (taking into account 
the timing and nature of this process), the Russian state’s choice of using 
coercion in foreign policy looks quite rational. First, for the simple reason 
that it is possible. In many cases it can quite easily use objectively existing 
dependence on Russia (primarily in terms of energy resources), and this 
alone fuels the temptation of using dependence as a tool for exerting pressure 
on its partners. Second, the Russian incumbent can make serious decisions 
alone and very quickly, has no responsibility for mistakes and never admits 
his mistakes— this is his principal position. The price of using coercion, as 
well as its long- term, strategic effects, are not calculated: for instance, nobody 
writes about the losses to Russia’s economy due to mutual sanctions; the dis-
cussion is only about the EU’s losses and about sanctions as an incentive for 
import- replacement in Russia. All the greater are Russia’s uncalculated non-
material, reputational losses. Third, coercion gives rapid results when the goal 
is, as in the Russian case, the revision of the previous international order. For 
instance, it is possible to quickly start a “small victorious war.” It is also pos-
sible to quickly impose sanctions, and just as quickly cancel them. Coercion 
produces a strong demonstrational effect— both for the internal audience 
(demonstrating the might of the Russian “great state”) and for the external 
world. Finally, playing with coercive instruments allows the Russian president 
to maintain the high level of unpredictability that he considers to be one of 
his important advantages. In fact, the Russian state feels no need to choose 
between coercion and authority power in foreign policy; the task is to com-
bine and coordinate coercion in various domains depending on the specific 
situation. Russia’s approach has brought results: the West has acknowledged 
that Russia is a power to be reckoned with.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the EU to analyze what toolkit for external interac-
tions its multilevel governance system has produced and now has at its dis-
posal. Neither member states nor supranational institutions can monopolize 
decision- making on foreign policy issues in the EU’s political arrangement, 
so the use of authority mechanisms and instruments is not a choice for the 
EU (in the presence of other alternatives), but the only possible main way to 
structure its internal and external relations. The Union uses authority as a 
standard internal procedure and then projects it onto the international envir-
onment. Authority logic lies at the heart of the Europeanization strategy and 
stands behind the tactics of conditionality, designed to produce incentives for 
change in neighboring countries in the desired direction.
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The distinguishing feature of the EU’s use of authority is the fact that the 
target subordinate is assisted in changing its political and economic institu-
tions under the EU’s guidance (first stage) and is then required and expected 
to shape its policies in a desirable fashion (second stage). When a third coun-
try enters an authority arrangement with the EU, it automatically finds 
itself  in a subordinate position and maintains it up to the culmination of the 
arrangement, when the EU’s “carrot and stick” policy results in the “golden 
carrot” of membership. The EU provides no guarantees that this will happen 
as the ultimate result of the interaction and initially sets no concrete time 
frame for the “membership deal” to take place. In the reform process that a 
third country undergoes in pursuit of membership, coercion is inherent in the 
EU’s authority- type approach, because the withdrawal of benefits serves as 
a punishment for noncompliance. The Copenhagen criteria function as a set 
list of universal demands by the EU which a partner has to fulfill in order to 
transform from a subordinate in the EU’s network of authority relations into 
one of the superordinates (member states) in its political system. The critical 
juncture of this transformation is the moment when a third country eventu-
ally gains full EU membership.
Given the limited range of rewards the EU has to offer to third states, 
the use of authority is not fruitful when the target country does not aspire 
to membership, or at least regard membership as an option for the distant 
future. Where a counterpart is resistant to the EU’s authority efforts, it can 
potentially be subjected to EU sanctions, especially if  its foreign policy pri-
orities coincide with those of the EU and shape the same environment in the 
opposite direction. Sanctions represent a form of coercion that is inherently 
available to the EU, but the constraints to using it are built into the EU multi-
level governance system. Not only does the launch of a sanctioning strat-
egy require the unanimous consent of all member states, but its continuation 
requires this unanimity to be reaffirmed again and again, very often before 
the results— the change in the target’s country’s behavior— are achieved, while 
the European national economies are already experiencing substantial losses.
In Chapter 4 I argue that from the beginning of their interaction in the 
’90s, Russia and the EU failed to establish a sustainable strategic status quo in 
their relations. The EU’s attempt to establish (weak) authority relations with 
Russia in the ’90s failed, and over the following 15 years a relationship was 
formed that rested on mutual distancing and the separation of the political 
and economic elements of cooperation. This status quo proved to be fragile 
and was ultimately destroyed by Russia, resulting in both parties turning to 
the use of coercion with regard to each other.
The authority instruments that the EU developed and implemented in the 
’90s for interacting with Russia did not bear fruit. The EU did not manage 
to strengthen Russia’s state capacity and good governance, while successful 
projects launched by the EU became “invisible” within the huge territory of 
the country. The instruments were too weak and not designed with any coer-
cion in mind, as the EU was frightened to punish Yeltsin for any wrongdoing. 
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In addition, the member states’ “practical” (in other words, unscrupulous) 
approach to Russia undermined even the weak actions that the EU had taken, 
and made the Russian leadership prioritize bilateral relations with EU states 
over those with the EU as a single entity. For Yeltsin, rapprochement with the 
EU very soon stopped being a survival strategy.
Despite numerous declarations and signed documents, Russia and the EU 
have never been strategic partners in the true sense of the word. In the ’90s, 
the rhetoric of partnership masked the attempt to establish authority rela-
tions by the EU, one which proved ineffective as the EU lost momentum at 
the beginning of the ’90s and later was unable to introduce the principle of 
conditionality (with its coercive possibilities) in relations with Russia. On the 
contrary, in the 2000s, it seemed that Russia was beginning to attain the pos-
sibility of using coercion with regard to the Union through the latter’s energy 
dependence on Russia.
During the 2000s, it seemed that Russia– EU relations were gradually 
approaching a status quo that was beneficial for both sides. In Russia, 
President Putin was busy building the “great state,” while the EU was busy 
with enlargement. In both Russia and the EU, politicians relied on the contin-
uing external tensions as a mechanism for generating internal consensus while 
implementing the respective transformations of their political systems. At 
that time member states were left to develop their own relations with Russia 
almost fully in accordance with their national priorities, be it dependence (or 
independence) of national economies on Russia’s gas, capital or exports.
This status quo, despite all predictions, proved to be very fragile and was 
destroyed with the political crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea. At that moment we observed multilevel governance in full effect: 
while domestic politicians of EU member states openly demonstrated diver-
gence and disagreements over the proposed sanctions, in the end the European 
national leaders unanimously supported sanctions in the European Council. 
Russia has imposed “tit- for- tat” sanctions, combining them with tools of 
“hidden coercion” used to split the EU along various dimensions and to 
undermine trust in it.
Two questions are of particular interest to me in Chapter 5: what are the 
key goals of Russia and the EU within the “common neighborhood” (CN) 
area, and what kinds of power tools do they use to achieve these goals?
The differences in Russia’s and the EU’s approaches to the CN are 
evident— both in terms of  general strategies and in terms of  the use of  con-
crete power instruments. Russia’s main interest in the CN countries stems 
from the need to build a coalition to confirm its aspirations to great power 
status. The CN countries suit this purpose as Russia has the capacity both 
to reward and to punish them. Russia needs coalition partners, but the prob-
lem is that there are physically not enough potential candidates— countries 
that would be geographically close, reliable, and that could be firmly and 
permanently bound to Russia. The dearth of  potential coalition partners 
pushes Russia to perceive each country that could enter a Russia- centered 
 
8 Introduction: and yet another book
8
coalition as being of  great value. From this perspective, the CN countries 
appear exceptionally attractive, given their dependence on Russian energy 
supplies, as well as the cultural and historical affinities that these states share 
with Russia. The task of  building a coalition around Russia and the apparent 
“availability” of  the CN countries has made the Russian establishment think 
that these countries are doomed to make a “final choice” between Russia and 
Western Europe.
Unlike Russia, the EU has never wanted to include the CN states in any 
kind of coalition, or to someday see them as members of the Union. Nor 
has the EU ever put forward the idea of a “final choice.” The key word in the 
EU’s strategy towards the CN has been “security,” which is to be achieved 
by surrounding the EU with a “ring of friends.” Thus, the EU’s main goal 
with regard to common neighbors was and is to create a safe neighborhood 
area. In order to achieve this goal, the EU has developed a set of authority 
instruments based on the conditionality principle, designed to initiate cer-
tain reforms in target countries by shifting these societies into a course of 
Europeanization. The desired stability along the EU border requires changes, 
and therefore creates instability (at least in the short term) in the CN countries. 
This temporary instability that emerges as a by- product of Europeanization 
is, however, principally different from the “managed instability” that is part of 
Russia’s larger strategy toward neighboring countries.
The EU’s approach is based on building authority relations with the CN, 
and consequently, it uses authority instruments combined with some coer-
cion within the general authority approach. For Russia, relations with the CN 
states are predominantly built on coercion (real and virtual) with the appear-
ance of authority- building (while the details of that appearance depend upon 
the individual country- specific situation). Furthermore, there is a diffusive 
effect of coercion when the “waves” of instability spread to adjacent areas, 
with the coercer turning into a source of security problems for the larger 
region. In other words, there exists a principal difference in the combination 
of authority and coercion within Russia’s and the EU’s agendas towards the 
CN countries, and therefore these are different types of power relations, “par-
allel worlds,” so to speak, that Russia and the EU strive to establish with the 
CN countries.
I argue that one of the main problems is that authority is not a response 
to coercion, while the opposite is possible, and coercion could be a response 
to authority at least in the short run. One consequence of this fundamental 
incompatibility is the mutual incapability of Russia and the EU to predict not 
only the strength of reaction with regard to each other’s actions, but some-
times even the character of this reaction.
Russia– EU rivalry has led to a deep divide in the area of the “common 
neighborhood” between the countries that have joined the Eurasian Economic 
Union (i.e., Belarus and Armenia) and those that have signed the Association 
Agreements (AAs) and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements 
(DCFTAs) offered by the EU under the Eastern Partnership (i.e., Georgia, 
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Moldova and Ukraine). Russia has “lost” Georgia and Moldova as well as 
the most strategically important country— Ukraine. However, the game is not 
over, and the sustainability of the choice of each CN country remains an open 
question for the long run.
Chapter 6 explores the first country case, Belarus. It is well- known that the 
relations between Russia and Belarus are extraordinarily close and free from 
major crises. On the surface, the Russia– Belarus relations look like relations 
of close authority. However, this is in fact an imitation of authority, since 
Belarusian President Lukashenka has very few choices in defining both his 
general external strategy and concrete foreign policy moves. For Belarus, the 
threat of Russia using coercion is very real. In this situation, the role of the 
EU with its authority instruments is and will remain marginal, as the Union 
simply does not have enough “points of entry” to the country.
President Lukashenka is in a dual position: on the one hand, he is respon-
sible for the economic survival of his country, for which Belarus needs sub-
sidies from Russia. On the other hand, he is the guarantor that there will 
not be “too much Russia” in Belarus. It seems as if  such a duality should 
give Lukashenka broad room for maneuver, but the opposite is actually hap-
pening: the amplitude of his tactical moves is small as the “red lines” drawn 
by Russia that mark the borders of his opportunity corridor, and which he 
cannot cross, are quite close to each other. It may appear that Lukashenka is 
balancing between Russia and the EU (though under Russia’s “supervision”), 
but I argue that in fact this is balancing between Russia and sovereign state-
hood, while interaction with the EU is an external expression of the latter 
alternative.
Lukashenka’s commitments are in reality not credible— neither with regard 
to Russia, nor with regard to the EU. His periodic “flirting” with Europe is not 
a “turn towards Europe,” even a situational one, but just an attempt to show 
his ability to be an independent actor by interacting with the union of coun-
tries that is— at least to some extent— interested in what is going on in Belarus. 
Starting genuine authority relations with the EU would at some point inevita-
bly mean genuine, and not demonstrative, reforms, which could easily get out 
of control. Lukashenka’s commitments to Russia are stable only under the 
current status quo: the thing that can turn Belarus away from Russia is obvi-
ous and irreversible attenuation of the latter. If  this happens, and only then, 
can the European Union start to work with Belarus. The rise of Belarusian 
sovereignty will be with great probability conducted within the context of an 
authoritarian system, but this is surmountable with time as Belarus will remain 
a small Eastern European country without a self- sufficient economy. The EU 
knows well what kind of authority instruments it could offer Belarus, but it 
does not know how to “release” Belarus from Russian influence.
Chapter 7 brings the reader to Georgia, a country noted for its very dra-
matic political development; in particular, the second transition that started 
after the Rose Revolution of 2003, and the subsequent reforms undertaken 
by President Saakashvili and strongly supported by the West. This support 
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presupposed active authority involvement by the European Union and the 
US in Georgia’s political and economic development. On the other hand, for 
neighboring Russia, coercion in various forms was practically the main means 
of interaction with Georgia. Georgia is the country where Russian coercion 
directly faced two types of authority— American and Western European. 
In both cases, Georgia’s voluntary compliance was at a high level and the 
involvement of these two actors in the political process in Georgia was con-
sidered legitimate. While the authority involvement of the US puts a particu-
lar emphasis on military education and assistance as well as on humanitarian 
help, that of the EU has a multidimensional character and is based on a more 
active exchange at different levels. Westernization (and Europeanization as 
part of it) has become a survival strategy for President Saakashvili. During 
his presidency, Saakashvili took a firmly pro- Western course, and this was a 
huge risk for him as this choice meant starting an open confrontation with 
Russia, the scope and duration of which Georgia was not able to control or 
predict.
But Saakashvili has left and the ruling elites in Georgia have changed. 
Moreover, so far there have been no tangible economic results that would 
come as a reward for Georgia’s European choice. This circumstance has 
been unhesitatingly used by Russia, which is trying to quickly repair its rela-
tions with Georgia. The failure of  the European project in Georgia would 
not only mean a failure of  Western (above all, the EU’s) authority rela-
tions with Georgia, but it would negatively affect the pro- European aspira-
tions of  countries like Ukraine or Moldova. It would also send a signal to 
the Russian leadership that Georgia’s “European choice” was situational 
rather than long- term and sustainable. Thus, the Georgian leadership has to 
make a strategic choice— either to confirm the choice made by Saakashvili, 
or to fundamentally undo it in favor of  Russia. The idea of  maintaining 
“proper” relations both with the EU and Russia, as proclaimed by the cur-
rent Georgian leadership, for all its apparent attractiveness has no chance 
of  working.
In Chapter 8, I  focus on Ukraine. So far Ukraine’s political destiny has 
been that of a country trapped between two entities that have significantly 
more political weight. This double asymmetry between the EU and Ukraine 
on the one hand and between Russia and Ukraine on the other hand places 
the country in constant tension, as its spectrum of external action is limited 
by the interests of the two dominant powers on its borders. For Russia, within 
the whole post- Soviet space there is no other country as strategically import-
ant as Ukraine. The entire post- Soviet political history of Russia– Ukraine 
relations is a history of ever- increasing coercion— from punishing Ukraine 
with cancelation of special prices on gas (it is a known fact that if  rewards 
are regularly given, they can be withheld as a punishment, and vice versa) 
to its culmination in the annexation of Crimea and support of insurgents 
in Eastern Ukraine. Even the periods of “normalization” were in fact times 
of camouflaged coercion. Russia persistently continued attempts to ensnarl 
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Ukraine in authority relations and insisted that the country should make a 
final choice between Russia and the EU. In 2014, Ukraine made its choice— 
and not in favor of Russia. Now, for Russia, coercion in various forms seems 
to be the uncontested option for dealing with Ukraine.
For the EU, the political crisis in Ukraine, its speed of escalation and its 
scale came as a shock; all of a sudden, Ukraine became very important to the 
EU, though not in itself, but rather as a threat to stability in Europe. The EU 
is often criticized for offering Ukraine too little, keeping in mind the Union’s 
reluctance to offer the country “potential for membership,” which signifi-
cantly weakens its leverage over Ukraine’s development and reduces support 
for pro- reform forces in the country. However, membership in the Union is a 
question of the will and capacity of the elites to conduct certain (often pain-
ful) reforms with the consent of larger social groups, and their capacity for 
making credible commitments. The EU’s cautious approach with regard to 
membership is completely justifiable, especially in the case of Ukraine, where 
once high hopes have been replaced with deep disappointments.
Thus, the problem of increasing state capacity is absolutely central 
for Ukraine, and much more relevant than the issue of returning Crimea. 
Without an efficient state (and a strong national center that unites the coun-
try in reality rather than on paper), it is impossible to challenge the oligarchic 
power and corruption that persistently grips Ukraine. Without a sufficient 
level of state capacity, it becomes impossible to establish sustainable authority 
relations with the EU. Otherwise, under the conditions of economic depend-
ence on Russia, the country becomes easy prey to coercion. The task of the 
EU is therefore to support the stabilization of the Ukrainian economy and 
to increase state capacity and quality of governance, while constantly and 
strictly monitoring to ensure that the processes developing in Ukraine do not 
contradict the general idea of Europeanization but contribute to it. In the 
coming years the question of Ukraine’s membership will arise in any case, 
which is why following the conditionality principle in relations with Ukraine 
is so important for the EU.
Chapter 9 explores the authority/ coercion relations of Turkey with Russia 
and the EU. So far, as with all emerging markets, Turkey is essentially playing 
catch- up, trying to close the gap with the advanced economies of the world. 
What makes it principally different from other countries in Russia’s and the 
EU’s neighborhood is its territorial size, key geostrategic location and eco-
nomic and military capabilities. Both Russia and the EU are Turkey’s most 
important economic partners, though its list of priorities in external relations 
includes many other states and regions.
Russia and Turkey are similar in many respects: both countries have imper-
ial legacies, and both perceive themselves as decisive regional and global 
actors, which does not correspond to their actual capabilities. Russia cannot 
exercise power over Turkey through authority relations, playing a dominant 
role; with regard to Turkey it pursues a policy of “carrot and stick”— the 
situational and selective use of coercion. Despite any declarations that could 
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come from the Russian leadership in the future, it would be unreasonable to 
count on the emergence of a Russian- Turkish strategic alliance, at least while 
the current political regime in Russia is preserved.
As for EU– Turkey relations, there is reason to expect that these rela-
tions will change— from predominantly authority- type ones to predomin-
antly partnership- type in selected spheres of  mutual interest. The “Turkish 
model,” based in particular on the country’s “European choice” and EU 
membership as the final goal, has proved not to be sustainable enough to 
cope with domestic and external pressures. Despite the still existing official 
goal of  Turkey’s accession to the EU, the EU has reached the limits of  its 
power to extend its rules to Turkey, while a combination of  domestic and 
external factors has made the Turkish leadership abandon the country’s 
steady rapprochement and later full membership in the Union as its sur-
vival strategy. In addition, the direction of  refugee flows (from Syria to the 
EU through Turkish territory) gave the Turkish executive a bargaining chip 
in negotiations with the EU, transforming authority relations into a differ-
ent type of  exchange.
In the Conclusion I summarize my ideas concerning the choice in favor of 
building authority or coercive power relations by major powers, as well as 
the constraints on such a choice. I also propose some considerations about 
the attractiveness of Russia’s mode of behavior in IR and the EU’s “global 
mission.”
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1 Forms of power in international 
relations
Lake’s distinction between authority and coercion
It would probably be no exaggeration to assert that studying international 
politics by and large means studying various types of power relations and the 
application of different power instruments by actors operating in the inter-
national arena. As Kay (2004, p.14) observes, “Regardless of the reasons for 
attaining power, the standard reply to the question ‘What is the nature of the 
international system?’ has been the further question ‘Where does the distri-
bution of power lie?’ ” However, in the contemporary world, power, under-
stood as the ability of a state (or group of states) to make another state do 
something that it otherwise would not do (Morgenthau, 1978; Keohane and 
Nye, 2001), works through increasingly numerous channels, not least due to 
the processes of globalization. Manifestations of power impress with their 
diversity.
That is why trying to achieve a better understanding of the “power prob-
lem” in international relations implies, in particular, scholars’ efforts to struc-
ture the forms of power applied in IR. Indeed, in recent years, scholars of IR 
have made many attempts to progressively refine the distinctions between dif-
ferent types of power. The distinction between hard and soft power won, per-
haps, the greatest popularity (Josef Nye [2004] is considered to be the first to 
identify the latter), though scholars did not stop at this distinction and contin-
ued the process of “refinement.” As Petersen (2012, p.10) writes, “In the last 
couple of decades alone scholars in IR have developed terms like hard power, 
soft power, and smart power, compulsory power, institutional power, struc-
tural power, and productive power, normative power, and network power.” 
She herself  distinguishes four different types of power in international rela-
tions: coercive power, bargaining power, concerted power and institutionalized 
(or political) power. Her typology is ultimately motivated by the desire to 
develop a clearer understanding of the distinction between power and vio-
lence (Petersen, 2012). Some types of power are “pure” (like soft and hard 
power), while others lie “inbetween,” like smart power, which Nye concep-
tualizes as a “third way” in power relations. Nye stresses that smart power 
goes “beyond” hard and soft types (Nye, 2004, 2008a, 2008b; Armitage and 
Nye, 2007).
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Without debating the significance of these distinctions between forms 
of power in IR, I will use that proposed by David Lake (2010), namely the 
dichotomy of coercion and authority, for the purpose of studying relations 
between Russia and the European Union and the projection of these relations 
onto the area of the “common neighborhood.”
Lake (2010, p.3) argues that
Power comes in two primary forms. In coercion, A threatens or uses vio-
lence … to get B to alter his actions. B may choose to comply with A’s 
demand to avoid pain (threatened violence) or remove it once imposed 
(actual violence). A’s purpose is to alter B’s incentives so that the latter 
chooses to behave in the manner A directs.
In effect, coercion is used to produce the outcomes that A  desires. On the 
contrary,
In political authority, according to standard conceptions, A commands B 
to alter his or her actions, where “command” implies that A has the right 
to issue such orders. This right, in turn, implies a correlative obligation 
or duty by B to comply, if  possible, with A’s order. B’s obligation, finally, 
implies a further right by A to enforce her commands in the event of B’s 
noncompliance. In any authority relationship, B chooses whether to com-
ply with A’s commands, but is bound by the right of A to discipline or 
punish his noncompliance.
(Lake, 2010, p.4)
Sovereignty, the subject of enduring and extensive studies, is one of the mani-
festations of authority.
What is the essence of the distinction between authority and coercion? 
Lake (2010, p.4) states that “Authority differs from coercion in being funda-
mentally a collective or social construct. … With authority, … the right to 
punish noncompliance ultimately rests on the collective acceptance or legitim-
acy of  the ruler’s right to rule” [emphasis added]. Imagine that a state wants to 
be a member of a certain union of states, intending to extract specific benefits 
(for instance, more security) from the membership and agreeing to comply 
with all of the union’s rules. Complying with the rules means that the state 
would need to constrain its sovereignty. The union can either reject the state’s 
membership application, or the union can accept it and lay down member-
ship criteria that presuppose certain reforms in the target state. In pursuit of 
membership, the target state agrees to fulfill them, thus recognizing them as 
legitimate. This is an example of authority relations. If  the target state fails to 
meet the membership criteria for whatever reason, denial of membership in 
the union will follow as a punishment. Consider another situation: a powerful 
state persistently offers to establish a union with a neighboring sovereign state, 
but the neighboring state rejects the offer. In response, the dominant partner 
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uses its coercive resources (e.g., it unilaterally changes the rules of trade or 
embargoes imports from the subordinate partner). Under such conditions, 
the neighboring state may be forced to join the union. This is an example of 
relations based on coercion and not on authority.
Modern states are very complicated organizations where numerous actors 
with different interests coexist and interrelate. Consequently, the decision 
to establish authority relations (with the subsequent restriction of freedom 
for the subordinate state, and probably for the dominant state as well) will 
create groups of winners and losers in both states. If  the losers- to- be can-
not block the decision, they will have to abide by it. For instance, this was 
the case with  the EU enlargement to incorporate countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe: the strategic decision of these countries’ elites to join the EU, 
as well as the consent of the existing member states to accept them, created 
groups of losers within existing member states as well as within the candi-
dates. A “burden of membership” can arise as a byproduct of a country join-
ing the WTO or any other international organization. Lake (2010, p.5) argues 
that “Political authority is never a dyadic trait between a ruler and a single 
subject, but derives from a collective that confers rights upon the ruler.” Thus, 
in authority relations, new rules must be accepted by all or a majority of the 
groups within a particular state. According to Blau (1963, cited in Lake, 2010, 
p.5), if  a subordinate is treated as integral, its compliance with authority is 
regarded as voluntary. But from the perspective of any individual subordin-
ate, compliance comes as a result of “compelling social pressures.”
Coercion and authority, for all their analytical differences, are not easy to 
distinguish from each other. As Lake (2010, p.5) writes,
Although distinct, political authority and coercion are intimately related 
in the use of violence to enforce commands … They are deeply inter-
twined in their reliance on violence, making it difficult for analysts to 
conclude whether, in any given instance, a subordinate followed the rul-
er’s command out of duty or force. … there is no bright line separating 
authority and coercion.
The main difficulty in distinction stems from the fact that both coercion and 
authority relations are hierarchical orders, meaning that they are not built on 
an equal basis. If  equality served as the foundation for such relations, they 
would not be power relations anymore, as power relations rest on the domin-
ation/ subordination dichotomy.
Beyond that, hierarchies built on authority and on coercion are princi-
pally different. Making a distinction between various hierarchical orders, 
Lanoszka (2011) writes about two categories. One consists of states voluntar-
ily following other states that they commonly designate to lead them, while 
still acknowledging the possibility of coercion in such relations. The other 
category, however, consists of a dominant state that supervises the policy 
choices made by other states and exercises prerogatives over their status. In 
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fact, this is the distinction between liberal and imperial hierarchical orders. 
Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990, cited in Lanoszka, 2011, p.5) define imper-
ial arrangements as those in which dominant states coerce subordinate states 
into compliance. This means that weak countries have no choice but to follow 
the commands of their more powerful counterparts within arrangements that 
might differ in their levels of institutionalization. By contrast, liberal orders 
are characterized by their open and inclusive form. From our perspective we 
can thus make a distinction between (predominantly) authoritative and (pre-
dominantly) coercive hierarchical orders.
Authority requires some coercive capability, as Lake (2010, p.14) argues. 
This is why there is always a slight “taste of hopelessness” in authority rela-
tions (putting coercive ones aside), as in any restrictions put on freedom. 
In practice— as authority relations between two states do not develop in a 
vacuum— this feeling of hopelessness can be strengthened when subordinates 
need a superordinate because they feel threatened by another major power. 
For instance, this was the case with the states of Central and Eastern Europe 
that rushed toward the EU immediately after the collapse of the “socialist 
camp” as they were terrified by the existence of the unpredictable Russian 
giant in the East. It is also the case with South Ossetia and Abkhazia cur-
rently seeking refuge with Russia against the Georgian threat.
But what is “some” coercion? How much coercion can authority contain 
while still remaining authority? Strictly speaking, the only thing that allows us 
to confidently claim that we observe authority relations in a given case is the 
fact that the dominant state (or union of states) cannot use force in principle, 
due to its domestic institutional design and principles of operation. However, 
such cases are rare. In thinking about how much coercion authority contains, 
it would be useful to look inside the dominant state, specifically at its political 
regime. Contemporary world politics continuously provide evidence that both 
democracies and non- democracies (autocracies) do use coercion. But what 
about authority? For democratic nations (or groups of nations) which are 
major powers in IR, authority relations may play a significant role in increas-
ing influence beyond their borders. A completely different situation emerges 
with autocracies. They can establish relations that can appear to be authority 
ones; in other words, they can only imitate authority relations with weaker 
states. In fact, authority can camouflage (successfully or otherwise) a per-
manent and real threat of coercion, finding new and sophisticated tools for 
applying it. Despite any declarations, subordinates can never know when the 
contract will be revised and coercion used. The contract between a super-
ordinate and a subordinate state can be changed unilaterally at any time by the 
dominant autocratic power, meaning that this power cannot credibly commit 
to maintaining genuine authority relations. While seeming authority- based on 
the surface, the relations between a dominant autocracy and its subordinates 
are similar to patron– client relations (about patron– client relations in IR, see, 
for instance, Ciorciari, 2013). It can be also assumed that if  a nondemocratic 
state strives to establish itself  as a “great power,” displaying its might to the 
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outside world, coercion as well as authority- like relations (predominantly 
with regard to its neighbors) would be a quick and natural way of doing so.
I am not arguing that the distinction between authority and coercion is 
better than other distinctions between different forms of power, for instance 
that between soft and hard power. I only argue that the authority– coercion 
distinction allows us to learn more not only about the use of concrete power 
instruments in international relations, but also about the nature of relations 
between “A” and “B” states, and about the states themselves, through the 
prism of the relations that they can or want to build with the outside world.
The pillars of authority
There are numerous manifestations of authority relations in the modern 
world, and the scope of the use of authority is expanding. Lake (2010, p.6) 
states that in different historical periods the sources of authority lay in the 
charisma of leaders (that is, charismatic authority), or in tradition (traditional 
authority), or in religion (religious authority). He considers Nye’s concept of 
“soft power” to be a form of charismatic authority (Lake, 2010, p.6).
However, today, he argues, there are two primary foundations of political 
authority: law (the foundation of formal- legal authority) and the social con-
tract (the foundation of relational authority).
In formal- legal authority, A’s ability to command B, the community of 
subordinates, and the willingness of B to comply, follows from the lawful 
position or office that A holds. … Since there is no duly constituted legal 
authority above states, it follows that there can be no authority between 
states.
 (Lake. 2010, p.6, emphasis added)
However, the European Union illustrates that such authority does exist: 
the EU has a legal identity and its own legal order as such. Furthermore, 
European Union law has a direct or indirect effect on the laws of its member 
states and, once in force, becomes part of the legal system of each member 
state (The European Parliament, 2016). As for candidate countries, they have 
to adopt the acquis communautaire (the whole massive body of EU legisla-
tion) once accepted into the Union.
“Relational authority, premised on a social contract,” continues Lake 
(2010, p.7),
is founded on an exchange between ruler and ruled in which A provides a 
political order of value to B sufficient to offset the loss of freedom incurred 
in subordination to A, and B confers the right on A to exert the restraints 
on B’s behavior necessary to provide that order. In equilibrium, a ruler 
provides just enough political order to gain the compliance of the ruled 
to the taxes and constraints required to sustain that order, and B complies 
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just enough to induce A to actually provide it. A gets a sufficient return on 
effort to make the provision of political order worthwhile, and B gets suf-
ficient order to offset the loss of freedom entailed in accepting A’s author-
ity. If A extracts too much or provides too little order, B can withdraw his 
compliance, and A’s authority evaporates. In this way, relational authority, 
contingent on the actions of both the ruler and ruled, is an equilibrium 
produced and reproduced through ongoing interactions [emphasis added].
Two vivid examples of authority deals are the admission of new states to the 
union of American states and the voluntary accession of Eastern Georgia 
into the Russian Empire. The US Land Ordinance of 1784 stated that once an 
area in colonized territory reached 20,000 inhabitants, it could call a consti-
tutional convention and establish a provisional government. The draft consti-
tution of a prospective state had to guarantee the foundation of a republican 
government form. The new state had to commit to the acts of Congress and 
to the Articles of Confederation. Upon the fulfillment of all above mentioned 
conditions, the state could enter the Confederation of 13 founding states on 
equal footing after reaching a population number equivalent to that of the 
least populated members. Thus, before entering the Union, the candidates 
had to prove their capacity for institution- building in the form prescribed by 
the Union, that is, the republican form.
The second example is the voluntary accession of Georgia into the Russian 
Empire. Prior to taking an oath of allegiance to the Russian Empire, the 
territory of modern Georgia was subjected to the competing expansionist 
ambitions of the Persian and Ottoman empires (modern Iran and Turkey 
respectively) struggling for dominance over the South Caucasus. Following 
the victory of the Russian Empire against the Ottomans in the war of 1768– 
1774, the tsar of the Eastern Georgian kingdom Kartli- Kakheti officially 
asked for Russian patronage over Eastern Georgia. In the bilateral Treaty of 
Georgievsk, Georgia recognized the supremacy of the Russian monarch in 
exchange for guarantees of its territorial integrity. Articles 8– 11 equated the 
Georgian privileged social strata (nobility, clergy and the merchant class) to 
those of the Russian Empire. Georgia maintained a high degree of autonomy 
in domestic affairs but had to coordinate its external policy with that of the 
Russian Empire and to provide the imperial center with military assistance. 
Four secret articles of the treaty determined the conditions for stationing the 
Russian military in Georgia, and prescribed for Georgia to avoid internal 
strife. Immediately after the death of its tsar, Georgia asked the imperial 
center for help again because of disputes surrounding the heir to the throne. 
This time, Georgia officially entered the Russian Empire as a government 
(guberniya) with no special privileges.
Who can initiate authority exchanges in international relations? The first 
criterion for becoming a superordinate in authority relations is that of being 
a successful and effective actor that has something to offer others. Since rela-
tional authority implies the ability to project authority exchanges far beyond 
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state borders, according to Lake (2010, p.8) international authority is basically 
limited to “great powers,” “although limited authority may also be exercised 
by regional powers.” However, the list of actors with the ability to establish 
authority relations is not limited to states with “great power” status. The 
European Union, being not a state but a union of democratic states, nolens 
volens poses a challenge to many regular formats of relations between states 
in the modern world. Using different forms of authority relations, the EU 
strives to change its external “others.” Thus, in shaping its relations with the 
world (beyond the West), the EU proceeds “from the belief that world coun-
tries should adapt international political norms to the European standards. 
Normative convergence is thus the starting point for developing relations with 
emerging countries” (Geeraerts, 2011, p.62). The EU is, of course, not a pion-
eer in using authority relations. However, it is certainly a pioneer in searching 
for and experimenting with various (occasionally, very sophisticated) forms 
of authority. For the EU, authority relations can be asymmetric with regard 
to different issues and policy directions. In other words, in some directions 
the rules can have a more binding character than in others. For instance, the 
Copenhagen criteria, which were formulated by the EU for Eastern European 
countries striving for membership in the Union, included the stability of insti-
tutions that would guarantee democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities, as well as a functioning market economy and 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union, but said 
nothing about the foreign policy of candidate countries.
Authority principally differs from coercion with regard to the defin-
ition of  the national interest of  the dominant actor. According to Lake 
(2010, p.12),
in authoritative relations, dominant countries, at least, do not define their 
national interests in narrow self- seeking terms, as implied in a world of 
only coercion. Rather, they see an interest in political order, in general, 
and are willing to pay costs and to forgo actions they might otherwise 
choose to create and sustain their legitimate right to rule over others 
[emphasis added].
The EU is unable to formulate its national interests in narrow terms, since it 
simply does not have any; its interest with regard to the territories beyond its 
borders relates first and foremost to maintaining security and stability.
The three pillars of authority that define its nature (and thus allow us to 
distinguish authority from coercion) are:
• legitimacy of  relations for both actors: the subordinate actor respects 
the constraints that the dominant actor puts on its behavior, and accepts 
punishment for violation of the dominant actor’s rules as legitimate, 
while the dominant actor must preserve its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
subordinate;
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• voluntary character— authority “deals” are based on pure or partial 
 voluntarism, in which the coercive power of the dominant actor is felt 
by the subordinate in the background, and not used directly (Lake, 2003, 
p.304);
• credible commitments, meaning that both parties not only assume initial 
obligations that constitute the essence of the authority “deal,” but are able 
and willing to maintain them during the whole period of the contract.
Genuine authority relations are an equilibrium, since, as Lake (2010, p.15) 
argues, “Subordinate (and dominant) states eventually develop vested inter-
ests in the authority and order of the hegemon, which give them incentives 
to actively support the dominant state, its efforts, and its uses of force when 
necessary.” This brings Lake (2010) to the conclusion that it is easier to main-
tain authority than to create it, and that authority relations become more 
robust over time. If  authority declines, it happens because “the subordinates 
withdraw their consent, the hegemon abuses its authority by acting in its self- 
interest, rather than in the general interest, … or the hegemon can no longer 
provide the required order” (Lake, 2010, p.15). However, the story can be 
more complicated. Using the example of Russia– EU relations, below I will 
show how the formal institutions that structured authority relations de facto 
not only declined, but were replaced by coercion.
For the subordinate state, the decision to enter authority relations with a 
dominant power is strategic, and this is only natural: right from the start of 
the “deal,” the subordinate loses a measure of  its sovereignty, as it becomes 
obliged to follow someone else’s rules. In addition, there is always the threat 
that the dominant state will abuse its authority, and as the dominant states 
are mostly “great powers,” the threat of  unlimited domination becomes acute. 
Hence, there is a problem of trust in the dominant state’s commitments— in a 
certain environment, the temptation may become high for the superordinate 
to break its commitments for its own profit. Meanwhile, to maintain success-
ful authority relations, the dominant state needs to convince subordinates 
of  its readiness to follow through on its commitments at any time, includ-
ing international crisis or even war. Such guarantees of  the credibility of 
commitments can be provided only by liberal democracies, due to the struc-
ture of  their domestic institutions and the expectations with regard to their 
decision- making process (Cowhey, 1993; Reed, 1997; Walt, 1997; Martin, 
2000; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2003; Leeds and Savun, 2007; 
Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse, 2008; Leeds, Mattes and Vogel, 2009).
The problem of unlimited domination and breaching of commitments does 
not apply to a single “great power”— it would also be applicable to supra-
national organizations if  not for the EU’s multilevel governance structure, 
which constrains in the highest degree the Union’s capability for coercion. 
The other factor which can lead a subordinate to make a strategic decision 
that leads to curtailing its sovereignty is the dominant state’s behavior with 
regard to its other subordinates in the past. Thus, candidate countries trust 
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the EU, in particular, because they have the evidence concerning the Union’s 
behavior in the course of its previous enlargements.
Why use coercion: benefits, costs and risks
David Lake’s appeal was to return authority to the study of international 
relations, and that is what he did. Coercion as the second basic form of power 
interests him much less. However, coercion in modern international politics is 
on par with authority, and the frequency of use of the former is increasing.
Scholars give various definitions of coercion. Some restrict coercion 
to the threat or use of severe deprivation, physical violence or even loss of 
life (Bierstedt, 1950; Dahl, 1957, cited in Molm, 1997, p.115; Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1963), while others argue that coercion must entail restriction of 
freedom (Bierstedt, 1950; Etzioni, 1968, cited in Molm, 1997, p.115). Molm 
(1997, p.115) defines coercion as “the use of punishment to obtain rewards 
from another.” In international relations, coercion in broad terms is the use 
of threats to influence another’s behavior (Bratton, 2005, p.99). At the same 
time, however, coercion is a process that takes place during the use of force, or 
during the actual use of other punishments, for instance, economic sanctions 
(Bratton, 2005, p.102). States use coercive power when, instead of  compromise 
and bargaining, they strive to unilaterally control the outcome of an inter-
action or the behavior of the other state (Petersen, 2012, p.6). The coercer 
wants to hurt the opponent, and does so, but, as Bratton argues, not always 
with all its might, “leaving open the threat of even more pain if  the opponent 
still does not comply.” Coercion can appear in the form of a single action, 
when the coercer wants to force the opponent to change a concrete decision, or 
to refrain from a certain action. Coercion can also take a form of a calculated 
strategy where the coercer applies, and then if  necessary increases, pressure on 
the opponent in different forms and spheres, thus limiting the choices available 
for the opponent until it is left with only the option desirable for the coercer. 
In this respect, coercion differs from “brute force,” where the goal is achieved 
using violence no matter what it takes (Bratton, 2005, p.101).
Coercive tools are diverse and complicated; they include not only the use 
of military force, but also coercive diplomatic strategies. Usually the latter 
come first, and the former follows in case of noncompliance. For instance, 
coercive diplomacy was used by the US with regard to Libya in the 1980s. The 
US leadership made a set list of demands that Gaddafi did not comply with. 
Then in 1986, the Americans bombed Tripoli and Benghazi. The same logic 
functioned with the case of Kosovo— air strikes against Serbian President 
Slobodan Milosevic followed the failure of coercive diplomatic efforts to 
make him comply with externally defined rules (de Wijk, 2014). Here it is 
worth noting that in order to evaluate the effectiveness of coercion, we need 
to take into account both the implications of using force and those of imple-
menting coercive diplomacy. The example of NATO’s air war over Kosovo 
in 1999 is very indicative in this respect. If  coercion is seen only as the use of 
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force, then Operation Allied Force was a success, because NATO’s bombing 
campaign forced the Serbs to withdraw from Kosovo and to allow the pres-
ence of NATO peacekeeping troops. However, NATO’s coercion of Serbia 
began in 1998, but the Serbs ignored a full year of coercive threats. From this 
perspective, as Bratton (2005, p.104) stresses, Kosovo looks at best like a lim-
ited and belated success, if  not a failure.
The forms of coercion have become increasingly sophisticated with the 
passage of time; most common tools of the recent past— naval blockades, 
strategic bombings and economic sanctions— are now complemented by 
other instruments, which are occasionally combined in surprising and unusual 
ways. This makes scholars and experts invent new concepts to explain what 
is happening, and try to predict the development of coercive strategies in the 
future. In their attempts to do so, scholars have come forward with the con-
cepts of “cross- domain coercion” (see Chapter 2) and “hybrid warfare.” The 
latter is conceptualized by Lanoszka (2016, p.178) as
a strategy rather than a new form of war. It is a strategy, because it delib-
erately integrates the use of various instruments of national power so as 
to achieve foreign policy objectives in the light of the believed goals and 
capabilities of the adversary. … In waging hybrid warfare, the belligerent 
is actively striving to undermine its target’s territorial integrity, subvert 
its internal political cohesion and to disrupt its economy. Hybrid warfare 
can serve such revisionist goals as territorial expansion and the impos-
ition of indirect rule over another (nominally) sovereign state.
Despite the fact that the “hybrid warfare” concept has quickly gained prom-
inence and continues to enjoy widespread popularity in both scholarly and 
policy circles, its utility as an analytical tool is heavily contested. First, the 
“hybrid” approach to war is not new, and second, in being used to explain 
the Russian case in particular, it inadequately reflects the direction of Russia’s 
military modernization and leads to a skewed understanding of Russia’s mili-
tary capabilities (Renz, 2016).
The new developments not only contributed to the discussions on the 
necessity of new concepts, they also changed the focus of debates on coercion: 
until recently most studies were devoted to the successes and failures of US 
coercion against third parties, whereas now Russia’s coercion against Ukraine 
is the “hottest” issue.
Indeed, coercion has played a major role in world history. For instance, 
territorially distinct states in Europe were consolidated around permanent 
military establishments. The ability to use coercion by achieving military 
superiority granted larger states better chances to survive (Tilly, 1990, p.46). 
It is difficult to think of a state that has never used coercion against others in 
the long- term perspective. Countries have always used coercion, and recent 
events like Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, the military conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine and the war in Syria give grounds to expect that states will continue to 
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use coercion as a foreign policy tool. And, indeed, why should powerful states 
use authority with all its conditions and constraints, when they can simply use 
coercion? Such a wide range of benefits, both material and symbolic, can be 
achieved with coercion! Coercers can get results quickly. They can redraw the 
world map by expanding their territory or by creating new— nonrecognized— 
states; they can force governments to resign or simply destroy them. A coercer 
can gain direct access to new resources, or it can demonstrate its might to 
neighbors or to the whole international community.
From this perspective, we can only wonder why powerful countries do 
not perpetually use coercion against weaker ones, and why the world has not 
yet turned exclusively into an arena of multidirectional pressures from some 
states against others. But in reality, world politics is much more complex than 
that. There is enough evidence of coercion being in use, but a state’s choice 
in favor of coercive strategies is constrained by both objective and subjective 
factors and considerations.
In most cases coercion is expensive, so one of the initial factors deter-
mining whether coercion can be used or not is the availability of political, 
financial and military resources. This factor applies to all states (or groups of 
states), regardless of their political regimes. When making a choice in favor 
of coercion, a state should be ready not for a single political step involving 
massive investments, but for a series of costly steps that have to be continued 
until the desired result has been achieved. In addition, the coercer must also 
calculate that coercion can imply losses for its own economy (for instance, 
when economic sanctions are imposed, both the imposer and the target states 
suffer economic losses) as well as costs in human capital and the threat of 
diminishing legitimacy of the incumbent political elite. In other words, there 
are always costs involved in using coercion, and these costs tend to dispro-
portionally grow with the passage of time. At the moment when the use of 
coercion starts, it is very difficult (or even impossible) to accurately calculate 
its long- term costs.
With regard to using coercion, a distinction should be made between 
democracies and nondemocracies. In most cases, democracies use coercion 
against nondemocracies. “Democratic peace theory” helps to explain the rea-
son. The theory was first postulated in Kant’s work Perpetual Peace (1957) and 
then developed within normative and institutional approaches. According to 
the normative reasoning, all democracies share and abide by certain norms 
(separation of powers, rule of law, respect for human rights) that breed trust 
and respect among them (Doyle, 1997). Nondemocracies are perceived by 
democratic leaders as inherently unjust, able to withdraw the basic rights of 
their population if  needed, and more inclined to use force to suppress internal 
uprisings. In turn, autocratic states perceive democracies as weak negotiation 
partners that eagerly make concessions in order to avoid military conflict by 
any means. If  political bargaining appears fruitless, an autocratic state will 
inevitably either directly attack a democracy or threaten it with warfare. In 
this case, the political rationale for a democracy would be to use a proactive 
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strategy by launching a preemptive strike against the autocracy (Owen, 1997). 
If  it does not, it will have to respond reactively by defending itself  against 
a nondemocracy at war. The institutional reasoning implies that democratic 
leaders are held accountable by the population and make decisions under 
constant pressure stemming from the opposition. Democracies have strong 
institutional frames and strong armies, which is why they are reluctant to fight 
against each other— defeat is more probable and its cost is exceptionally high. 
Meanwhile, institutions in autocracies are weak, because autocratic lead-
ers aim at neutralizing all forces that may challenge their power monopoly. 
Therefore, a democratic politician can start a war against an autocracy more 
eagerly and with better chances to win.
Democracies mainly resort to coercion when they consider the domestic or 
external policy of the leadership in a certain nondemocratic state unaccept-
able, meaning that this state poses a threat to the international community. 
In this case, the coercer’s national interest will be determined not in narrow 
terms, but more broadly— as an interest in the maintenance of order and 
security, and the observance of international rules and commitments. It is 
expected that material losses from coercion will be compensated by long- term 
political and security benefits. However, at least theoretically, there is a way to 
transform “unacceptable” behaviors into “acceptable” ones by turning non-
democratic countries into democratic ones, coercing them into democracy 
with the further ambitious goal of spreading democratic rule across the whole 
world. It is the US that developed the strategy of “coercion to democracy,” 
pursuing it based on two alternative grounds: threat to US national interests 
(whatever these may be) and the “Responsibility to Protect”— the UN regu-
lation prescribing that massive infringement of the basic rights of the local 
population by the incumbent authorities of a given country permits external 
forces to violate its sovereignty for the sake of protecting ordinary people.
The rise of terrorism added another rationale to the interventionist 
approach: after the terror acts of 9/ 11, the US official stance was formulated 
in the phrase “America is at war against terrorism” (The White House, 2002). 
The official position of the American authorities was that rogue states pro-
vided fertile ground for terrorist organizations by failing to maintain internal 
order and security within their territory. This position justified military inter-
ventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and Syria. It was claimed that regime 
change could bring to power political forces able to establish a stable efficient 
democracy, which would defeat terror.
The reasoning of nondemocracies in using coercion is different from that 
of democracies. By applying coercion against weaker states, nondemocra-
cies can be motivated by the idea of revenge or punishment of “disobedient” 
states while at the same time demonstrating their might to the international 
community. Coercion can also be triggered by a “favorable” situation, for 
instance, when central authorities in a “disobedient” state experience a legit-
imacy crisis— this was the case with Ukraine in early 2014, when Russia used 
the sharp weakening of the central state to annex Crimea under slogans of 
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“Now or never!” and “Carpe diem.” In this case, coercion was not a strategy 
calculated beforehand (although the readiness to use coercion certainly existed 
prior to the annexation), but a reaction to a specific situation, while Russia’s 
justifications for the coercion came after its actual use. Finally, nondemocra-
cies can use coercion “by force of habit,” when they have previously done so— 
domestically and internationally— without a proper reaction from other states 
and international organizations. For such a situation there is another slogan 
(allegedly belonging to Catherine the Great): “Winners are not judged!”
Coercion is successful when the target state concedes to a significant 
part of  the coercer’s demands, and fails when it does not (Bratton, 2005, 
p.109). There is no consensus among scholars on the question of  whether 
coercion is an effective foreign policy tool. For instance, Homans ([1961] 
1974, cited in Molm, 1997, p.117) and Blau (1964, cited in Molm, 1997, 
p.117) argue that coercion is ineffective and produces resistance and retali-
ation rather than compliance. Keck (2014, no pagination) argues that “It 
shouldn’t come as a surprise that coercion often fails, regardless of  the 
kind of  pressure applied to the target.” Other researchers, on the contrary, 
have found that use of  coercive power shows high efficiency (Willer, 1987, 
cited in Molm, 1997, p.117). According to Molm (1997, p.117), most actors 
would avoid using coercion in relations of  mutual exchange, due to the high 
risks inherent in it. These risks are reduced (and the probability of  using 
coercion increases respectively) only in one situation: when the exchange 
frequency between the two partners is so low that there is little to lose. 
Molm narrows the analysis to exchange between two counterparts, though 
the relations between a coercer and its opponent state do not develop in 
a vacuum, so the coercer should also consider the risks coming from the 
regional level and the level of  the international community as a whole. 
Meanwhile, as stated above, it is impossible to calculate the risks of  using 
coercion in the long run. The high probability of  mistakes in the aggrega-
tion of  risk calculations for different arenas and time periods leads one to 
the conclusion that coercion should be an exceptional foreign policy tool 
for rational actors. Full- scale coercion is only worth using in special situ-
ations where there are major common threats; it is in no way a substitute 
for “traditional” foreign policy options. The choice in favor of  coercion in 
external policy has a strategic character, meaning that by using it, a state 
shapes its future (at least to some extent), since it creates certain expecta-
tions with regard to its behavior in international politics.
Economic sanctions: coercion, available to all
As discussed above, coercive tools differ greatly, and not all are available to 
every country that would want to use them. However, there is one tool of 
coercion that is available to all countries (though the rationality of its use 
is another question). This tool is economic sanctions or a threat to impose 
them. Only countries that are completely isolated from interactions with other 
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states are deprived of the opportunity to use sanctions, which is extremely 
rare in the globalized world. Even unions of states can impose sanctions act-
ing collectively— in this case they must reach an agreement on the matter, 
which is much more difficult to achieve than in the case of a single state. Thus, 
even actors as fundamentally different as Russia and the EU have at least one 
feature in common: they can both impose sanctions, and this is what they are 
currently doing against each other.
According to Drezner (2003, p.643), sanctions are “the threat or act by 
a sender government or governments to disrupt economic exchange with 
the target state, unless the target acquiesces to an articulated demand.” 
Sanctions are among the oldest (we can trace their application to the times 
of  Greek city- states) and most frequently used tools of  coercion. The prac-
tice of  using sanctions has become unprecedentedly widespread since the 
Cold War. But not only is the frequency of  using sanctions rising, they are 
increasingly acquiring a multilateral character (where previously, sanctions 
were in imposed unilaterally in most cases [Lopez, 2007]). Moreover, new 
regimes of  “targeted” and “smart” sanctions have emerged (Franco, 2015, 
p.1). As Harrell (2015) shows, US and European sanctions against Russia 
mark a significant evolution of  the sanctions toolkit. Novel types of  finan-
cial and energy sanctions have been developed, driven by the need to take 
an innovative approach to sanctions against an economy twice the size of 
the combined gross domestic products of  all other countries subjected to 
significant EU and US economic sanctions.
There are many reasons to impose sanctions. The most general one is to 
change the behavior of the target country by punishing it economically. In 
many cases, the threat of using sanctions is used as a signal of wrongdoing 
for the target state, and if  the expected reaction by the target state follows 
at once, a sanction policy is not launched. Sanctions can also be used by a 
state to demonstrate its might, and therefore its belonging to a certain group 
(for instance, to the club of “great powers”). States can impose sanctions to 
express solidarity with another state (or states) that have already imposed 
sanctions with regard to the target state. Finally, sanctions, or more precisely 
countersanctions, can be a tool for a state’s revenge against those countries 
which were the first to impose sanctions against it. This is known as the “tit 
for tat” approach. In 2014, when Western countries imposed sanctions on 
Russia as a reaction to the annexation of Crimea, Russia reciprocated with its 
own sanctions. As Nalbandov writes,
On August 6, 2014, Putin signed decree #560, “On the Use of Specific 
Economic Measures,” which mandated an effective embargo for a one- 
year period on imports of most of the agricultural products whose 
country of origin had either “adopted the decision on introduction of 
economic sanctions in respect of Russian legal and (or) physical entities, 
or joined same.”
(Nalbandov, 2016, p.169)
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Sanctions are a flexible policy tool, because they are relatively easy to 
commence and to cancel, and this is one of the reasons for the expansion of 
their use. For instance, the US began its sanction policy against Russia with 
Presidential Executive Order 13600, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons 
Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine.” That order imposed sanctions on 
individuals and entities responsible for violating the sovereignty and territor-
ial integrity of Ukraine. Eleven days later, another executive order expanded 
the scope and depth of economic sanctions. US sanctions against Russia were 
followed by other individual states (Canada, Japan, Australia and others) and 
also launched collectively within the framework of international organiza-
tions (G7, NATO, the EU, etc.) canceling various forms of sector- specific 
international cooperation with the Russian Federation. As Nalbandov (2016, 
p.168) argues, the sanctions were aimed at punishing “Putin’s inner circle in 
hopes that it would, in turn, put pressure on Putin to abandon the selected 
course of actions disrupting regional peace in Europe.” This ease of impos-
ing sanctions is obviously not applicable to the situation within the European 
Union, for which it is incomparably difficult to approve a joint sanction policy 
(I will come to this in Chapter 3).
It is noteworthy that despite the widespread use of sanctions through-
out the world, there is no consensus among scholars and practitioners on 
their effectiveness and utility. Some consider them a “notoriously poor tool 
of statecraft,” and estimate their rate of success as very low (Nossal, 1994, 
cited in Baldwin, 1999– 2000, cited by Bratton, 2005, p.113), while others, on 
the contrary, think of sanctions as a reasonably effective tool of coercion 
(Dreyer and Luengo- Cabrera, 2015). However, what policymakers really want 
to know is the comparative utility of sanctions, i.e., whether sanctions show 
more utility than other coercive strategies and instruments, such as the use 
of military force. The comparative utility of sanctions depends both on their 
effectiveness and on the costs they imply (Baldwin, 1998, cited by Bratton, 
2005, p.110). So, as Bratton argues, quoting Baldwin, “It is quite possible for 
sanctions to be more useful than force even in situations in which they are 
less effective” (Baldwin, 1998, cited by Bratton, 2005, p.110). Bratton (2005, 
p.113) goes on to say that “The costs and benefits of economic sanctions must 
be evaluated within the context of other instruments that policy makers have 
at their disposal, such as military force or diplomacy.”
As I have already said above, sanctions are coercive tools available to all 
states, both those with democratic and those with nondemocratic political 
regimes. However, it is important to stress that there are profound differences 
between democracies and nondemocracies with regard to the reasons for 
imposing sanctions, their success rates and their choice of target countries.
As democracies opt for the application of military force as a last resort, 
they very often prefer to use economic sanctions to exert pressure on target 
countries. General reasons for sanctioning include violation of human rights 
or of the rule of law, ethnic cleansings and the violation of the territorial 
integrity of third countries. Democracies use sanctions not only as a reaction 
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to a target country’s behavior, but because of the arrangement of their domes-
tic actors. As Lektzian and Souva showed (2003), democracies impose sanc-
tions more often than other regime types, because they encompass a greater 
variety of interest groups. The rate of success of economic sanctions used 
by democracies is higher than of those launched by other political regimes 
(Hart, 2000). Importantly, democracies prefer sanctioning nondemocracies 
to sanctioning other democracies (Lektzian and Souva, 2003; Cox and Drury, 
2006). Examples of democracies sanctioning nondemocracies are numerous 
and include such different countries as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North 
Korea, Russia and Syria. There is every reason to expect that sanctions will 
remain one of the key foreign policy tools used by democracies towards non-
democracies in the years to come.
When it comes to nondemocratic regimes, the literature discusses mostly 
their resistance to sanctions imposed by democracies; in other words, non-
democracies are analyzed as targets of  sanctions, not as their senders. Thus, 
scholars draw attention to the fact that sanctions against autocracies can 
have the opposite effect on the regime in power: instead of  weakening the 
regime, they can strengthen it and allow the leaders to extract a higher rent 
(Allen, 2008). Nondemocracies can also show remarkable resilience under 
the pressure of  sanctions as they can “simply pass on the costs of  the sanc-
tions to the governed and rely on armed forces to deter political opponents 
who are dissatisfied with policies” (Nossal, 1999, cited in Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 2007, p.902). Another reason why nondemocratic regimes can 
be strengthened under sanctions is the ruler’s capacity to incorporate the 
existence of  sanctions into a regime’s legitimation strategy (Grauvogel and 
von Soest, 2013).
As nondemocratic regimes differ from democracies, they behave differently 
under pressure from sanctions, with some of them being easier to destabilize 
than others. Woo and Verdier (2014) argue that dictatorships are more respon-
sive to foreign aid and economic sanctions than autocracies. Escribà- Folch 
and Wright (2010) have found that rulers in personalist regimes and mon-
archies are more likely to be destabilized by sanctions than leaders in other 
regime types because they are more sensitive to the loss of external sources of 
revenue (such as foreign aid and taxes on trade) needed to fund patronage. In 
contrast to that, the reaction of the rulers in dominant single- party and mili-
tary regimes would be to increase their tax revenues and to reallocate their 
expenditures to increase the levels of cooptation and repression.
Another important question arises with regard to selectivity of using sanc-
tions against nondemocracies. How are target countries selected by democ-
racies? Which autocracies are punished, and which are not? Von Soest and 
Wahman (2013) argue that some of the world’s most repressive authoritarian 
regimes have never been subjected to sanctions, while other more competitive 
autocracies were repeatedly put under sanctions pressure by Western democ-
racies. Using a dataset on democratic sanctions between 1990 and 2010, they 
found strong support for the suggestion that senders select economically and 
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politically vulnerable targets where the expected probability of sanction suc-
cess is high.
But nondemocracies not only have to resist sanctions; they can also apply 
them. For instance, China has recently threatened to impose sanctions on US 
defense companies that sell arms to Taiwan (Forsythe, 2015). Russia launched 
its own sanction policy in response to the Western sanctions that were imposed 
on it after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Are there any differences between democracies and autocracies in the 
reasons and the manner of  imposing sanctions? The answer is yes. First, 
as imposing sanctions presupposes resource availability as well as an active 
foreign policy, the circle of  imposing autocracies will be limited to those 
that consider themselves to be “great powers.” Second, decisive factors for 
the introduction of  sanctions will be the structure of  domestic institutions 
and therefore the nature of  the sender’s foreign policy (disposition to use 
coercion) and the degree of  public support for the incumbent government, 
as well as resources for compensation for those suffering in the incumbent’s 
inner circle. Third, nondemocracies will use sanctions regardless of  the 
type of  political regime in the target country (i.e., against both democracies 
and autocracies). And fourth, the aim of  imposing sanctions by a nonde-
mocracy will be not to change the target’s political regime or even policy, 
but to change the behavior of  the target country solely towards the sender. 
In other words, for nondemocracies sanctions would be motivated only by 
national interest, free from values and principles such as the need to respect 
human rights, rule of  law, the necessity of  following commitments, etc. The 
motives of  revenge (“tit for tat”), political pressure and status demonstra-
tion as well as simple intimidation of  the target country (especially if  this 
country is highly dependent on the sender, for instance, in terms of  delivery 
of  natural resources) can be thought of  as popular reasons for nondemo-
cracies to impose sanctions. In other words, nondemocracies can impose 
sanctions against other countries (and also cancel them) almost arbitrarily 
(wherein the real reasons can be very different from the officially declared 
ones) and at any time. These features of  sanctions determine that, unlike 
democracies, nondemocracies can join sanctions imposed by international 
organizations but cannot form “pro- sanctions” coalitions with other coun-
tries; they are doomed to act alone.
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2 State- building in Russia and the  
choice for coercion in external  
relations
Today, the state- building process is still going on in many parts of the world. 
While recent studies on state- building have focused mostly on the cases of 
Iraq, Afghanistan or Africa (Scott, 2007, p.5), this set could be beneficially 
expanded with the cases of post- Soviet states, where the Russian one is among 
the most pertinent.
The state is an absolutely central topic for Russia, and its construction and 
reinforcement is the highest- priority task for the authorities. In principle, all 
that authorities do should be work toward this task— to build a state, and not 
just one state among others, but a state the greatness of which no one must 
doubt. Indeed, the president of Russia considers himself  to be a great builder 
of a great state; he wants to be remembered in Russian and world history as a 
powerful political figure comparable to Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible. 
Putin has his own conception of the “ideal” great Russian state and he acts 
in accordance with this conception. The remarkable thing, however, is not 
Putin’s conceptions as such, but the fact that he has built the contemporary 
Russian state on their basis. He has created a state that he genuinely consid-
ers great. Since 2014, Russia has been in press headlines all over the world— 
due to the crises in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and Syria. Russia’s population 
warmly  welcomes the decisions and actions of the president, equating them 
with the success of the Russian state. Artists compose songs and poems for his 
birthday. In October 2014 in his speech at the Valdai Club, Volodin, the dep-
uty head of the presidential administration, put forward his famous thesis: 
“While there is Putin— Russia exists; no Putin— no Russia” (Sivkova, 2014, 
no pagination). This thesis may be even considered correct— if  we equate 
“Russia” with the current Russian state.
Foreign policy plays an especially important role in the state- building 
process, as successes in foreign policy (or what is presented as success by 
national elite) should legitimate Russia’s great power status in the eyes of 
both its citizens and the outside world. Most of  Russia’s foreign policy tools 
belong to the coercive arsenal. Why does the Russian state tend to use these 
instruments?
From the state- building perspective (taking into account the timing 
and nature of  this process), the Russian state’s choice to use coercion in 
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foreign policy may seem optimal. First, for the simple reason that it is pos-
sible. Indeed, in many cases Russia can easily use the objective fact that 
other countries are already dependent on it (primarily for energy resources), 
and this alone gives rise to temptation. In addition, the Russian incumbent 
can make decisions alone and very fast (serious political decisions such as 
the annexation of  Crimea or the introduction of  sanctions against Turkey 
were made in a couple of  days!), he bears no responsibility for mistakes 
and he never admits them— this is his principal position. The price of  using 
coercion, as well as its long- term, strategic effects, are not calculated: for 
instance, nobody writes about the losses to Russia’s economy due to the 
mutual sanctions; the discussion is only about the EU’s losses and about 
sanctions as an incentive for import replacement in Russia. Russia’s nonma-
terial, reputational losses receive even less consideration. Second, coercion 
gives results quickly when the goal is, as in the Russian case, the revision of 
the previous international order. For instance, it is possible to quickly start 
a “small victorious war.” It is also possible to impose sanctions quickly— 
and cancel them equally quickly. Coercion produces a strong demonstra-
tional effect— both for the internal audience (demonstrating the might of 
the great Russian state) and the external world. Finally, playing with coer-
cive instruments allows Russia to maintain the high level of  unpredictability 
that the Russian president considers to be one of  his important advantages. 
In fact, the Russian state does not choose between coercion and authority; 
its task is to combine and coordinate coercion in various domains depend-
ing on the concrete situation. The strategy that the Russian elite applies in 
order to build the great state naturally has its price, namely total distrust of 
Russia: “Almost anything Vladimir Putin touches these days is perceived by 
the West as a weapon, and almost everything he does is seen as an attack” 
(Trudolyubov, 2016, n.p.).
State- building by authoritarian rulers
Building a state is a complex task, as to do so means to create institutions, 
practices and structures to make and enforce top- level decisions throughout 
a certain politically defined territory (Chesterman, Ignatieff  and Ramesh 
Thakur, 2005, p.2). Goldsmith (2007, p.27) defines state- building as “the 
creation of effective organs of central government” in order for the state to 
“develop respected and effective public institutions to carry out policy.” Thus, 
state- building presupposes changing the previously existing characteristics of 
the state. Building a state means that ruling elites do not just preserve the sta-
tus quo but conduct certain types of activities. In other words, “State- building 
refers to interventionist strategies to restore and rebuild the institutions and 
apparatus of the state, for example, the bureaucracy” (Scott, 2007, p.5).
An essential prerequisite for state- building is that those who do it (elite 
groups or the leader) have sufficient resources, both material (possibilities 
for financial redistribution) and symbolic (such as popular support). For 
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instance, as Slater and Fenner (2011, p.20) argue, “coercive state apparatuses 
must be well- funded to be able to repress broadly when the time comes.” 
State- builders need resources to be able to reward their supporters; therefore, 
successful state- building will depend on developing a political network that 
distributes power and patronage throughout the nation (Myerson, 2011). 
Thus, for territorially large states with multiethnic populations, building a 
network of  loyal regional leaders by selectively granting them privileges will 
be of  particular importance. In addition, as Hanson (2015, p.1) shows, rulers 
face threats to their rule, both horizontal and vertical. The former emerge 
from within the ruling elite, while the latter come from the other societal 
actors. As such, the existence of  such threats, their intensity and the ruler’s 
ability to cope with them will be an essential factor in explaining the ruler’s 
state- building strategy and the speed of  its realization, as well as the likeli-
hood of  its completion.
The state- building process should be separated from that of the evolution 
of the political regime. As Hanson (2015, p.1) stresses, “Disentangling the 
two can be thorny (especially) in the authoritarian context, where the institu-
tional organization of the regime may be fused with that of the state to some 
degree.” Slater and Fenner (2011, p.16) develop the idea further:
The intellectual division of labor between studies of regimes and states 
is both essential and unfortunate. … The separation is essential because 
states and regimes are analytically distinct, but unfortunate because states 
and regimes are empirically intertwined. Though all metaphors have their 
limits, we find the notion of the state as a kind of machinery that is linked 
but not reducible to the actors who operate it helpful.
Thus, the operator (of the regime) can come and go, while the machinery 
(the state) exhibits greater permanence (Hanson, 2015, p.3). Neil Robinson 
(2008), for instance, has shown the necessity of distinguishing between state 
and regime for understanding Russia’s political development.
In authoritarian regimes the outcome of the state- building process will be, 
to a large extent, determined by initial state capacity, which will influence the 
choice of state- building strategy (Hanson, 2015, p.10). Also of great import-
ance is the degree to which the regime is able to capture control over the state.
The situation is not static. Over time, the ruler or ruling group can build 
new institutions or gain incremental control over the state. We thus have 
different combinations of initial strategies for grappling with the prob-
lems of authoritarian control and power sharing, as well as different pos-
sible trajectories for these combinations.
(Hanson, 2015, p.10)
According to Myerson, the role of political leaders is essential in any state- 
building process. “The simple fact is that states are founded by leaders, and 
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the relationship between these founding leaders and their supporters can 
determine the nature of the state” (Myerson, 2011, p.92). In cases where the 
authoritarian regime has pronounced personalistic features where one indi-
vidual dominates the military, state apparatus and ruling party, the role of the 
leader in state- building will progressively increase.
There can be no doubt that the state- building process is in principle a slow 
process, one that takes time. However, authoritarian rulers will be tempted 
to accelerate it in order to see the desired results while they are still in office. 
This temptation could stem from their desire to secure their “place in the 
nation’s history” by preserving and maximizing their political power since 
“states are the ultimate institutional weapons in the authoritarian arsenal” 
(Slater and Fenner, 2011, p.17). Two things follow from this perspective. 
First, the continuity of  staying in power and building the state according to 
the ruler’s plan without interruptions will be crucial. Thus, even if  the rulers 
can’t run for another term because the national constitution forbids it, they 
can “organize” the transfer of  power to a chosen successor (often formally 
following the election procedure) and return to office when the successor’s 
term is over. And second, the “desired results” that prove the success of 
state- building process can be achieved in the sphere of  foreign policy— and 
much faster than in the domestic sphere. The results can come in the form 
of  victorious war, the increment of  the state’s territory as a result of  annex-
ation, or other revisionist actions to which other states have to respond.
It is equally important to note that for authoritarian rulers the tasks of 
making real improvements to state capacity, such as creating and enforcing 
rules or delivering services, may not be of  the highest priority, especially 
in comparison with the task of  securing and strengthening their power. In 
other words, gaining state autonomy from various interests— regional, oli-
garchic or parliamentarian— will be more important than increasing state 
capacity.
State- building cannot be completed without building the nation, i.e., cre-
ating and developing within the country’s borders a community of citizens 
with shared beliefs in a common belonging and destiny. As Scott (2007, p.5) 
shows, most scholars consider a well- functioning state to be a requirement 
for the development of a nation, and therefore state- building is a neces-
sary component of nation- building. However, following Hippler (2004, p.9), 
nation- building can be viewed as “a political objective as well as a strategy 
for reaching specific political objectives.” For neo- patrimonial or personalist 
rule this political objective will be securing the position of the leader and state 
apparatus, which is why nation- building follows the building of state institu-
tions: the task of nation- building can only be accomplished after the funda-
mentals of the state have already been built. Thus, nation- building is the final 
stage of the state- building project.
State- building is simply not “a series of  discrete steps taken one at a 
time” but a process that takes considerable effort and time (Zartman, 1995, 
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p.273). As the Russian case shows, the efforts involved in state- building are 
considerable indeed, but the results can be achieved in a relatively short 
time period.
Putin’s conception of the Russian state
During his first year in presidential office Putin repeatedly declared that build-
ing the Russian state was crucially important for Russia and therefore this 
task was his highest priority. It is noteworthy that many Western scholars 
shared this idea with Putin. As Hanson (2000, p.1) writes,
Prominent Western analysts and advisors, too, proclaim that successful 
state- building in the Russian Federation is the prerequisite for sustain-
able political and economic development— as well as the only means of 
attaining reliable control over Russia’s stockpiles of weapons of mass 
destruction.
Moreover, Western analysts offered their own recipes on how to improve the 
Russian state— by finding an honest and devoted bureaucracy or by increas-
ing the state’s political accountability (Hanson, 2000; Taylor, 2011). Putin, 
however, did not heed their advice as he had his own recipe, one which was 
simple but efficient.
When entering presidential office in 2000, Putin already had resources 
greater than those that had been at Yeltsin’s disposal. First, oil prices had 
begun to rise after late 1999 (Bashmakov, 2006). Second, Putin was sup-
ported by governmental officials as well as by his former colleagues from St 
Petersburg (piterskie) who had moved to work in Moscow, and by former 
colleagues from the KGB. And third, his main political resource was the 
Russian population who gave him the mandate to rule.
The state was central to Putin for many reasons: to ensure Russia’s “right-
ful place” in global politics and to provide Russian people with external secur-
ity, stability and order. Very early on, before the 2000 presidential elections, 
Putin stated that “Russia needs a strong state power and must have it” (The 
Globalist, 2000). In July 2000 in his first State of the Union address he argued 
that coping with the various challenges facing Russia was “impossible without 
strengthening the state” (Taylor, 2003, p.1). And as with every ruler, from the 
very beginning of his rule he had certain ideas about what an “ideal” Russian 
state should look like. These ideas were vague in the eyes of the experts and 
public at that time, though now, looking back, we can state what they were 
with high probability.
Putin was (and after 15 years still is) deeply convinced that Russia has 
all of  the objective prerequisites (where they come from— from God, or 
Mother Nature— does not matter) to be a “great power.” These include 
the world’s largest state territory, huge resources and a long history. An 
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excerpt from Putin’s “Turn of  the Millennium” manifesto clearly demon-
strates his ideas:
Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the 
inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and cultural 
existence. This determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of 
the government throughout the history of Russia and this cannot but do 
so at present.
(Putin, 1999, n.p.)
In order to make Russia “great” these objective prerequisites need to be com-
bined with the “correct” mode of government, wherein the immanent features 
of such a mode are a strong and beloved leader, the Sistema (the governance 
style that relies on indirectness and interpretation rather than command and 
control) managed by the leader,1 a central bureaucracy and the siloviki as the 
leader’s main agents, in addition to a happy people subordinated to the state 
apparatus. This might sound like a caricature, if  it were not for the fact that 
the project became a reality. In addition, Putin strongly believes in a “techno-
cratic approach”; as a competent technocrat he is convinced that there is 
always a right (and simple) formula for solving any problem.
A great state should be great in all respects— this goes without saying. 
Therefore, the “greatness” of Putin’s foreign policy is a mandatory and 
organic element of Putin’s state- building strategy. This means independent 
foreign policy, (very) active involvement in world affairs, protection of Russia’s 
national interests (as the Russian leadership understands them) and building 
a pro- Russian coalition. What is important is that to achieve these goals, a 
demonstration of considerable and visible successes is absolutely necessary.
In this way, in order to build “his” state Putin had first to deal with Yeltsin’s 
legacy, then to accumulate resources, and from this springboard go on to 
build the “great Russian state” by combining objective prerequisites with 
the appropriate form of governance, while constantly showing the world its 
ever- growing might.
Yeltsin’s legacy
As Slater and Fenner rightly emphasize, “Regime leaders are not usually the 
original architects of the states they operate … State apparatuses are typically 
inherited rather than originally constructed by the regimes that run them” 
(Slater and Fenner, 2011, p.16). This thesis is true for Russia, as indeed Putin 
did not (and could not) build the Russian state from scratch; he had to rely on 
the legacy that Yeltsin left him.
Many scholars of Russian politics were fairly optimistic about the future 
of a Russian democratic state right after the Yeltsin era (see, for instance, 
Smith, 1999). However, there were exceptions: Brown described the legacy 
Putin inherited from Yeltsin as a very mixed one at best. On the positive side 
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he listed freedom of speech and the press and certain elements of democ-
racy that were written into the constitution, as well as price liberalization 
and privatization. On the negative side, however, there was negative growth, 
capital flight and lack of industrial investment, in addition to the demoral-
ization of the armed forces and growing corruption and alcoholism (Brown, 
2001a). Some of the issues mentioned by Brown are not directly related to 
state- building, but they are important as contextual factors for an assessment 
of Putin’s state- building activity.
Thus Brown (2001a, p.4) comes to the conclusion that “The Russia Putin 
inherited from Yeltsin was in substantially worse shape than the Soviet Union 
of the perestroika years, or for that matter, the Brezhnev era.” To Brown’s 
list (on its negative side) I would add the fragmentation of Russia’s political 
space due to the process of chaotic and uncontrolled regionalization, and 
severe problems in interethnic relations. Furthermore, Yeltsin’s decisions were 
subject to severe criticism from all of the political parties, which existed at 
that time, while the State Duma, with which he constantly clashed, tried to 
oppose his reforms. In attempting not to “justify,” but to better understand 
Yeltsin’s “space of possibilities,” I should mention that unlike his successor, 
Yeltsin had few resources— be they financial (the country’s economic sys-
tem was in deep structural crisis and aid from the West did not principally 
change this situation) or symbolic (the credibility of the president in the eyes 
of the people was progressively decreasing during the ’90s). All in all, as world 
chess  champion Garry Kasparov nicely put it in January 2000, “Mr. Yeltsin’s 
battering- ram power was sufficient to destroy the prison of the past, but he 
lacked the education and creativity to design the palace of the future” (The 
Globalist, 2000, n.p.).
An undoubtedly positive development under Yeltsin was the creation of a 
market economy in Russia; however, as Yasin (2011, p.9) shows, its efficiency 
was low, primarily due to incomplete institutional transformations. In other 
words, market reforms were not followed by the formation of a modern state 
capable of constant adaptation to internal and external challenges (Busygina 
and Filippov, 2012). And it wasn’t just that the Russian state was not modern, 
and thus weak and noneffective, but even worse— the state was captured by 
vested interests, namely by regional executives and big business (oligarchs).
Direct elections of governors, changing the procedure of formation of the 
Federation Council (wherein regional executives became deputies of this upper 
house of parliament), and bilateral treaties signed during the ’90s between 
Moscow and the regions contributed to a dramatic increase in regional 
autonomy. Thus, during the ’90s the federal center was progressively losing 
its leverages of influence over the situation in the regions, and the degree of 
uncontrolled decentralization in Russia reached its zenith. Political regimes in 
the regions were centered around the head of the regional executive, while the 
federal center played more the role of an external actor (Gel’man, Ryzhenkov 
and Brie, 2000). Regional executives saw federalism as a tool for constant 
pressure on the center. As the central state failed, regional elites were able to 
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capture their “pieces” of state, declaring themselves as “complete masters” of 
their territories. With the central state’s failure, citizens turned more and more 
to the regional leadership as a source of security and order (Myerson, 2011).
Critically important for Russia was the character of privatization in the 
first half  of the ’90s. After the first wave of voucher privatization, in spring 
1995 came the second, when state property was redistributed through mort-
gage auctions (zalogovye auktsiony). These auctions have left many “tasty 
morsels” (mainly of oil and steel companies) in the hands of several banks 
and financial groups who have close links with the federal bureaucracy.2 The 
result was the formation of a cohort made up of the largest financial struc-
tures (the semibankirshina).3 These were the oligarchs who, together with 
Abramovich, established the closest relations with the “Family,” that is, with 
Yeltsin and his entourage in the Kremlin. Additionally, at lower levels, big 
business actively interacted with high state officials over the lucrative process 
of distributing political rents. By 1996– 1997 a system was formed whereby 
financial capital was in fact the main political actor; this was not lobbyism, 
but the direct participation of financial capital in political decision- making 
(Peregudov, 2011, p.153). As Peregudov notes, in interacting with bankers, 
the state officials were not driven by any kind of national or state idea; they 
merely used the momentum of favorable conditions for the purpose of per-
sonal enrichment (Peregudov, 2011, p.148).
However, even the weakest state and the most incapable government could 
not be captured fully and forever. And even the most corrupt officials do not 
sell all of their authority, but only some portion of it and for a certain time. 
The financial collapse of August 17, 1998 brought major changes to the sys-
tem. The banks were severely weakened, and at the same time Russian indus-
trial companies became less dependent on the banks. Lukoil, Surgutneftegas 
and the other oil companies were turning from amorphous holdings into 
vertically integrated structures (Peregudov, 2011, p.154). No less important, 
however, was the fact that the decision- making center was moving from the 
president and his administration to the government— this process was initi-
ated by Primakov as prime minister, continued by Stepashin and decisively 
completed by Putin. The autonomy of the federal executive was substantially 
increased (Peregudov, 2011, p.156). Here it is important to note that Putin 
began the process of power concentration in the hands of the federal execu-
tive even before he took presidential office.
In fact, the only more or less happy sphere under Yeltsin was relations 
with the West. Indeed, as Makarychev (2015, n.p.) shows, there were Western 
countries that provided Russia with many “chances to augment its inter-
national influence, and boost its status and role in the world.” Russia was 
recognized by consensus as the successor of the Soviet Union, and this safe-
guarded its permanent seat in the UN Security Council. It was accepted as a 
member of the most important international institutions, such as the Council 
of Europe and the G7 (extended to G8 as a gesture of goodwill from the 
West). Russia signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the 
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EU. Germany launched its Ostpolitik that was in fact a pro- Russian policy 
built on a “Russia first” principle, and within this framework Russia enjoyed 
the status of Germany’s most privileged partner. Finally, since the early ’90s 
the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe promoted Russia- 
friendly policies with regard to the situation with Russian speakers in the 
Baltic states (Makarychev, 2015).
Putin inherited from Yeltsin a weak and ineffective state dominated by 
informal institutions, and one which was captured by vested interests. These 
“invaders”— the regional elites and oligarchs— who had played a major role 
in determining Putin’s state- building agenda in the early stages of his presi-
dency soon became the main target of his reforms. Meanwhile, a frustrated 
population crying out for “order” and a “strong hand” became Putin’s key 
source of support. Relying on this resource, Putin gradually built up the 
power of “his” state.
Russia’s position in the world had to be fully reviewed: what was nor-
mal and even good for Yeltsin’s Russia was absolutely insufficient and not 
“great” enough for Putin’s. The world had begun to lose its fear of  Russia, 
and for the Russian authorities this meant only one thing: it had ceased to 
respect it.
Putin comes into office: accumulating resources
As Willerton and McGovern (2010, p.21) argue, “It is little wonder that both 
elites and citizens were so disdainful of the Yeltsin record and so anxious to 
support an assertive Vladimir Putin advancing a state- centric political for-
mula.” However, the support which Putin gained from Yeltsin’s negative leg-
acy needed to be confirmed and strengthened. The new president began with 
the task of gaining confirmation of his democratic mandate from his main 
political resource, the population. Putin addressed a frustrated and disori-
ented population not with the promise of an immediate comfortable life, but 
with promises of order, security and a strong and effective state. The other 
important topics were the battle with terrorism, and peace in interethnic rela-
tions, in the first place in the North Caucasus. Addressing and solving the cri-
sis of the Chechen War was an integral part of Putin’s state- building project 
as it confirmed the seriousness of his intentions to the public. As he declared 
when he came to power, “my mission, my historic mission— it sounds pom-
pous, but it is true— is to resolve the situation in the North Caucasus” (cited 
in Gevorkan, Kolesnikov and Timakova, 2000, p.133). Putin’s state- building 
projects would demand more wars, this time outside Russia, but at the begin-
ning of the 2000s nobody could predict this.
The success of  the state- building mission depends to a large extent on key 
decisions about how power in the new regime is to be distributed. So, like any 
good builder, before starting the construction process Putin had to secure 
his leading role in the process and provide order at the construction site 
by placing the building blocks where they belonged. As Kryshtanovskaya 
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(2009, p.27) argues, “Putin therefore sought to bring under control centers 
of  power that until then had competed with the Kremlin— in particular, the 
oligarchs, regional governors and the State Duma.” He started by neutral-
izing alternative sources of  political influence, i.e., by excluding regional 
executives and oligarchs from the ruling coalition. Prior to the elections of 
March 2000, in an interview Putin stated that “From the very beginning, 
Russia was created as a super- centralized state. That’s practically laid down 
in its genetic code, its traditions, and the mentality of  its people” (cited in 
Brown, 2001b, p.51).
The president solved the problem of the political autonomy of the regional 
executives, and their disproportionate influence on the national decision- 
making process, by introducing several reforms. In the summer of 2000, 
seven new federal districts ruled by Putin’s representatives were created. 
Then the governors lost the opportunity for direct contact with the presi-
dent as a new administrative layer was formed between the Kremlin and the 
regions. Governors were also deprived of their right to serve as deputies in 
the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament. These 
reforms effectively transformed the governors from independent politicians 
with their own power bases into executives who were fully dependent on 
Moscow’s favor (Kryshtanovskaya, 2009, p.28). This new system has been 
labeled a “power vertical”; however, as Myerson (2011, p.5) points out, “Any 
successful state, whether democratic or autocratic, must be able to recruit local 
leaders and assure them some share of the long- term benefits of state power.” 
Thus, it became clear fairly quickly that this vertical was not rigid: outside the 
agreements with the federal executive (which fundamentally comprised pro-
vision of political stability in the regions and certain guaranteed results for 
United Russia at the elections) the governors had a fairly free hand.4 In other 
words, this freedom was granted in exchange for maintaining local order and 
authority.
At the very beginning of his presidency, Putin already expressed his inten-
tion to keep all oligarchs “equidistant” from interfering in the formulation of 
state policy. In 2000 the cases of Gusinsky and Berezovsky, who were pushed 
out of the country, clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the oligarchs. 
Although up until 2002 Putin had maintained the practice of holding per-
sonal meetings with representatives of big business, and various problems 
were discussed at the meetings held by the president with the bureau of the 
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, from 2003 these meetings 
stopped abruptly. The dialogue between big business and the federal executive 
authority was interrupted on the initiative of the latter. As a consequence, the 
political role of big business has declined.
Khodorkovsky, the head of the Yukos corporation and the most politic-
ally active oligarch, was arrested in 2003 and after a show trial sentenced to 
a long term in prison. The Yukos case was not just an outstanding episode, 
but an important milestone in the development of business– state relations; 
this case was a clear and cruel signal to the oligarchs about the “red line” that 
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they should never cross if  they valued their businesses and their freedom. 
Indeed, after this case, representatives of big business had two options— 
either to accept the new reality or to leave the country (Kryshtanovskaya, 
2009, p.27). Prominent amongst those who “accepted the reality” were the 
Rotenberg brothers, Timchenko, Kovalchuk, Abramovich and Usmanov. 
Closeness to Putin has allowed these oligarchs, and many others, to enrich 
themselves even despite the personal sanctions that have been imposed on 
them and their companies. As compensation for their losses, Timchenko and 
the Rotenbergs’ companies have been given much wider access to government 
contracts (goszakazy) (Novosti Ukrainy, 2014).
Yukos was ultimately broken up (with the state corporation Rosneft gain-
ing the largest share) and this marked the beginning of  the process of  nation-
alizing corporate property. Before long, Gazprom, Alrosa and Bashneft all 
fell under full state control. In addition, large corporations such as Rosatom 
and Russian Railways (RZhD) were created under the auspices of  federal 
ministries— the argument used by the federal authorities was that under con-
ditions of  globalization the state should preserve control over the key sectors 
of  the national economy and thereby defend Russia’s strategic interests. In 
2005, the government created an “A- list” of  27 companies and a “B- list” of 
44 companies in all branches of  the economy, including fuel and energy (in 
particular, the electric power and atomic industries), the military- industrial 
complex, infrastructure (for example, transport and communications), bank-
ing and electronic media. As Kryshtanovskaya (2009, p.32) argues, “The 
more important the company, the more likely it is that ministers will sit on 
its board of  directors.” The boards of  large state corporations were soon 
dominated by government officials, servants, employees of  the presidential 
administration and siloviki. From 2007 the state launched a program of 
creating large corporations (e.g., Rostechnologii in the field of  engineering) 
which were tasked with the role of  becoming “modernization locomotives” 
(Peregudov, 2011, p.301).
In 2004 the president proposed a new federal law on State Duma elec-
tions that eliminated the single- mandate districts: since the 2007 election, 
Russian voters have been able to vote for deputies who belong to party lists. 
Together with the cancelation of gubernatorial elections, this contributed to 
a decrease in the influence of big businesses in the regions as the governors 
were not interested in building good relations with them. A new hierarchical 
order was established in the regions following the blueprint of the federal level 
(Peregudov, 2011, pp.278– 279).
It is noteworthy that the elections of  governors were restored in 2012 
and single- mandate districts returned for the Duma elections in 2016. But 
the devil is in the details: the candidates for governor’s office have to pass a 
“municipal filter.” More than 40 elections have taken place since 2012 and in 
all cases the incumbent governors were reelected. With regards to the single- 
mandate districts, the federal center uses election manipulation techniques, 
in particular, the suppression of  independent observers and the new and 
 
 
 
 
 
44 State-building in Russia
4
original divisions of  election districts where the urban electorate is mixed 
with rural constituents, which are much more easily controlled by the author-
ities (Petrov, 2015).
Putin had learned a good deal from Yeltsin’s mistake of not gaining the 
support of a parliamentary political party. Thus, by creating his own party— 
United Russia— and building it into the hierarchical power pyramid, Putin 
has successfully tamed the State Duma and is able to use the party as an 
instrument of his state- building ambitions. Since its birth, the party’s deci-
sions have been “secondary” in character, duplicating documents elaborated 
in the presidential administration or the government. This was the case with 
the “Putin Plan” that became United Russia’s main program document at the 
2007 Duma elections. The same thing happened with “Strategy 2020” and the 
anticrisis program.
As regards potential horizontal or vertical threats to his rule, Putin has 
been able to build an effective system of  defense. He succeeded very quickly 
in his quest to emasculate rival power centers and has been able to consoli-
date his position through the use of  various “carrots and sticks.” There has 
not been a single real threat to his position. Indeed, the state’s weakness 
together with the economic troubles of  the ’90s made power maximization 
quite difficult for Yeltsin, but Putin’s maximization strategy has been much 
more effective, and in fact he has had a free hand to do more or less what he 
wishes during his tenure in office (Gel’man, 2015). In 2011, after national 
elections to the State Duma and the rise of  civil protests in Russia’s larg-
est cities, it looked like the situation was changing— but this was an illu-
sion: presidential elections in March 2012 have shown that the slogan “For 
Putin, for stability!” is still more attractive to Russians than any appeals by 
the opposition. As my co- author Filippov and I have demonstrated, pro- 
democracy protests and support for political and institutional reforms are 
not spreading in modern- day Russia, and remain limited to specific social 
groups and large cities. It is highly probable that this situation will continue 
in the future. The explanation for this fact lies in Russian citizens’ concerns 
over the highly uncertain redistributive consequences of  political reforms 
(Busygina and Filippov, 2015).
Thus, Putin’s behavior has not been defined by real dangers, but rather by 
constraints. First, the new state was built on the basis of the old “Yeltsin” 
Constitution: Putin has resisted the temptation to drastically change it and 
further accelerate the state- building process (for instance, by the abolition of 
federalism). Second, for his state- building strategy the continuity of remaining 
in office has been crucially important. Putin was constrained by a four- year 
term of office as well as by a two- term limit. These constraints were elegantly 
overcome by the prolongation of the presidential term from four to six years 
(initiated by Medvedev and approved by the parliament in 2008) and by his 
“castling” maneuver with Medvedev in 2012 (whereby President Medvedev 
and Prime Minister Putin swapped posts), which Putin himself  confirmed had 
already been agreed upon in 2008 (Top News, 2011).
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The authorities have thus built a secure power base that now dominates 
Russia. In fact, Putin has accumulated unlimited political resources that, in 
addition to high levels of support from the population, include the “party of 
power,” state control over big business, the federal, regional and municipal 
bureaucracies, and last but not least control over the army, police and various 
law enforcement agencies. In the absence of a functioning judicial system and 
secure property rights, and given the marginal role that the parliament and 
civil society play in the political system, there have been ample opportunities 
for Putin to exercise these extensive powers. To build the state in Russia, Putin 
has captured it.
Nation- building as part of the state- building project
Support from the population has been Putin’s main political resource 
since he took office in 2000. Nevertheless, taking into account the degree 
of  polarization within Russian society, its multiethnic composition and its 
general propensity for opportunistic behavior, maintaining this support is 
the subject of  ongoing work by the state, and the president in particular. 
After the foundations of  the state were constructed (and only then), Putin 
began systematic work on building the Russian nation as a political com-
munity and at the same time as a constituent part of  his state- building 
project. The main goal was to build a nation that not only would create 
no problems for the state, but that would show absolute loyalty and be the 
source of  permanent recruitment for state service. At its core, the task was 
to build the nation for the state.
Below I  shall attempt to give an outline of the main directions of state 
work on the creation of the Russian nation. Some of these factors have been 
extensively discussed, while others are relatively new.
After Putin took presidential office, his first task was to secure at least 
some degree of unity within the population. As Cannady and Kubicek (2014, 
p.1) show, Putin has made appeals to nationalism far more than Yeltsin 
or Gorbachev. He had repeatedly recognized that his first challenge was 
“ restoration of the country’s unity [and the] establishment of sovereignty of 
the Russian people, rather than the supremacy of individuals and groups, 
across its entire territory” (Putin, 2012, no pagination) [emphasis added]. 
This shows that his views on the nation are very simplistic and that he rejects 
pluralism (Cannady and Kubicek, 2014, p.4). The basis for this unity is the 
“Rossiyskaya ideya” which is derived from a set of traditional Russian values 
including patriotizm— a feeling of pride for Russia, its achievements and great 
history; derzhavnost’— Russia as a great power; and gosudarstvennost’— belief  
in a strong state that ensures order and protects its citizens from foreign ene-
mies (Tolz, 2004). In addition, in legitimizing these values a prominent public 
role was given to the Russian Orthodox Church.
Construction of the common political past was another important dimen-
sion of nation- building. This has been achieved mainly through education, 
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in particular through history textbooks. Ismailov and Ganieva argue (2013, 
p.381) that
In the context of Russian textbooks one can also explore the re- 
presentation of historical events or reinvention of historical narratives by 
providing an emotional connection between the student and the country’s 
past through bringing to light the notions of pride, feelings and a sense 
of continuity.
In Russian academic circles the “struggle with the falsification of history” (by 
foreign historians) has become common. The victory of the Soviet Union in 
the Great Patriotic War has been used by the state to forge a greater sense of 
unity and a distinct national identity (Nikitina, 2014, p.4). At the same time, 
Russia’s post- communist history, in particular the period of the ’90s, has been 
portrayed as “wild” and “a time of troubles.”
Whilst the various nation- building measures have done their job, it soon 
became clear to Putin and his administration that the main resource of 
nation- building in Russia was the figure of Putin himself. The policy of “using 
Putin” has had various manifestations. Thus, the most traditional and famil-
iar feature of Putin’s presidency was Direct Lines with the President, which 
Ryazanova- Clarke describes as “three or so hours of simultaneous radio and 
television broadcasts of President Putin’s questions and answers with the gen-
eral public” (Ryazanova- Clarke, 2008, p.311). The format of Direct Lines has 
been kept unchanged since its inception in 2001. Such direct contact between 
the president and “ordinary Russians”
constructs feelings of admiration and love towards the President. The 
public usually start their speech moves by expression of gratitude for his 
work and his care for the people, which brings the conversation within 
the socio- cultural paradigm of paternalistic relations between the power 
and the populace.
(Ryazanova- Clarke, 2008, p.328)
Putin’s work with Russian youth, as an investment in the future, deserves 
special mention. Indeed, the format of Direct Lines was not dynamic and 
energetic enough for young Russians. Instead of Direct Lines, they have been 
able to engage with Putin at youth camps such as the “Territory of the Senses” 
camp, which was organized under the patronage of the presidential adminis-
tration and which replaced the “Seliger” camp.
Young Russians want to see a “tough” president, and they do: Putin is seen 
diving underwater to the seabed (and he never returns without a trophy), he 
flies in the sky with cranes, goes hunting in Siberia and the Far East, does judo 
and plays hockey. He is the main patron of Russian sports and show business 
and he is also a fashion line; T- shirts with the inscription “Vova, ya s toboi!” 
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(“Vova [as short for Vladimir], I am with you”) were distributed at the youth 
camps, where they enjoyed great popularity.
State- run initiatives— like the first Putin- era youth formations Idushchie 
Vmeste and Nashi— became the largest of their kind since the Soviet- era 
Komsomol (Lassila, 2014). These associations, which also attracted volun-
teers and entrepreneurs, were principally oriented toward the mobilization 
of youth around two magic concepts: “Putin plus the Rossiyskaya ideya.” 
Recently Putin has extended the range of those who are to be included in the 
nation- building process: in October 2015 he issued a decree on the establish-
ment of the Russian School Children’s Movement. This organization, which 
is an analogue of the Pioneers in the Soviet era, will be financed directly from 
the state budget (Kozlov, Makutina and Surnachaeva, 2015).
More recently we have witnessed a number of sophisticated policies aimed 
at building the “right” nation in Russia. The first is the policy of “cultivat-
ing citizens’ dependence” on the state: state employees (byudzhetniki) will be 
reluctant to engage in any oppositional steps against the state, as they know 
that to do so they will be putting themselves at great risk of punishment— they 
could be demoted or their jobs could simply be cut (Slater and Fenner, 2011, 
p.23). The second policy could be termed “preemptively cleansing society of 
dissenting voices.” The first step of such a policy is “overreaction,” when the 
state demonstrates an openly negative and even outrageous reaction to people 
or organizations which in reality are relatively harmless to the state. This was 
the case with the law on foreign agents as well as with the massive campaign 
that began in Russia after the annexation of Crimea, which was directed 
against “friends of the junta” and “national traitors.” The campaign was 
enthusiastically supported by the federal mass media. Such a reaction could 
seem suboptimal if  we do not take into account its expected strategic implica-
tions. The task of the “overreaction” is to make those dissatisfied with Putin’s 
politics feel insecure and frightened, eventually goading them into leaving the 
country. To realize this decision a special border regime for Russian citizens 
is maintained (and this is the second step of the policy)— holding the border 
open for the disloyal and closed for the most loyal citizens. The Ministry of 
the Interior, the FSB and some others have asked their employees to refrain 
from traveling abroad. In reality this request turned into an unofficial ban. 
(Interestingly, this practice strikingly contradicts the Soviet- era experience 
whereby citizens had to prove their loyalty to the regime if  they wanted to 
travel abroad). The policy of “cleansing” has damaged the reputation of the 
Russian state in the eyes of the West; however, this, it would appear, is a price 
that the president is willing to pay.
As Hutchings and Tolz (2015, p.25) argue, “the construction of a com-
pound identity for the peoples of Russia, with the help of an authoritative 
discourse of nation- building, has been part of Vladimir Putin’s broad agenda 
of strengthening the Russian state in the new millennium.” This nation— for 
the state and under the state— has now been built.
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The external dimension of state- building and the use of coercion
As state- building is first and foremost a process of restoring the authority of 
the state (Lake, 2010, p.22), it can be achieved through both internal and exter-
nal policies. In Russia the external dimension of the state- building process 
plays an immense role and has had several manifestations. The first to appear 
was “sovereign democracy,” an interim concept5 that allowed Russia to dis-
tinguish itself  from other democratic states whilst formally remaining within 
the democratic framework.6 It is notable that in the Russian context this con-
cept has been employed to emphasize state power and the central role of the 
state (Cannady and Kubicek, 2014). The next manifestation was the idea of 
“diversion”— the combination of economic openness to the West, maintained 
mainly because of the need for foreign investments, with political distancing 
from it (Busygina and Filippov, 2013). Starting in the mid- 2000s if  not ear-
lier, the Russian official rhetoric as well as the mass media have progressively 
introduced into the consciousness of Russians the idea of the West as a biased 
actor that is hostile to Russia. The West, Russian mass media claim, does not 
understand Russia; this wrong evaluation leads to wrong conclusions, and 
wrong conclusions lead to wrong political decisions. Nevertheless, according 
to this approach the West is perceived as a strong actor that Russia needs, if  
in a limited sense.
After the political crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of  Crimea 
the diversion approach has lost its purpose, as Russia has opted for marked 
revisionism in external relations.7 The approach was generally built on the 
idea of  global opposition between Russia and the West, and a Western 
conspiracy against Russia. Who are the conspirators, and on what pil-
lars is the conspiracy built? The conspirators are the US and European 
national governments,8 and the rationale of  conspiracy is based on an old 
idea: the West doesn’t need a strong Russia. And Russia is strong not only 
for its military power, but first and foremost for its right values. Today 
Russia strongly supports the discourse of  cultural distinctiveness, present-
ing itself  as a global defender of  conservative values (Tsygankov, 2016). 
As Karaganov (2016) argues, Western elites have largely detached them-
selves from their societies, while the Russian ones are inextricably linked to 
the population. Russian values include support for the traditional family, 
patriotism, centralization and the pursuit of  justice in contempt of  for-
mal rules and laws. In international relations, they include support of  state 
sovereignty and a political pluralism that objectively opposes Western uni-
versalism. One of  Russia’s ideological messages to the world is that con-
sumption is not a purpose, that the main thing is service (sluzhenie) to 
higher goals. Interestingly, the Russian establishment is not concerned with 
the fact that its declared values do not correspond with the Russian reality. 
Thus, for family values, Russia occupies the second place in Europe after 
Ukraine on the percentage of  divorces (Russia- On, 2013), and is the abso-
lute leader in the percentage of  abortions (Ulyanov, 2010). The desire for 
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personal enrichment by Russia’s state servants is well- documented (see, for 
instance, Ryavec, 2005; Cheloukhine and Haberfeld, 2011; Milov, Nemtsov, 
Ryzhkov and Shorina, 2011; Zaslavskaia, 2012; Danks, 2013), as is the gap 
between declarations and behavior: for instance, even after the “five- day 
war” with Georgia, Russia proclaimed respect for international law and its 
supremacy, and in particular, for the inviolability of  borders (Romanova, 
2009, p.55). Essentially, “great power” status entails special rights (different 
from those of  other states) in pursuing foreign policy free from constraints 
(norms and values) yet in accordance with Russia’s understanding of  its 
international commitments.
In principle, there was not much new to this approach.9 However, the nov-
elty of  the current situation lies in two things. First, while Russia is still pre-
sented as a strong and fair state, the West is seen not only as unfair (which 
is not new), but as weak and degenerating (this specially relates to the EU). 
Indeed, political conflict with Ukraine, support for insurgents, anti- Russian 
sanctions and most importantly the annexation of  Crimea have made Russia 
a “great state” in the eyes of  the majority of  citizens. “Krym nash!” (“Crimea 
is ours!”) was not just an idea— this was a real thing, a genuine confirm-
ation of  Russia’s “greatness.” According to an opinion poll carried out by 
the Levada Center in October 2014, 86 percent of  the respondents gave a 
positive answer to the question “Are you proud of  the fact that you live in 
Russia?” During the same poll 78  percent of  respondents agreed with the 
statement “It is better for me to be a citizen of  Russia than of  any other 
country in the world” (Zorkaya, 2015). In November 2015 the percentage 
of  those who agreed with this statement increased to 85 percent (Petrenko, 
2015). The “militarization” of  the Russian mentality has reached its peak. 
At the same time, as Kofman and Rojansky (2015, p.6) argue, “Moscow 
wants as much of  the global audience, and certainly its own citizens and 
those in the post- Soviet space, to question anything and everything coming 
from the West.” Second, Russia’s struggle with Western conspiracy has for 
the first time shifted to “enemy territory,” that is to the territory of  the EU 
(see Chapter 4). Russia has turned to a proactive policy with extensive use of 
sophisticated coercive tools.
At the same time, in Crimea, Ukraine and the Middle East, Russia has 
been developing a strategy that Adamsky calls cross- domain coercion— 
the Russian art of orchestrating non- nuclear, informational, and nuclear 
influence within a unified program for the sake of coercion (both to 
deter and to compel). … Informational struggle choreographs all threats 
and moves across conventional and nuclear, military, and non- military 
domains to produce the most optimal correlation of trends and forces. It 
is a coercion “master of ceremonies”: by nuclear manipulations, it con-
structs a cordon sanitaire that enables immune maneuver space (strate-
gicheskii prostor), a sphere of the possible, within which other forms of 
influence can achieve tangible results with, or preferably, without the use 
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of force. Ideally, the image of unacceptable consequences, produced by 
this cross- domain coercion should paralyze Western assertiveness and 
responsiveness.
(Adamsky, 2015, p.37)
Special operations were combined and coordinated with information warfare, 
both technological and cognitive- psychological. In turn, these tools were syn-
chronized with political, diplomatic and economic measures regionally and 
worldwide. Then the next stage came, with demonstrations of the resolve and 
capability to use force and by facilitating the flow of volunteers and arms 
to opposition forces. In this way the Kremlin tried to coerce Kiev to accept 
its terms of political settlement (Adamsky, 2015, p.37). Adamsky emphasizes 
that in all three cases, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and the Middle East, Russia 
has “demonstrated aptitude for organizational and conceptual learning and 
transformation, and scale of improvisation that are rather unorthodox for the 
post- Soviet Russian military practice” (Adamsky, 2015, p.41). To paralyze the 
West, Russia is also using “virtual coercion” that comes in the form of Russian 
“constant presence and closeness”— that is, military exercises simulating the 
invasion of Poland (Shleifer and Treisman, 2011) or the Baltic states, or viola-
tions of territorial waters and airspace belonging to Scandinavian countries.
Today militarization affects all areas of public life. “Russian society has 
been militarized for decades, if  not centuries,” writes Kolesnikov.
Being prepared for a lightning- fast military mobilization was arguably the 
main shared value in the Soviet Union, during and after Joseph Stalin’s 
rule. The badge that Soviet children received upon successful completion 
of athletic challenges was even named “Ready for Labor and Defense.” 
Soviet discourse was replete with rhetoric about the “struggle for peace,” 
which gave birth to a rather canny joke about struggling for peace until 
the world was torn into pieces. Exorbitant military spending contrib-
uted to the Soviet Union’s collapse. But this lesson has been completely 
forgotten now.
(Kolesnikov, 2015, no pagination)
Militarization of public life is combined with a sharp increase in military 
spending, as is only natural: according to the information that Russia has 
provided to the UN, its military spending in 2015 reached 2.9 trillion rubles, 
increasing by almost a trillion compared to 2014 (Tkachev, 2016).
Within the post- Soviet space, Russia is investing considerable effort in 
building a coalition that on the surface resembles authority relations but in 
reality can be at best described as authority- like. As Lake (2010, p.12) argues, 
when projecting authority far from their borders, great powers
must create and maintain political orders of value to subordinates even 
when it is inconvenient for them to do so … Dominant states must also 
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discipline subordinates who violate the rules of the international order 
they create or challenge their authority.
This is definitively not what Russia is doing (see Chapter 5). Within the post- 
Soviet space, Russia is building a coalition with a hegemon, working to recruit 
new subordinates into its international order. While Lake (2010, p.15) points 
to the authoritative rather than coercive roots of hegemony, these “authority- 
like” relations cannot hide the fact that the coalition rests largely on explicit 
and implicit threats of coercion.
It should be recognized that Russia has received from the West what it has 
long wanted: Western acknowledgment that Russia is a force to be reckoned 
with. Western experts recognize Russian capabilities and Moscow’s activism, 
which are able to project Russian influence, in contexts where Western inter-
ests overlap with Russia’s (Giancarlo, 2016, p.8). However, as Trudolyubov 
rightly states,
If  you have the reputation of turning everything you touch into a weapon, 
everything you say and do might be construed as an attack. You become 
everyone’s enemy. Russia’s leaders have become so adept at their game 
of projecting menacing ambiguity that it is now impossible for them to 
persuade anyone that sometimes the Russians might just simply want to 
do business.
(Trudolyubov, 2016, no pagination)
Notes
 1 As Pavlovsky describes it, Putin
has crafted his own version of sistema, a complex practice of decision- making 
and power management that has long defined Russian politics and society and 
that will outlast Putin himself… While managed democracy lasted, wealthy 
players knew that once a contract, sale, or merger of theirs reached a suffi-
ciently high level, it was time for them to see Putin to explain the project. If  
Putin accepted it, they were told that his agreement was “placed on deposit.” 
Yet in his third presidential term, Putin added a layer of uncertainty to this 
process by extending the power vertical, building a higher level that he alone 
occupies: a private penthouse. Today, he is only “kept up to date with the 
situation,” as his press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, usually reports. Those who 
meet with Putin leave with only a vague idea of what they are supposed to do. 
They try their best to remember every word Putin said, so that one day, they 
can quote him. Those words are the only license they have… This new govern-
ance style relies on indirection and interpretation rather than command and 
control.
(Pavlovsky, 2016, no pagination)
 2 The speed and mechanisms of privatization led not only to extremely rapid enrich-
ment of the winners, but also resulted in the weak legitimacy of the new property 
relations: the danger that the results of privatization would be canceled, and of 
prosecution, hung over the winners like the sword of Damocles. The businessmen 
were on the hook of the federal executive; a hook it would later use in the 2000s.
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 3 The largest banks were Interros (headed by Potanin), Menatep (Khodorkovsky), 
Inkombank (Vinogradov), SPb- Agro (Smolensky), Most Group (Gusinsky) and 
Logovaz (Berezovsky).
 4 The best illustration of this thesis is the situation in the Chechen Republic: 
President Kadyrov, being, in his own words, “Putin’s watchdog,” has virtually 
unlimited freedom of action in his region.
 5 Sovereign democracy, as defined by its ideologist Surkov, is a system in which 
“political powers, their authorities and decisions are decided and controlled by a 
diverse Russian nation for the purpose of reaching material welfare, freedom and 
fairness by all citizens, social groups and nationalities, by the people that formed 
it” (Surkov, 2006, cited in Cannady and Kubicek, 2014, p. 7).
 6 It is noteworthy that since 2014 (and even earlier) Putin has stopped playing these 
“games of democracy” with Western countries. Today “sovereign democracy” is 
not needed and has been forgotten by all.
 7 According to Combes,
revisionist power would be described as a state primarily concerned with its 
own power and prestige above all other considerations, seeking to remodel 
the international system and order for its own benefit and in its own interests. 
This makes a revisionist power a staunchly realist one. Realism posits that 
states are the primary actors in the international system which is anarchic, 
referring to the fact that there is no higher power than the state i.e. no world 
government.
(Combes, 2011/ 2012, p.5)
 8 International rating agencies are also included in the list of conspirators, as they 
tend to assess Russia “unfairly.” However, Russia is unable to reach these private 
actors with any of its coercive tools.
 9 In Russia there is a popular expression, “Anglichanka gadit,” which can be trans-
lated as “the English lady is spoiling things” (though in Russian it sounds much 
ruder) and has existed since the time of the conflict between the Russian and 
British empires.
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3 Multilevel arrangements in EU 
external relations
Stimulating authority, constraining 
coercion
The EU’s external action strategy— launching institutional isomorphism in 
the common neighborhood— is determined by the essence of the Union as a 
political entity. In the ’50s the EU (then the EEC) was established by the elites 
of six initial member states, and until now national executives have retained 
the final say in setting the main vectors of the EU’s foreign policy. According 
to Benz, inwardly the EU represents a compound governance system, which 
“fuses incompatible components of competitive and consocional democracy” 
(Benz, 2001, p.4) and this very specific system determines the “boundaries of 
the possible” with regard to the EU’s external actions.
The EU has acquired many titles, as politicians and experts are still trying 
to grasp the essence of the system. Holding the office of British prime minister, 
Tony Blair once said that “The EU should be a superpower, not a superstate” 
(Blair, 2000, cited in Cameron, 2007, p.2). Most definitions of the EU use the 
term “power,” with different scholars stressing different dimensions of this 
power and deriving definitions based on what element of it they place in the 
spotlight. Thus, Duchêne coined the term “Civilian Power Europe” (Duchêne, 
1972, cited in Orbie, 2006, p.123), emphasizing that the EU is a civilian power 
in the sense that its strength lies in its ability to promote and encourage stabil-
ity by economic and political means (Duchêne, 1972). Manners (2000, p.29) 
came forward with the concept of normative power, defining it as the power 
and ability to shape and impose the superordinate’s understanding of what is 
“normal,” whereby norms are “collective expectations about proper behavior 
for a given identity” (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996, p.54). Norms 
lie at the core of Manners’s approach. He explores different types of norms: 
utilitarian norms that help states define their “utility” in the sense of a rational 
choice; social norms that lie at the foundation of interests and identity; moral 
norms that set boundaries to acting in pure self- interest; and narrative norms 
that legitimate “proper” narratives (Manners, 2000, p.32). The EU particu-
larly specializes in the creation of the last three types of norms.
Six elements shape the Union’s normative power: contagion (unintentional 
norm diffusion), strategic and declaratory communications, institutionaliza-
tion of relationship, transference (exchange of benefits between the EU and 
third parties), physical presence of the EU in third states and the cultural 
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filter (cultural diffusion and political learning in third- party states) (Manners, 
2000, p.35).
The functioning of normative power is subdivided into normative intent, 
normative process and normative impact (Manners, 2000). Reflexivity for the 
EU implies changing its behavior if  faced with convincing argumentation or 
evidence, anticipating adverse consequences of its own actions and adjusting 
policy to manage these consequences (Neimann and de Wekker, 2010, p.9). 
Whitman (2013, p.175) stresses the predisposition of the EU to develop as a 
normative power due to the historical context of the twentieth century (the 
legacy of the world wars), its hybrid polity with supranational elements and 
its treaty- based nature. It is worth mentioning that the concept of normative 
power differs from that of civilian power, because the latter describes real, 
physical capabilities, whereas the former draws attention to cognitive pro-
cesses and approaches (Neimann and de Wekker, 2010).
What is the foundation of the EU’s normative power? Meunier and 
Kalypso (2011) conclude that the EU bases its normative power on trade. 
Nottebaum (2012) gives the EU the status of “a formidable power in trade” 
in terms of the export of standards. In his opinion, the Union’s power extends 
its influence in bilateral interactions by symmetric and asymmetric bargaining 
over market access. The regional dimension is covered by the Union’s “mar-
ket power” (Woolcock, 2011) via enabling reciprocal market access. The glo-
bal dimension of the EU’s trade power is arranged by means of specific and 
diffuse reciprocity— the EU contributes to gradually shaping the multilateral 
world system by transforming the trade agenda on a deep level (Nottebaum, 
2012). Forsberg and Seppo (2008, p.4) raise the issue of the convertibility of 
the EU’s different power modes and the importance of the organizational 
resource for calling the EU’s power into being at its full scale.
There can be no doubt that the EU is a power; moreover, it is an unconven-
tional one. It is capable of building power relations with the outside world, 
though in quite a specific manner. In this chapter, I will be building my argu-
mentation on the fact that it is its multilevel governance system that allows the 
EU to act unconventionally not only within its borders, but also externally. 
This “unconventionality” has neither a positive nor a negative connotation 
per se, either for the EU or for third countries. It creates both new possibilities 
and constraints to building relations with the latter. The EU has proved to be 
able to develop a distinct approach, enabling it to either to offer the promise 
of membership, or to delay this decision depending on the concrete situation. 
By saying “maybe” (in other words, “under certain conditions”), the EU does 
not close the “opportunity window” that can potentially stimulate domestic 
change in target states, and at the same time avoids being subject to the blame 
game for being an unreliable counterpart that does not keep any promises. 
However, the EU’s strategy of external action is open- ended and potentially 
costly: the conditions of the EU’s “presence” in third countries do not allow 
it to exert control, or in many cases even to monitor how the money targeted 
for reforms is really being allocated and spent.
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This chapter consists of  four sections: I will first show how the multilevel 
governance system influences the EU’s power relations, then move on to ana-
lyze how the authority- type approach is manifested in the Europeanization 
policy and in conditionality tactics. Part three explores the fruitfulness of 
the EU’s use of  the “golden membership carrot.” The following, final, sec-
tion explores the coercive instruments used by the Union (namely, economic 
sanctions) as well as the constraints that multilevel governance places on 
their use.
Multilevel governance interplay in the EU
The EU is a multilateral authority- type system. The initial arrangement 
between states and supranational authorities implies that supranational insti-
tutions decrease the costs of coordination and bargaining for member states, 
while member states delegate enough power for supranational institutions to 
fulfill their functions. This arrangement was institutionalized in the concept 
of “multilevel governance.” In the EU multilevel governance (MLG) (also 
labeled as “poly- centric governance” and “FOCJ”— functional, overlapping, 
competing jurisdictions) is a way of “sharing authority across an institution-
alized, hierarchically structured set of actors with varying degrees of unity/ 
coherence, commitment to EU norms, and power resources” (Smith, 2004, 
p.743). Stephenson (2013) argues that MLG emerged as a vertical arrange-
ment and then developed into a less hierarchical approach with coordin-
ation as its centerpiece. Enlargement of the EU, especially the largest one, the 
Eastern Enlargement of 2004, raised demand for “internalizing externalities” 
because decentralized jurisdictions could better the reflect heterogeneity of 
preferences (Marks and Hooghe, 2003). MLG presupposes in the first place 
the existence of overlapping competences in multiple levels of government, 
whereby the power of nation- states is redistributed both to the supranational 
and to the subnational levels (Awesti, 2007). We observe vertical layering of 
governance processes, and the relations themselves evolve directly between 
different governance levels (Peters and Pierre, 2001). According to Keukeleire 
and Justaert, MLG transforms the EU into a system of multiple networks— 
semi- stable informal clusters of independent actors, who have or take 
specific interest or stake in solving a certain policy problem and who dis-
pose of resources required for shaping and implementing the policy, and 
who are willing to mobilize and pool these resources
(Keukeleire and Justaert, 2008, p.2)
for which the European Commission is a policy broker.
There are two basic levels in the EU with regard to foreign policy— a 
supranational and a national level. They are autonomous, though strategic-
ally interconnected by authority- type relations that function in both direc-
tions: in some spheres, European institutions direct and constrain the policy 
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choices of member states, while member states may behave proactively in oth-
ers. The thesis that the EU’s foreign policy is decentralized and fragmented 
can be supported by the fact that the European Council is the EU’s main 
decision- making body for foreign policy. The Commission is endowed mainly 
with the function of representation, though it is responsible for the budget 
and acts as the EU’s ultimate borrower in international markets. An example 
of a purely top- down initiative by the Commission with regard to foreign 
policy is the European External Investment Plan (EEIP) for Africa. Greece’s 
call for the EU to change the name of Macedonia, which Greece considers to 
be historically inaccurate, as an obligatory requirement for accession negotia-
tions to proceed, meanwhile, is an instance of individual bottom- up initia-
tive. Collective bottom- up initiatives include the most recent Franco- German 
Defense Plan on the establishment of a joint EU military headquarters to 
consolidate the EU after Brexit, and a Germany– Belgium– Luxembourg ini-
tiative aiming to establish a European anti- terror agency.
Key participants in multilevel games have to take into account the con-
sequences of  interactions at different levels simultaneously. Each actor 
assigns a different significance to the outcomes of  different games. The 
choice of  whether to cooperate on one level or not can at least partially 
explain decisions— similar or different— made at other levels. The mutual 
interrelation of  these levels remains the key to understanding the EU’s for-
eign policy. On the one hand, the emergence of  the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) has not diminished the importance of  the national 
foreign policies of  member states (Busygina and Filippov, 2015, p.4). On 
the other hand, the existence of  different national foreign policies did not 
stop the EU from investing efforts into the elaboration of  a CFSP. It is 
impossible to predict the outcome of  decision- making at the EU level sim-
ply by aggregating the messages articulated by national leaders (Busygina 
and Filippov, 2015, p.5).
Decision- making by consensus makes it principally possible for each indi-
vidual member state to become a veto power with regard to a proposal that 
contradicts its interests. This mode of policy- making also leads to the so- called 
Abilene paradox: a group of actors collectively decides on a joint action that 
contradicts the preferences of each of the individual members (Toje, 2008). 
Technically, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a “passarelle” clause, which enables 
the European Council to unanimously introduce qualified majority voting 
on a specific issue or a whole policy area. Qualified majority voting may also 
be proposed by the High Representative at the request of the Council (Paul, 
2008). In practice, the use of these options would be equal to progressive dele-
gation of authority in the sphere of foreign policy, something nation- states 
reject in order to preserve their sovereignty. It is hard to compromise over a 
particular policy, but once it has been adopted, it becomes extremely difficult 
to abandon. Even if  a policy vector is not particularly active, once it has been 
launched, it persists, because any transformation would require new rounds 
of bargaining.
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Multilevel governance architecture exerts specific pressure on member 
states to pay particular attention to the timing and capacity for coalition- 
building. Three components are needed for an idea to be transformed into a 
concrete policy: a window of opportunity, a committed single policy entre-
preneur and a convergence of ideas in the coalition of the willing (Wegge, 
2012, p.10). The idea of the EU’s core (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and Germany) to use the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of 
Rome in 2017 as a milestone for the development of a reform program for the 
Union may serve as an example of an attempt to exploit the timing factor.
National executives have to be able to “sell” their foreign policy priority 
to at least one other EU country. The initiating country has to “package” its 
initiative in a way that sends the right signal to the right people. Otherwise, 
this initiative may easily be blocked or at least suspended by a confrontational 
coalition. The latter usually emerges more rapidly, because there is no need to 
find a compromise among players seeking to freeze a proposal without offer-
ing an alternative.
There is a side effect that stems from defining the EU through the notion 
of power. It lies in the tendency of European policymakers within the MLG 
structure to become involved in as many matters of external action as possible, 
extending the structure’s unconventional power. The EU is running a wide 
spectrum of regional policies, including the Black Sea Synergy, the Middle 
East Peace Process, the Northern Dimension, the European Neighborhood 
Policy and the Eastern Partnership. Most of these are offers of multilateral 
authority- type relations to countries residing in particular regions. The inter-
action proposed is the EU’s sponsorship in exchange for domestic political 
and economic reforms in target states. Traditional areas of EU external action 
include Common Foreign and Security Policy, Trade, Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection, Combating Terrorism, Crisis Response, Development and 
Aid. New policies include the EU’s International Cyberspace Policy, Science 
Policy and Arctic Policy. Additionally, the EU tends to establish financial ties 
with an exceptionally wide range of third countries. This extension across 
space provides the EU with the image of the world’s biggest donor, though 
this can be counterproductive for setting priorities. When the “stream of prob-
lems” is packed with an enormous number of issues, focus dispersal makes it 
difficult for the Commission to address them and to “catch” the right ones to 
shift into the “policy stream.” However, while this rationale functions for the 
EU’s interests, supranational institutions as policy entrepreneurs act accord-
ing to rationales of their own. Each new policy domain potentially creates 
new competences for them and increases the possibility of greater delegation 
of authority.
The EU’s interests as a single entity do diverge from the interests of indi-
vidual member states. It is commonly argued that the EU is barely capable 
of taking tangible external action, and has no common position on major 
issues like Russian ambitions in the Caucasus, Ukraine and the growth of 
Chinese power (Simms, 2012, p.49). Indeed, the CFSP is often criticized for 
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having much rhetoric and little substance, weak central institutions and a gap 
between expectations and delivery, as well as for a lack of political will. As 
Peterson states,
most support the conclusion that the CFSP has been crippled by three 
fundamental defects, none of which can be repaired in any simple way… 
The first is a lack of identity. … A related problem is one of interests. … 
The CFSP’s third defect— its weak institutions.
(Peterson, 1998, p.3)
Another reproach to the CFSP is that the EU has attempted to establish it 
without first creating a parallel single federal political authority within its 
borders (Simms, 2012, p.61).
This belief  in the severely limited capacity of the EU’s CFSP has spread well 
beyond the EU itself, reached beyond the expert community and penetrated 
into the realm of the political decision- making of foreign states. Indeed, not 
all EU members are ready to act for the good of the EU if  such action could 
theoretically harm their national interests or actually does so— at least in the 
short term. By joining the EU, its current members have committed to power 
delegation, but they still need a sense of ownership and the right to withdraw 
from any arrangement that may potentially harm them. However, as the case 
of sanctions against Russia has shown, in the case of a common major chal-
lenge, all members can reach agreement despite significant economic losses 
asymmetrically distributed among them.
Europeanization through conditionality
Authority relations are central to the EU both internally and externally, first 
and foremost with regard to its neighboring countries. The EU has absorbed 
political systems of different origins and sharply varying legacies, and man-
ages to accommodate them in a single mechanism, capable of reproducing 
its governance principles and of projecting them abroad. The EU’s drive for 
external reproduction provides credible evidence that its system is consolidated 
enough to address issues outside its locus of control. At its borders, the EU 
has the zone of states that are much weaker economically and structurally. By 
assisting their transformation according to the pattern of Europeanization (a 
process to which the EU is accustomed), the Union enriches its raison d’être 
with an external dimension.
Indeed, the Union has a lot to offer neighboring countries. To prove this, 
it is enough just to look at the advantages available to the countries that are 
already members of the “club.” The EU functions as an incomplete contract 
between the supranational and the national governance levels for the provi-
sion of the EU’s “club goods”— benefits associated with common currency, 
a visa- free space, cohesion and welfare. This incomplete contract resem-
bles a marriage of convenience, where both parties agree on the framework 
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arrangement to mutual advantage, but there is no full commitment and no 
unconditional trust.
The parties in the EU’s incomplete contract avoid the risks associated with 
trust and feel free to deviate from the framework arrangement by interpret-
ing its details favorably to themselves if  something goes wrong. Trust is a key 
word here— as Luhmann argues,
Trust … presupposes a situation of risk. You may or may not buy a used 
car that turns out to be a “lemon.” You may or may not hire a babysitter 
for the evening and leave him or her unsupervised in your apartment; he 
or she may also be a “lemon.” You can avoid taking the risk, but only if  
you are willing to waive the associated advantages. … If you choose one 
action in preference to others in spite of the possibility of being disap-
pointed in the actions of others, you define the situation as one of trust. 
… Trust is only possible in a situation where the possible damage may be 
greater than the advantage you seek.
(Luhmann, 2000, pp.97– 98)
The EU’s multilevel governance system produces a specific situation where 
EU member states are simultaneously superordinates and subordinates with 
regard to supranational institutions. Whether it is the former or the latter 
depends on the policy area and on the grade of authority delegation there. 
In foreign policy, member states act as superordinates, on equal terms with 
supranational institutions.
How does authority function in the EU? Inside the Union, the above- 
mentioned “marriage of convenience” stimulates Europeanization, which is 
at the same time the process of development of authority relations and the 
goal of the whole project. According to Radaelli (2004, p.3),
Europeanization consists of processes of construction, diffusion and 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and 
then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) dis-
course, political structures and public policies.
Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, p.8) understand Europeanization as “the emer-
gence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning, to which 
member- states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their 
domestic rule structures.” Europeanization is developed and implemented 
through conditionality— the method of practicing authority within and out-
side the EU.
Europeanization presupposes significant engagement by both supra-
national institutions and those of member states. Thus, member states 
“upload” national preferences to the EU level, while the EU “downloads” 
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regulations and norms to the national level (De Flers and Müller, 2010). 
“Downloading” occurs though elite socialization, by means of bureaucratic 
restructuring, constitutional changes and changes in public perceptions. 
Policy projection “uploading” happens by institution- building, via the use of 
agenda- setting power by the European Commission, and by example- setting 
and ideational export (Kaminska, 2007, p.7). Domestic Europeanization is 
a bottom- up process first aggregated at the level of member states and then 
resulting in changes in how the European level deals with its external environ-
ment. The reverse top- down logic is in play during the implementation period, 
when commitments and stimuli at the EU level produce change in various 
aspects at the national level (De Flers and Müller, 2010). It is worthwhile not-
ing that with regard to countries with candidate status, EU authority tools 
show the greatest efficiency when the perspective of membership is real but 
the final goal of membership is not yet achieved, as at this time the incentives 
of national elites for domestic reforms are the strongest. At the same time can-
didate states were very differently affected by the process of Europeanization; 
Cowles, Caporaso and Risse have described Europeanization as “domestic 
adaptation with national colors” (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001, p.1).
External Europeanization also follows the top- down logic, and the EU’s 
motivation in launching it lies primarily in increasing the level of security 
beyond EU borders, although there are other important reasons, including 
the wish to facilitate economic interaction with third states and to equip their 
markets for the entry of the EU’s firms and producers. In addition, external 
Europeanization helps the EU to develop its identity. By trying to explain its 
governance mode to third states and even to impose it on them, the EU can 
better understand what it is and what it is not.
The EU as a whole is most interested in maintaining the status of a super-
ordinate, which means that it wants to establish power relations with its coun-
terparts to its advantage by using the practice of political conditionality. 
Evidently, this is not always possible, especially with states that do not want 
to join the Union and therefore are reluctant to comply with its rules and 
regulations.
The EU does not hold the patent for the invention of conditionality tactics. 
In the ’80s that instrument was first used by international economic insti-
tutions such as the IMF, which linked financial aid to an economic reform 
package. As Smith argues, the European Community/ Union began to use 
conditionality in relations with third countries only after the end of the Cold 
War, though not all countries formally labeled part of the “West” were per-
fect democracies. Conditionality was not used by the EU with regard to the 
“Third World” for fear of reviving associations with the colonialist past. 
During the period when the Community refrained from using conditionality, 
it was the European Parliament that favored linking aid to the protection of 
human rights. When the Single European Act (1987) entered into force, the 
Parliament gained the power to approve association agreements and mem-
bership applications and used it to promote conditionality (Smith, 1997). 
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Conditionality acquired special importance for the EU following the 2004 
enlargement. Due to enlargement fatigue, European policymakers started 
to develop new mechanisms to avoid creating dividing lines within Europe, 
doing so by structuring external political space so as not to grant third coun-
tries access to European institutions (Balfour, 2012).
At the beginning of  the ‘90s, the “socialist camp” collapsed into a number 
of  states with dysfunctional institutions, and the shocks of  painful political 
and economic reforms were to follow. Externally, these countries predictably 
made a choice in favor of  the EU— as an alternative to a weak, unpredict-
able and therefore even more frightening Russia. This situation was used as 
an opportunity for the EU to launch authority- type Europeanization in the 
post- Soviet area, and former socialist countries were incorporated into the 
Union in 2004– 2007, in the course of  by far the largest EU enlargement. This 
was the timing with which the EU entered these countries’ political stage with 
its Europeanization toolkit and the tactics of  conditionality. Asymmetric 
negotiation power in favor of  the EU explains the patronizing nature of  the 
authority relations between the EU and these states, with the EU unilaterally 
defining the rules of  interaction (Anastasakis, 2015). Though the EU has 
invested much effort and a high amount of  resources in building state cap-
acity in these countries, the process has not been finalized yet, and the Union 
still shares a border with some weak and unstable regimes.
Europeanization takes place when the EU starts to define the “grammar 
of political action” for its subordinates. To make it real, the Union has to dis-
courage domestic veto players while supporting and empowering agents of 
change. Much depends on the presence and availability of domestic incentives 
for change and on the regime type. De Fler and Müller (2010) put forward 
the “goodness of fit” argument: the compatibility of worldviews and political 
aspirations between the EU and the party subject to Europeanization define 
the effectiveness of domestic transformation. A consensus- oriented decision- 
making culture is another factor facilitating Europeanization— it enables 
negotiating a common position through dialogue, and overcoming veto points 
by marginalizing veto players (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012). Ensuring the sus-
tainability of change after the incumbents in the third country leave office and 
new people come to power is the most difficult part of the Europeanization 
process (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012).
If  the EU’s pressure for adjustment is very specifically targeted, coercion, 
which is inherent in authority- type Europeanization, is launched at the high-
est level. If  the EU’s adjustment pressures are less specified, coercive elements 
appear at the lower level of the hierarchic authority relations. If  rules are 
solely offered by supranational institutions, mimesis is the most the EU can 
expect from a third state, and there is a high probability for regulatory com-
petition to emerge between it and the EU (Schmidt, 2002, p.897). Tracing the 
results of Europeanization is a challenging task, because its outcome is never 
universal and has no linear time pattern— there may be a considerable gap 
between supranational stimulus and national feedback (Radaelli, 2004). The 
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side effects of the EU’s authority- type Europeanization efforts are also diffi-
cult to calculate in any particular case.
Within the Europeanization strategic process, conditionality is the method 
aimed at making nonmember states comply with European principles of legit-
imate statehood. Solana explained the essence of conditionality as follows: 
“We just ask the countries which are interested in participating in our struc-
tures to comply with our rules and to share our values” (Solana, 2003, cited in 
Veebel, 2009, p.208). “By engaging in the conditionality relationship with the 
EU, a third country agrees on upfront risk- taking (Luhmann, 1989) by delib-
erately abstaining from checking whether the information the EU provides 
about benefits and setbacks of cooperation corresponds with reality” (Börzel 
and Risse, 2015, p.8). The EU, in turn, “buys a pig in a poke” and engages in 
an open- ended adventure.
The EU’s positive conditionality defines the “carrot” in “carrot and 
stick” with such subcomponents as legitimacy based on mutual benefit, 
interest or voluntarism, one- way shaped (pooled) sovereignty, economic 
reasoning and creation of  independent institutions to safeguard the process 
(Veebel, 2009, p.210). The Union commits itself  to changing the domestic 
economic and political environment in a target country by reacting either 
to fulfillment or to nonfulfillment of  the imposed conditions by rewarding 
or by withholding rewards (Smith, 1997). The strategy excludes both the 
use of  force and full engagement in the comprehensive support of  a target 
state with the range of  available policy tools for Europe (Schimmelfennig, 
Engert and Knobel, 2003).
The EU does not have enough “power to hurt” to make the compliance of 
subordinates “as voluntary as our custom of wearing clothes” (Blau, 1963, 
cited in Lake, 2009, p.19). Nonmember subordinates have no sense of duty 
with regard to the EU, because they do not perceive its assistance in their 
development as an altruistic act. Multilevel governance and shared sover-
eignty have made domestic Europeanization possible. Nonmember states 
de jure have complete sovereignty and, therefore, freedom to choose (at least, 
theoretically) whether to comply with externally defined rules or not. The 
choice in favor of the EU is a difficult and strategic (long- term) one, so there 
is no reason to expect that the EU’s efforts with regard to third countries will 
always be sustainable and successful.
It is not inevitable that the EU will establish power (authority) relations 
with all of its neighbors; that is either impossible or unnecessary. In the EU’s 
bilateral contracts with equal partners, namely Switzerland and Norway, 
there is no need for Europeanization, because the counterparts agree to limit 
the ambitions of communication by reaping the fruits of sectoral agreements. 
Switzerland and Norway may selectively fill the emerging gaps in the fields of 
their interest by incorporating part of the EU’s acquis and thereby voluntarily 
constraining sovereignty to ensure access to the EU’s market. However, these 
countries carefully avoid signing binding agreements that presuppose auto-
matic incorporation of the EU’s norms in any policy area.
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The “golden carrot” of membership
EU membership is a very specific carrot. It offers access to the EU’s “club 
goods,” but the use of these goods is conditional and the more advanced 
the stage of integration, the more commitments applicants sign up to. 
Nevertheless, membership is perceived as a “golden carrot” by the national 
elites of many third countries because of the attractiveness of the associated 
gains. This motivation is powerful enough for the elites, though the benefits 
of membership can be nonobvious for the citizens. Explaining the “European 
choice” together with selective sharing of information enables national elites 
to persuade their population to opt for the “European path,” but when the 
veil of ignorance vanishes, referenda are needed to restore the connection 
between ordinary citizens and incumbent politicians (as in Hungary’s case) 
(Agh, 2003). From the other side, as we see from the examples of Norway and 
Switzerland, the situation of being in Europe geographically without belong-
ing to the EU institutionally, though sharing with it certain institutional 
arrangements, can be quite profitable. Interestingly enough, democratic vote 
against EU membership in these countries has no major adverse effects on 
the functioning of these arrangements. The problem, however, is that Norway 
and Switzerland are special cases, and there is no reason to expect that other 
“outsiders” could at least partly repeat that pair’s path of development while 
remaining outside the EU.
The reasoning behind EU enlargement is another controversial issue, as 
it is a process that seemingly threatens to disturb the EU’s internal order, to 
create new external borders and ultimately new divisions on the continent 
(Sjursen, 2002). The EU has set fixed membership criteria, but the choice of 
countries eligible for membership is limited purely geographically. Moreover, 
the enlargement strategy is based on the “unrealistic assumption about the 
ability of one potential new EU member to commit [itself] on all future behav-
ior as a full member” (Heinemann, 2001, p.4). The absence of a “compul-
sory withdrawal” clause in the treaties makes it legally impossible to withdraw 
membership in case of noncompliance after the accession.
Nevertheless, the evidence is that the EU has already witnessed six rounds 
of enlargement: Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the project in 1983, 
Greece became a member in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Then, in 
1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the Union. The fifth enlargement 
round was a compound one and included the enlargement of 2004, the larg-
est by far, which featured the entry of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, as well as 
the enlargement of 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania acquired EU member-
ship. The sixth and most recent enlargement involved Croatia’s accession in 
2013 (The European Commission, 2013).
The rationality of the EU enlargement lies in the interplay between the 
internal and external facets of the European integration multilevel governance 
system. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002, p.503) define enlargement as 
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“gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules 
and norms,” where “Institutionalization means the process by which the 
actions and interactions of social actors come to be normatively patterned.” 
This normativity is the main driving force in the EU’s attempts to structure 
its external space by means of institutional isomorphism and absorption of 
new members. The EU uses various mechanisms of injecting and supporting 
its norms in third countries: it ensures its dominance in the authority- type 
approach, it creates conditions for internalization (making noncompliance for 
membership aspirants painful even if  it is connected with direct material ben-
efits) and it obliges membership aspirants to incorporate its law and makes its 
application binding via treaties. Finally, it threatens the elites of membership 
aspirants with reputational losses if  they drift away from the course of the 
EU- assisted transformation (Axelrod, 1986).
Enlargement is “a formalized act and at the same time a gradual process 
that begins before, and continues after, the formal accession” (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, 2002, p.503). According to Article 49 of the Treaty on 
European Union, the decision on enlargement proceeds by unanimous vote 
in the Council, and absolute majority vote in the European Parliament in 
consultation with the European Commission. The application procedure 
starts with an official letter from a candidate country, which is submitted 
to the rotating EU presidency. The Council forwards this application to the 
Commission, which has to prepare its opinion (Avis) on the third country’s 
fitness for further reforms. The whole process, from the EU Commission 
screening the situation in the third country to the actual delivery of the Avis 
back to the Council, may last more than a year. The Council then makes a 
decision about subsequent steps the candidate has to take on the way to EU 
membership (The European Commission, 2016b). The phase of developing 
the accession treaty starts upon the “closure of chapters” and, once the appli-
cation treaty has been signed, the candidate acquires the status of “acceding 
country.” Even at this stage, the actual accession can be blocked by any EU 
member, because the accession treaty must be ratified by all member states in 
accordance with their constitutional rules. Recently the EU has developed a 
special procedure for the Western Balkans— they were offered the status of 
“potential candidates” (The European Commission, 2016a). The Union com-
mitted itself  to granting them official candidate status upon the fulfillment of 
special conditions. The list of current candidate countries includes Albania, 
Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey. On September 20, 2016, the EU Council 
forwarded Bosnia’s membership application (which had been submitted on 
February 15, 2016)  to the Commission to assess the country’s readiness to 
begin membership talks (Gotev, 2016).
Indeed, the potential for the accession of the Western Balkans coun-
tries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and previously Croatia) to 
the EU has naturally given birth to an appropriate authority tool, namely 
the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), initiated in 1999, which laid 
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the groundwork for negotiations between national governments and the EU. 
The SAP’s purpose was the stabilization of these countries in order to achieve 
three main goals— to ensure transition to a market economy, promotion of 
regional cooperation and eventual membership in the EU (The European 
Commission, 2012).
The SAP is a multistep process. Once the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements (SAA) were signed with the Western Balkans countries, they were 
ratified by all the member states as well as by the European Commission. 
After this first step, the countries were to gain access to preaccession assist-
ance programs and use the programs’ funds to assist the reform process. Then 
the aspiring member country was expected to deliver a national program for 
the adoption of the acquis. As Nenadović (2012, p.26) describes,
the SAA monitoring is coupled with intensive political dialogue and 
Progress reports that track the countries’ successes and obstacles in com-
pleting the set terms. Once a country receives candidate status, official 
accession negotiations with the EU begin and determine under which 
conditions that country will join the European Union.
The criteria that set the directions of reforms for acceding countries, and 
at the same time allow the EU to evaluate and compare the progress that 
these countries are making with regard to Europeanization, are central to the 
enlargement project. The Copenhagen criteria consist of three sets of require-
ments: a political criterion, implying stable democratic institutions; an eco-
nomic criterion, which sets the requirement of a market economy capable 
of coping with competitive pressures inside the Union; and a legal criterion, 
which requires the capacity to subscribe to the objectives of a political, eco-
nomic and monetary Union (Tulmets, 2005). Here the EU cannot do with-
out coercion playing a significant role: as Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, p.7) 
stress, “membership Europeanization works to a large extent through legal 
coercion.” In addition to setting mandatory goals and criteria, the EU tries 
to shape third countries’ markets indirectly, “by placing them in a regulative 
competition framework through more or less forceful opening of their econo-
mies” (Bruszt, 2002, p.134).
In negotiating accession, the positions of the EU and applicant countries 
are definitively not those of equal partners; in fact, the start of the accession 
process marks the beginning of authority relations between superordinate 
(the EU) and subordinate (the applicant country). Indeed, applicant coun-
tries find themselves in a weaker, subordinate negotiating position vis- à- vis 
the EU in the preaccession period and concede much in exchange for mem-
bership (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003, p.44). But the expected reward is 
alluring: by joining the Union a new member principally changes its status— 
from the “club of subordinates” it enters that of superordinates, where it can 
from now on decide the fate of those striving to join. In this sense the carrot 
is “golden” indeed, as a sovereign state, as a superordinate, cannot offer the 
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same possibility to its subordinates within an authority relations framework. 
Heinemann (2001, p.4) writes that
Pre- entry, a candidate has no impact on the acquis and basically is con-
fronted with one choice: to join the community with the constitution 
defined by the old member countries or to stay out. Post- entry, the same 
country takes part in the decision- making process both on day- to- day 
policy and the evolution of the constitution with the same rights as the 
old member countries.
However, entering the struggle for membership status is voluntary, and sub-
mitting a membership application is not the same as buying a one- way ticket: 
in May 2015 Iceland bought a “return ticket” by requesting to no longer be 
regarded as a candidate country.
Enlargement appears to be a very sensitive issue for “old” members of 
the EU, and not all of them welcome “new” ones. This was very clear with 
the EU’s Eastern Enlargement, when the coalition countering it included 
Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg (Heinemann, 2001). To overcome this coalition’s veto, as 
Christina Schneider (2007, p.86) has concluded, the EU had to launch “tran-
sitional allocation of limited membership rights” (“discriminatory member-
ship”). Plümper and Schneider (2007, p.569) remind us that the EU’s Eastern 
Enlargement was only possible when “most of the accession countries agreed 
to be temporarily excluded from agricultural subsidies, structural aid, and the 
free movement of labor as a means of paving their way to the European club.” 
Thus, the distributional conflict of enlargement pushed the EU to restructure 
ongoing authority relations.
The effects of accession of certain countries to the EU can be very 
asymmetric— they can be nearly invisible for some members while being 
very significant for others. As Schneider shows, the unanimity rules of the 
Council vote on accession serve as an “airbag” to guarantee that the position 
of already existing members does not significantly worsen after EU enlarge-
ment. They allow all EU governments to delay the accession of new members 
until they are satisfied with the arrangement according to which this process 
will take place. Generally speaking, enlargement may be more beneficial for 
prosperous EU economies in search of new markets. By contrast, weak mem-
bers have to bear most of the costs, because they “do not have enough power 
to avert the negative consequences of increased competition from candidates 
that have rival claims to the same benefits” (Schneider, 2011, pp.7– 8). Thus, it 
is institutional bargaining that allows weak members to exert influence which 
goes beyond their actual capacities, specifically in the pre- enlargement period. 
This is possible because strong members will bear the greatest costs if  enlarge-
ment negotiations are suspended or frozen, which is why they may choose 
to “buy out” the refusal of smaller states to use their veto power with “side 
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payments” in other areas in order to make urgent unanimity on their priority 
vote possible (Schneider, 2011).
Obviously, the “golden carrot” of membership cannot be offered to all the 
countries that might wish to join the Union. It was in 2002 that Romano 
Prodi, who then held the office of Commission President, voiced his con-
cerns that the Eastern Enlargement could “water down the European pol-
itical project and turn the EU into just a free trade area” (Prodi, 2002, cited 
in Vasconcelos and Bonvicini, 2006, p.8). Even so, only after the big- bang 
enlargement of 2004 did the EU start to seriously consider alternative vari-
ants of control over its external political environment so as to avoid the threat 
of “breaking the camel’s back” by overcomplicating its domestic arrangement 
(Leuffen, 2006). The proposal of Commissioner Frans Andriessen to institu-
tionalize second- class, “affiliate membership” in the form of the “European 
Political Area” (Baun, 2000), with states having a seat in the Council with 
rights equal to that of full members in specific areas only, had been rejected a 
year earlier. However, in order to maintain the membership aspirations that 
enable reforms in third countries, the EU did not set ultimate physical bor-
ders. Instead, it concentrated on efforts to move its legal border beyond its 
actual physical border (Vasconcelos and Bonvicini, 2006). The launch of the 
European Neighborhood “proximity” policy (ENP) was a critical juncture 
and a turning point from the politics of exclusion to the politics of inclusion 
(Kahraman, 2005).
The ENP was designed to export good governance, democratic institutions 
and decentralization to countries in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus, in the 
Middle East and in North Africa. The program was later split into subpro-
grams according to geography— into the Southern Neighborhood, which 
included Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, 
Syria and Tunisia, and the Eastern Partnership, which institutionalized the 
EU’s cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine. This extremely wide geographical scope allows us to assume that the 
ENP was not about enlargement but rather was a double- edged sword of a 
prize (Moldovanu, Sela and Shi, 2008)— and indeed, by agreeing to cooperate 
in this framework, a third country excludes itself  from the membership race, 
because the ENP is not aimed at assisting enlargement.
The ENP allowed the EU to start developing an alternative to enlargement, 
while at the same time “preventing future EU borders from becoming hard 
exclusionary boundaries and developing instead into integrated borderlands” 
(Vasconcelos and Bonvicini, 2006, p.7). In part, the initiative outsources the 
EU’s security policy by stimulating the build- up of state capacity (though to 
a limited extent) in countries that may become refugee exporters as well as in 
countries that share a border with the EU and therefore expose the Union to 
specific threats. In other words, there is little altruism in the EU’s approach 
to external policy— the EU is entirely rational; it serves its own interests 
and pays to pursue them. The EU cannot coerce its ENP subordinates into 
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compliance— the case of Belarus shows this well enough. It can offer its part-
ners something, though of course it will not be as “golden” as a membership 
perspective, and itis their choice whether to accept the offer or not.
By developing the ENP format, the EU became a policy transfer plat-
form (Bulmer and Padgett, 2004, p.104) and created different types of 
subordinates— reciprocators, defectors and those opting out. In his work on 
behavioral economy, Simon Gächter has analyzed a cognitive experiment 
of individual- level voluntary cooperation and come to a series of important 
conclusions.
The game … considers three strategies: non- participation, defection and 
cooperation. In this game, very small incentives lead to an unstable pat-
tern of non- participation with bursts of cooperation. When the incen-
tives are very large, a stable uniform population of cooperators emerges 
… The most remarkable outcome of the study occurs when intermedi-
ate incentives are offered and participation is voluntary. In this situation, 
slightly increasing the severity of punishment above a very low level 
results in stable populations of cooperators. By contrast, rewards of at 
least medium size are needed to cause a shift in the population from the 
majority who opt out of participation to a stable mixture of cooperators 
and defectors. When participation is voluntary, only very large rewards 
could generate a stable and uniform population of cooperators.
(Gächter, 2012, p.40)
Applying Gächter’s logic to the analysis of international authority rela-
tions (in particular, to the case of the EU and its neighboring countries) 
brings us to the conclusion that a viable medium- size reward is needed to 
initiate authority- type cooperation. When authority relations are already 
functioning and the subordinate country is carrying out the requirements of 
the superordinate, at least to some extent, it is possible for the EU as a super-
ordinate to slightly regulate compliance either by increasing reward or, if  this 
does not bring satisfying results, by engaging minor coercion. To ensure max-
imum compliance, the EU has to offer a reward that is very significant— and 
not only from the EU’s perspective, but from the viewpoint of the subordinate 
country. (From the other side, driving coercion to the maximum possible is 
likely to have the opposite effect of causing resistance and refusal to comply.)
The evidence from the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the 
Eastern Partnership reveals that alternatives to membership have fundamen-
tally limited ability to “generate a stable and uniform population of coopera-
tors” inside subordinate countries.
Economic coercion: the effects of multilevel governance
It follows from all of the aforesaid that the European Union is “doomed” to 
exert its power externally mainly through authority instruments, resulting in 
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the gradual Europeanization of target countries; however, it also has coercive 
instruments at its disposal, and these are, first of all, economic sanctions. By 
using these, the EU is in fact converting its economic power into a foreign 
policy tool.1 As Portela (2014, p.35) rightly notes, “Sanctions create bargain-
ing chips, but their effective employment in extracting political concession 
is part of a negotiation whose success often depends on the skillfulness and 
flexibility of the sender. Sanctions per se do not display ‘corrective’ or ‘heal-
ing’ effects.” In this section my task is to show what kind of constraints multi-
level governance puts on using this form of coercion as well as on choosing 
among numerous concrete instruments within it. But before moving onto this 
issue, I need first to describe briefly the EU’s general approach to sanctions.
The EEC has used sanctions as an instrument of political influence since 
the Rome Treaty of 1957, and since the 1980s they have been imposed by 
the EU fairly frequently with the general aim of pressuring targeted coun-
tries into policy changes (Portela, 2010, p.xiv). In other words, as the EU 
has been confronted with situations that require a firm response— and such 
situations have been emerging with increasing frequency— sanctions have 
become almost a standard reaction. It was the Maastricht Treaty that in 
1992 created the Common Foreign and Security Policy and formalized the 
decision- making procedures for sanctions (Kreutz, 2005, p.11). According to 
the European Commission, “sanctions are an instrument of a diplomatic or 
economic nature which seek to bring about a change in activities or policies 
such as violations of international law or human rights, or policies that do not 
respect the rule of law or democratic principles” (The European Commission, 
2008, cited in Leenders, 2014, p.4). In 2004, the Council came forward with the 
objectives the EU wishes to achieve by adopting sanctions: the Council will 
impose autonomous EU sanctions in support of efforts to fight terrorism and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and as a restrictive meas-
ure to uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance (The Council of the European Union, 2004, cited in Leenders, 
2014, p.7). What is important is that by setting out these objectives, the EU 
has in fact declared that the international system that the Union is striving 
to promote is based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global 
governance (Giumelli, 2013, p.396). It is also worth mentioning that, in devel-
oping its sanctions policy and evaluating its outcomes, the EU has gradually 
come to the idea of targeted sanctions (or “smart” sanctions) such as travel 
bans, commodity boycotts, financial sanctions “aimed at nonstate actors (i.e., 
individuals, groups or companies for the most part) and/ or … only specific 
economic sectors or specific products” (Giumelli, 2013, p.395). The objective 
is “to design the restrictive measures in order to maximize their impact on 
the actors responsible for the wrongdoings, and to minimize the unintended 
consequences on innocent civilians” (Giumelli, 2013, p.395). In other words, 
“targeted” sanctions are intended to minimize the effect of sanctions on the 
civilian population by targeting specific groups or individuals rather than the 
economy as a whole, thereby increasing the sanctions’ legitimacy (Esfandiary, 
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2013, p.2). By looking at several case studies from a set of 47 independent EU 
sanction cases, Leenders (2014) comes to the conclusion that, despite various 
challenges, the coercive nature of the sanction instrument nevertheless makes 
it a relevant foreign policy tool which allows the EU to react to external crises.
A nation (or group of nations) imposing sanctions against another nation 
signals that there is a conflict between them, and that both sides (not only 
the sender) will necessarily bear the costs of the conflict, while these costs 
will greatly increase should the nations be interdependent. Therefore, due to 
rational fears of economic loss it is much more difficult to punish economic 
partners (not declaratively, but practically) for international wrongdoing, and 
the difficulty of making this decision will be proportional to the degree of the 
sender’s dependency upon the target country. What matters is that the costs 
will be distributed asymmetrically across the sender’s territory: with the ter-
mination of exports of certain goods, the regions that specialize in production 
of these goods will suffer the most significant losses. However, in a sovereign 
state the decision to impose sanctions is taken by the national executive only, 
and in calculating the losses to the national economy due to sanctions, the 
national executive can take into account these asymmetries between subna-
tional regions, with those most hit by the effects of this decision then receiving 
compensation through redistribution mechanisms. However, the regions can-
not block the center’s general decision to impose sanctions.
In a union of states (such as the EU) this scheme does not work. As the 
EU brings together 28 member states, all of them inevitably pursue their own 
particular interests (Leenders, 2014, p.8). The EU member states’ individual 
interests play a decisive role in the EU’s sanction practice. Of course, much 
depends on the EU’s ability to manage sanctions consistently (and a good 
deal of criticism has been expressed about this), but the initial agreement 
of all member states is critical. In each concrete case of imposing sanctions, 
member states have varied greatly in their willingness to do so. As Gebert 
(2013, p.11) shows, in Iran’s case, Spain and Greece were reluctant to impose 
oil sanctions because of their dependence on the export of oil from Iran, and 
likewise France was eager to lift sanctions on Myanmar because of its invest-
ments in the country. Poland was very much in favor of sanctions against 
Belarus, but not against Ukraine (Gebert, 2013, p.7). Furthermore, the factor 
of the UN mandate also playes a role: some EU countries are less comfortable 
imposing sanctions that have not been mandated by the UN, as such measures 
are perceived as politically more sensitive (Esfandiary, 2013, p.3).
If  a union imposes sanctions, the costs of interrupting trade relations will 
vary significantly among its members. However, in contrast to developing 
foreign policy for a state, doing so for the EU demands building voluntary 
commitment without any form of enforcement. This is possible solely when 
national executives preserve certain “room for maneuver” at the bilateral 
level. And this is not a sign of failure, but a mechanism for reaching a broader 
consensus on EU foreign policy. Thus, to agree on sanctions means to reach 
consensus among member states: as the decision is based on the principle of 
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unanimity, each member must give its agreement. It is clear that reaching con-
sensus is not an easy task since while the decision is taken by national execu-
tives in Brussels, the costs (asymmetrically distributed among member states) 
will be at the national level. These costs can undermine political support for 
the incumbents and therefore lower their chances to stay in office after the 
next elections. With the system of multilevel governance, national executives 
find themselves in a twofold situation: they vote for sanctions in the Council 
and bear the costs of the decision at home. In addition, sanctions work slowly, 
and this creates another difficulty: it is difficult enough to reach initial agree-
ment of all members of the Union, but much more difficult to maintain con-
sensus among the member states long enough to achieve desired results.
What could be done to overcome the problem of “individual national inter-
est”? The EU can leave defining the character of the sanctions to the member 
states. This was, for instance, the case with South Africa in 1986, when the EC 
sanctioned new direct investments but left it to member states to declare if  the 
sanctions would be binding. The two major investors— the United Kingdom 
and Germany— failed to impose binding sanctions (Hefti and Staehelin- Witt, 
2014). In such cases, the EU can impose not formal but informal sanctions, 
which encompass measures that were not adopted in a formal sanction frame-
work, but can consist of just the same types of sanctions, though usually they 
do not entail heavy measures such as embargoes. For example, in Cuba’s case, 
a number of diplomatic measures were agreed, but via Council conclusions 
instead of a legal document (The Council of the European Union, 2003). 
In the cases of Pakistan and India, informal sanctions allowed the EU to 
react even when there was no consensus in the Council (Portela, 2010, p.117). 
According to Portela (2010, p.126), informal measures may come in useful if  
member states do not wish to be tied down by legal decisions, or if  disagree-
ment impedes an EU reaction, but they do not seem fit to pursue an effective 
and coherent sanction strategy. Leenders (2014, p.23) stresses the particular 
role of informal sanctions: they allow the EU to signal disapproval, while not 
inflicting too much harm on strategic relationships. However, the best thing 
for evening out the costs of member states and alleviating tensions would be 
the introduction of a burden- sharing mechanism— a suggestion that looks 
good, but, unfortunately, is not feasible in the foreseeable future.
The EU’s use of coercive instruments has increased exponentially in recent 
years: at the beginning of the century, the EU targeted fewer than 20 coun-
tries with restrictive measures, while in 2014 the number went up to 30. The 
EU used a very broad range of sanctions regimes— from traditional arms 
embargoes on countries such as Myanmar and asset freezes in Egypt to more 
complicated and multilayered regimes in Iran and Syria (Esfandiary, 2013, 
p.2). However, up to 2014, when the EU started sanctioning Russia after 
the annexation of Crimea, the targets were mainly geographically distant 
countries where imposing sanctions did not cause significant trouble for the 
EU member states. The case of Russia stands apart in the “EU sanctions 
story,” as for the first time the common challenge has reached a scale where 
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the EU member states have unanimously agreed to impose sanctions against 
the neighboring giant Russia, trade with which is very important for many 
of them.
As de Galbert (2015, p.1) argues,
with military coercion options constrained, and public condemnations 
considered inadequate in light of the severity of the situation, hard power 
economic coercion in the form of sanctions quickly emerged as a realistic 
response to hold Russia accountable and to deter it from escalating the 
conflict further.
But the costs of the sanctions regime have been calculated to be high for 
European economies, significantly higher, for instance, than what the Iran 
sanctions have cost the European economy in the past decade (de Galbert, 
2015, p. V).
Experts often point to the fact that itis the EU’s design (multilevel gov-
ernance in particular) that prevents it from acting efficiently in international 
relations, and that member states will not be able to reach an agreement 
because individual national security concerns are too important to them (for 
these arguments see, for instance, Kreutz, 2005). However, Kreutz (2005, p.3) 
notes that the inclusion of  sanctions as part of  the CFSP corresponds to 
the recent development of  the EU as a more active security provider. And 
indeed, the Ukrainian crisis has shown that, when faced with a major com-
mon challenge, all 28 EU member states are capable of  agreeing on costly 
joint measures such as sanctions against Russia. Moreover, it shows that EU 
members are capable of  consenting to bear the significantly variable costs 
of  this joint action caused by the interruption of  their economic relations 
with Russia. Thus, the Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated the ability of  EU 
institutions to obtain and sustain compliance, if  not necessarily consensus, 
despite significant differences in the interests of  the national states. The EU 
sanctions against Russia revealed readiness to accept the de- facto supremacy 
of  all- union decision- making institutions over bilateral relations. While the 
political leaders of  many member states expressed a desire to maintain ami-
able relations with Putin, at the EU level (the European Council, the Council 
of  Ministers) they supported united action against Russia.
The Ukrainian crisis created a unique opportunity to formally upgrade 
the role of the EU’s common foreign and security policy institutions to reflect 
their evolving de- facto significance. Theoretically, the greater reallocation 
of decision- making authority from national to EU institutions requires an 
issue of overwhelming importance for all member states, and the conflict 
with Russia over the annexation of Crimea and its support for separatists 
in Eastern Ukraine appears to be such an issue. At the same time, the multi-
level nature of the EU allows members to hold to their specific national con-
cerns to a degree. Member states with economies that are more dependent 
upon economic cooperation with Russia still preserve institutional means of 
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maintaining a more benevolent tone in their bilateral discourse, while pla-
cing the responsibility for the “angry voice” on the European Union as a dis-
tinct actor in which they can pose as a minority. The same actors— national 
executives— continue playing different games in different arenas. In general, 
the “sanctions story” proves that the EU’s institutional arrangements can be 
more robust than is traditionally considered, though this robustness manifests 
situationally, in the event of the EU encountering a real and large- scale com-
mon challenge. From the other side, the crucial role of the national executive 
will guarantee that the EU will refrain from “arbitrarily” extending its use of 
coercion.
As coercive tools, sanctions regimes do play an important role in EU exter-
nal relations, though the roles of sanctions and authority are absolutely not 
comparable. The role of sanctions will remain supporting, or additional, while 
the uniqueness of the EU and its power relations through which it impacts on 
external spaces is embodied in authority relations.
Note
 1 It is important to mention that there also exists the possibility of using sanctions 
within the EU— against its own member states. These are sanctions in response to 
deterioration of democracy in the EU’s member states, and such cases are mul-
tiplying: Romania, Hungary and Poland are the “best” examples. According to 
Sedelmeier,
the EU can use two types of sanctions against democratic backsliding in mem-
ber states: hard (material) sanctions and soft (social) sanctions. The main hard 
sanctions are defined in Article 7 TEU. In Article 7, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
gave the EU the possibility to punish “serious and persistent” breaches of 
the liberal democratic values contained in Article 2. If  the European Council 
agrees unanimously that such a breach exists, the Council can decide by quali-
fied majority to suspend “certain [membership] rights … including the voting 
rights” … Soft sanctions against democratic backsliding consist of social pres-
sure, i.e. shaming through open criticism of illiberal practices in a member state.
(see Sedelmeier, 2016, p.8)
However, Article 7 has never been used so far, and, as Zalan points out, “the 
new ‘rule of law framework’, adopted in 2014, did not introduce any new sanc-
tions or any new mechanisms for holding EU states accountable. Instead, it simply 
codified the political dialogue between Brussels and the offending member state” 
(see Zalan, 2016, no pagination). It can be expected with a high probability that 
due to the effects of multilevel governance, “soft sanctions” as a form of diplo-
matic warning will remain the EU’s only practical tool for intervening in a member 
state’s internal affairs.
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4 Russia and the EU
From failed authority to mutual 
coercion
In 2016, Russia’s Valdai Club published a report titled “Russia and the 
European Union: Three Questions on New Principles of Relationship” with 
the main idea being that Russia should flatly refuse any kind of integration 
with the EU. Russia should turn to the East (in particular, to China) and 
cooperate with the EU exclusively on a set list of specific problems. The 
report also demands that the Union cancel sanctions against Crimea (Valdai 
Discussion Club, 2016). As Inozemtsev (2016) has rightly noted, the report 
not only supports the statement that Russia is drifting away from Europe, 
and Europe from Russia; in fact, the report presents a kind of ultimatum on 
what the EU must do in order to restore communication with Russia. The EU 
has not put forward an ultimatum to Russia— its tone is quite discreet— but 
experts are deeply concerned by “an unresolved question of how to achieve a 
lasting agreement on the rules and norms for regulating the international pol-
itical associations between the European security community and its various 
neighbors” (Ferguson, 2017, p.19), primarily, Russia.
Russia and the European Union are two of the major powers in Europe, 
but due to a combination of two factors— geographical proximity and stra-
tegic economic interdependence— the relations between the rising European 
Union1 and the rising Russia are very different from those between other “ris-
ing powers.” Indeed, the border between the two partly is the border between 
Russia and Estonia, and Russia and Latvia (these Baltic republics were part 
of the USSR). The Kaliningrad region, Russia’s exclave within the Union’s 
territory, is located between Poland and Lithuania. Over the past 20 years, 
the EU and Russia have become increasingly economically tied (Gottlieb 
and Lorber, 2014), and it was due to an excessively high degree of economic 
interdependence that the EU called relations with Russia a key strategic chal-
lenge in its latest Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EEAS 
press team, 2016). Forsberg and Haukkala (2016, p.77) stress that economy 
is the true foundation of EU– Russia relations, while “The structure of trade 
between the EU and Russia reveals natural complementarities suggesting a 
good match between the economies.” In this case a “good match” is a very 
asymmetric “match,” as it is energy relations— Russia sells natural gas and 
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oil, the EU member states buy them— that form the main pillar of economic 
interaction between Russia and the EU.
In 2014, prior to the launch of the sanctioning spiral, the EU was Russia’s 
primary trading partner while Russia was the EU’s third most important 
partner. The EU exports pharmaceutical products (8  percent), chemicals, 
machinery and equipment (22.8 percent) and cars and trucks (10 percent) to 
Russia, while its imports from Russia are vastly dominated by oil and gas. 
In 2015, Russia came fifth among the EU’s trade partners (with 6 percent of 
exports and imports), and for Russia the Union accounted for 44.8 percent 
of total exports and imports (Russell and Sabbati, 2016). Such an extent of 
economic interdependence between Russia and the EU is the first big differ-
ence compared to the Cold War period. The second is the new status of the 
EU and Russia in the world, as both have acquired the status of rising powers 
(Busygina, 2017).
Geographic proximity and strategic economic interdependence create 
objective conditions for cooperation between the “rising antipodes,” while the 
deepest dissimilarities between them lie in two domains— preferences/ values 
and contrasting institutional systems. Developing the theoretical argument 
of Organski and Kugler, who posit that a dissimilarity of preferences for the 
international status quo— or the security, military, economic and diplomatic 
rules and norms of engagement— is an essential determinant of wars between 
great powers (Organski and Kugler, 1980), Benson proves that dissimilarities 
of preferences serve as fundamental motivation for conflict between nations 
(or groups of nations). Disagreements over the structure of the international 
status quo impact relationships between states in a number of different ways 
that are pertinent not only to the most intense wars in the international envir-
onment, but also to disputes that fall short of war (Benson, 2007). Indeed, 
after the crisis in Ukraine, there are few grounds to doubt that Russia and 
the EU do have a difference in preferences over the international (European) 
status quo. Moscow views the world as a multipolar one, where the poles 
(and only they) are important players in the international system, and where 
each pole has unconditional freedom of action in its sphere of influence. It is 
from this perspective that Moscow has tried to build relations with Georgia, 
Ukraine and other post- Soviet states. In this respect, the EU is by its nature 
a challenge to Russia’s approach, undermining the idea of “free rein in my 
sphere” that is so dear to the Kremlin.
However, institutional dissimilarities do not necessarily lead to conflict in 
relations, though, as Souva argues, dyads with similar political and economic 
institutions are less likely to experience conflict than other types of dyad (Souva, 
2004). In the case of EU– Russia relations, institutional dissimilarities are only 
natural. The salient point is that policy outcomes created by the institutional 
arrangements of one party are incomprehensible and unpredictable to the 
other. Moscow has repeatedly stressed that the Russian system is based on the 
“power vertical.” In foreign policy, this vertical is virtually limited to one main 
actor (the president) who makes decisions. The unpredictability comes from 
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the absence of information on the main actor’s intentions and the degree of 
his rationality. But the story with the European Union is completely different.
The nature of the European Union cannot be described with the same 
hierarchical principle, as it is much more a system of multilevel governance, 
where, as Benz and Zimmer argue, “attention is focused on multiple actors 
including regional governments, national governments and parliaments, the 
European Commission and the European Parliament, as well as on their 
patterns of interaction, which are described as networks and negotiations” 
(Benz and Zimmer, 2010, p.18). A number of scholars have already stressed 
the importance of the multilevel nature of EU– Russia relations, focusing on 
the interactions between the all- Union institutions and the Russian govern-
ment, on Russia’s bilateral relations with member states, and on cross- border 
cooperation at the sub- national level (see Smith, 2004; Busygina and Filippov, 
2008; Gjovalin and Kalypso, 2014; Nechiporuk, 2014).
Thus, the multilevel system of governance is an adaptation of decision- 
making to the circumstances of territories under multiple jurisdictions. In 
practice, this means (in addition to numerous other manifestations) that 
the declarations made by national executives for their national communities 
could principally differ from the decisions made by the same actors on the 
same matter in Brussels. It was exactly so with the sanctions against Russia: 
in counting on declarations made by national executives prior to the sanc-
tions, the Russian leadership grossly underestimated the willingness of the 
EU member states to stand together against Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
(White and Troianovski, 2014). The reality proved to be very different, and 
the decision on sanctions was perceived by the Kremlin as an unexpected 
and very unpleasant surprise, a kind of “betrayal of Russia” by at least some 
European leaders.
These principal and very deep differences make the EU a very troubling 
neighbor for Russia, one which Russia can neither understand nor accept. For 
Russia, the US is much more understandable, though considered more hostile. 
“The dyadic relationship between the EU and Russia has oscillated between 
conflict and cooperation,” argue Forsberg and Haukkala (2016, p.236). It is 
worth noting, however, that cooperation has been developing almost exclu-
sively in the spheres where the parties have had no other choice of potential 
partners and the cooperation has had a long history, being rooted in the times 
of the Soviet Union. Other spheres of potential cooperation have produced 
either deadlocks or conflict.
In this chapter, I  am interested not so much in Russia’s “incompatibil-
ity” with the EU, but in what follows from it: what interests both sides will 
choose when they are “doomed” to interaction. In this chapter I argue that 
from the beginning of their interaction in the ’90s, Russia and the EU have 
failed to establish a sustainable (strategic) status quo in their relations. The 
EU’s attempt to establish (weak) authority relations with Russia in the ’90s 
failed, and in the 15 subsequent years a relationship was formed that rested 
on the distancing of both parties and the separation of the political and 
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economic elements of cooperation. This status quo proved to be fragile and 
was destroyed by Russia, resulting in both parties turning to the use of coer-
cion with regard to each other.
The ’90s: failure of authority
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, managing relations with Russia 
became important both for several EU member states and for the EU as a 
whole; for the former, the reason was their reliance on Russian natural gas. 
For the Union, the reasons were less prosaic. Russia required special attention 
because of its significance for stability on the European continent: an econom-
ically weak, turbulent and corrupt Russia could seriously threaten security in 
Europe. In Russia, the elites around President Yeltsin counted on European 
support for making the reforms in the country irreversible. This support was 
the source of their legitimization in the eyes of the Russian citizens. For the 
EU, Yeltsin was the only guarantor for nonrestoration of Soviet rule. This 
status, which the EU granted Yeltsin from the very beginning, determined the 
EU’s attitude towards the Russian president to a large extent, making it hard 
to criticize him, and even more so to use coercion towards his regime.
During the ’90s, national executives and EU commissioners traveled to 
Moscow more frequently than to any other capital outside the EU. Relations 
with Russia developed into the EU’s most active external dimension. All in 
all, as Joan De Bardeleben (2013, p.46) argues, “A relatively high degree of 
unanimity about Russia prevailed amongst EU member states in the early to 
mid- 1990s, a period of post- communist honeymoon when the newly democ-
ratising neighbours posed relatively few problems.” During this period, it 
was the Union, not Russia, which had the initiative in developing mutual 
relations, while their character and basis were co- determined by Russia. In 
relations with the EU, Russia was playing the role of recipient. The EU was 
aiming at establishing authority relations with Russia under conditions where 
the degree of interest in Russia differed greatly between EU member states.
Indeed, EU member states were unevenly attuned to events in Russia. Thus, 
the German government was among the most involved, and it had put for-
ward the strongest initiatives for conducting close relations with the Russian 
post- Cold War leadership. In the ’90s, bilateral German- Russian relations were 
probably the most important element of West– East relations within Europe, 
and Germany established the most active engagement with Russia among the 
EU member states. The United Kingdom and France regarded active diplo-
macy towards Russia as symbolic for their status as major European powers 
and both had a significant cadre of experts on Russia (Wallace, 2003, p.55). 
With the 1995 enlargement, the EU extended to include states for which a 
common policy towards Russia was one of the highest foreign policy priori-
ties. Finland and Sweden joined the EU and developed the concept of the 
“Northern Dimension” (1997), which became an important pattern of rela-
tions not only with Moscow, but also with the regional authorities of Russia’s 
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northwest. The rest of the EU members, however, displayed much milder inter-
est in developing relations with Russia (Busygina and Filippov, 2013, p.108). 
However, most of the powerful member states as well as Russia’s northern 
neighbors in the EU supported the idea that the Union should actively develop 
its relations with it.
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and 
the EU,2 signed on June 24, 1994, defined the basic framework for the Union’s 
relations with Russia and laid the basis for authority relations between the 
two. The PCA played a very important role in the development of ties between 
the European Union and the Russian Federation because it sealed the transi-
tion from purely bilateral relations between Russia and EU member coun-
tries to relations with the European Union as a whole, provided political and 
legal foundations for such relations, and established institutions for political 
dialogue. Article 106 of the Agreement stated that it was to be extended auto-
matically every year. At the same time, the PCA was also influenced by the 
principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; it constituted what 
can be described as a mixed external action of the EU with a cross- pillar 
dimension (Hillion, 2000, p.1219). This “cross- pillarization” of the PCA 
facilitated policy coordination across the EU pillars (see Blair, 2003; Stetter, 
2004). The Agreement was not only aimed at promoting economic coopera-
tion between the EU and Russia, but also at developing political dialogue 
within the multilevel institutional framework.
What is important is that the Partnership was established exclusively based 
on European values. Thus, Art. 1 stated that
A Partnership is hereby established between the Community and its 
Member States, of  the one part, and Russia, of  the other part. The 
objectives of  this Partnership are: to provide an appropriate framework 
for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing the development 
of  close relations between them in this field, to promote trade and 
investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties 
based on the principles of  market economy and so to foster sustain-
able development in the Parties, to strengthen political and economic 
freedoms, to support Russian efforts to consolidate its democracy and 
to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market 
economy… [emphasis added]
Art.2 of the Agreement laid down general principles of cooperation and 
postulated that
Respect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in particu-
lar in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, 
underpins the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitutes 
an essential element of partnership and of this Agreement.
(The European Commission, 1994)
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The next EU authority instrument appeared in the late ’90s. By the mid- 
1990s, the EU proposed expanding the tools of common foreign policy. The 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) for the first time introduced a new instrument, 
Common Strategies, in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
European Union. The first Common Strategy (CS) with regard to Russia was 
developed and adopted by the European Union in 1999. The draft of the 
Strategy was created under a German presidency by the group of member 
states feeling the most concern— France, the United Kingdom and Finland— 
and approved by the others practically without discussion. The list of the 
main priorities for the CS included fostering democracy and rule of law in 
Russia, preserving stability on the European continent, working to improve 
the investment climate and nuclear safety, and fighting organized crime.
In 1991, in order to assist and to guide political and economic transforma-
tions in 12 countries of the collapsed Soviet Union and in Mongolia, the EU 
developed the TACIS program.3 TACIS determined five priority sectors for 
cooperation and funding: training, energy, transport, financial services and 
food distribution. Cooperation with target states was implemented on two 
basic tracks: creating a functioning market economy and establishing plur-
alistic democracy. On the first track, the sub- targets for Russia included pri-
vatization and human resource development. On the second track, Russia 
was expected to launch decentralization, to promote good governance and 
to enable sufficient participation of civil society in decision- making (The 
European Commission, 2000). In the National Indicative program for Russia, 
a special accent was placed on the development of Kaliningrad Oblast, 
Russia’s exclave in the EU (The European Commission, 2003). TACIS pro-
vided financial assistance in the form of grants to a wide range of recipients, 
such as state or local government institutions, cooperative associations, state 
or private enterprises and educational or training institutions (The European 
Commission, 2016).
The EU allocated over €7 billion to TACIS between 1991 and 2006, with 
Russia being the largest beneficiary country, receiving around €200 million 
(Tuomiola, 2006). The total amount of financing from EU to Russia in 
1991– 2000 within TACIS comprised €2 billion (The European Commission, 
2000). In 2006, the EU invested €8 billion in good governance projects in 
cooperation with Russian authorities (€6 billion in reform of the judicial sphere 
and €2 million in the development of e- governance) (Shapovalova, 2011).
The impact of TACIS on Russia has been asymmetric: according to OECD 
evaluation, it was comparatively high in education and training, moderate 
in governance and moderate to low in enterprise restructuring and building 
a framework for a market economy (OECD, 1999). Other estimations are 
less optimistic and state that the TACIS approach of financial assistance in 
exchange for reforms generally did not deliver. Buscaneanu calls TACIS a 
hierarchic top- down strategy with limited flexibility to its programs, which 
were too detailed and therefore could not match the constantly evolving needs 
either of the EU or of the target states (Buscaneanu, 2013). Other experts 
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point to the incoherence of TACIS projects with each other (Lainela and 
Sutela, 2004), and insufficient evaluation in process as well as rare national co- 
financing and “lack of a sense of ownership on the Russian side” (Tuomiola, 
2006, no pagination). All in all, the TACIS program has proved incapable of 
significantly affecting the course and the character of Russia’s political and 
economic development.
The second Chechen War revealed significant differences in attitudes 
between the EU as a whole and its member states. The European Council 
declared the violations of human rights in Chechnya “totally unacceptable” 
and decided on a set of punitive measures, including termination of credits for 
food and trade preferences, as well as a substantial reduction in TACIS aid. 
The EU proposed a resolution condemning Moscow’s actions in Chechnya at 
the UN’s Commission on Human Rights. Six months later, the EU restored 
its cooperation with Russia (Portela, 2010, p.114). The Union’s punitive meas-
ures had practically no impact on the behavior of the Russian political elites. 
At the same time, the national executives of the member states (especially of 
the larger ones) chose a more practical approach to shaping their relations 
with Moscow. Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder visited Moscow to meet 
with yet- to- be- elected Vladimir Putin in order to establish good relations with 
the future Russian president. As Haukkala (2010, p.119) argues,
the member states used the European foreign policy and common strat-
egy on Russia as avenues through which they expressed collective disap-
proval of the Russian actions while simultaneously using them as shields 
under which they were able to carry on business as usual in their bilateral 
ties with Moscow.
In the 1990s, basic consensus between the EU’s institutions and its mem-
ber states, as well as among the member states, was established only around 
the thesis of the overall importance of Russia to the European Union, not 
around real policy priorities towards Russia. The very combination of chal-
lenges posed by Russia at the time (a powerless giant that needed assistance 
to prevent a return to communism), together with the attraction of its new 
market for European businesses, plus the need for energy supply from Russia, 
all pushed the EU’s national executives to negotiate their separate foreign 
policy interests with Russia. The Union’s still- weak institutions for consensus- 
building were not truly triggered by the Russian case. The EU was inclined 
to consider the two Chechen crises as isolated regrettable incidents, if  not 
altogether Russia’s internal affair, and not worth undermining the progress 
already made by Russia and in relations with the Russian government.
The authority instruments that the EU developed and implemented in the 
’90s with regard to Russia did not bear fruit. The EU failed to strengthen 
Russia’s state capacity and good governance, while successful projects became 
“invisible” within the huge territory of the country. The instruments them-
selves were too weak; they did not foresee any coercion— the EU was frightened 
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to punish Yeltsin for wrongdoing. The EU miscalculated: it considered non-
restoration of Soviet rule to be the guarantee of Russia’s democratization, 
and this was not so. In addition, the member states’ “practical” approach to 
Russia undermined even the weak actions that the EU had undertaken, and 
made the Russian leadership prioritize bilateral relations with EU states over 
those with the EU as a single entity. For Yeltsin, rapprochement with the EU 
very soon stopped being a survival strategy— when Kozyrev, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and a passionate supporter of Russia’s pro- Western orienta-
tion, left office in 1996.
2000– 2014: the foundation of a new status quo
After the new Russian president came to office in March 2000, it quickly 
became clear that the relationship between Russia and the EU was doomed to 
change. This change was all the easier since the previous system of relations 
was emasculated and did not produce “added value” for the parties. Under the 
new, much more favorable economic conditions provided by a sharp increase 
in oil and gas prices, and Putin’s presidency, Russia stopped positioning itself  
as a Western- oriented country. President Putin wanted relations with the EU 
to be built on the basis of pure economic interest, rather than on common 
values (interests replacing values). At this time, the Russian establishment 
already did not hesitate to explain the crisis of the ’90s as the West attempt-
ing to involve itself  in Russia’s internal affairs, with disastrous consequences 
(Simonov, 2014, p.235), and to declare the Union as a “ cynical power Europe” 
(Forsberg and Haukkala, 2016, p.251). However, during this period Russia 
still considered itself  to be European, though different from the EU: it made 
a sharp distinction between Europe and the EU, and  presented the European 
continent as based on two pillars: a Western pillar (led by the Union) and an 
Eastern pillar (led by Russia) (Trenin, 2009, p.73). With regard to the concept 
of power, Gomart has defined this Russia as “a resurgent superpower [whose] 
system is based on a close association between the prestige of the state and 
that of the army” (Gomart, 2008, p.5). The Russian elite would agree with 
such a definition.
The cost of conflict between nations (or groups of nations) significantly 
increases for all of them should they be interdependent. Therefore, this condi-
tion theoretically should reduce the likelihood of conflict. Furthermore, due 
to rational fears of economic loss, it is much more difficult to punish economic 
partners (not declaratively, but practically) for international wrongdoing. As 
EU– Russian relations illustrate, European concerns about relationships with 
major Russian companies, such as Rosneft and Gazprom, factored heavily in 
the EU’s reluctance to impose sanctions on Russian businesses. At the same 
time, Russia tried to expand its access to the EU energy market because the 
EU’s increased dependence on Russia could be turned into a powerful source 
of coercion in case of conflict (Gawdat, 2006). Russia has planned the con-
struction of several additional pipelines running from Russia to the EU and 
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has attempted through Gazprom to gain ownership of the EU’s refineries and 
domestic distributing pipelines. Gazprom wanted to control the pipelines run-
ning through the major transit countries and further into the EU, as well as 
the pipelines running within countries to deliver gas products to distributors 
who then deliver them to the end consumer (Orban, 2008, p.5). Russia’s use 
of gas as a coercive foreign policy tool in third countries (for instance, gas- 
related clashes with Ukraine in 2006 and 2009) had direct adverse effects on 
EU consumers: the citizens of Slovakia and Bulgaria have experienced this to 
their discomfort (Popescu, 2014, p.2).
The most recent breakthrough in mutual relations that at least to some 
extent was based on their previous rationale occurred when both sides agreed 
on the Strategic Partnership and Four Common Spaces in 2003, and thus set 
a new format for subsequent interactions. As Ferguson describes it,
The Common Spaces agreement constituted the EU– Russia relationship 
as an association of equals with plans for four broad areas of regional 
cooperation. Partnering with the EU in the governing of Common 
Spaces appeared to give Russia what it has been denied since the end 
of the Cold War; namely, an equal voice and authority with Europe in 
regional security affairs.
(Ferguson, 2017, p.19)
However, the very notion of equality has been understood differently in 
Russia and in the EU: “For Russia, equality meant equal to the EU, while for 
the EU, it meant equal to the other nonmembers aspiring to have a relation-
ship with the EU” (Forsberg and Haukkala, 2016, p.240).
Russia and the EU put their signatures under a number of  commitments 
that, while appearing serious, remained on paper for the most part. For 
instance, the EU and Russia formally agreed to create a Common Economic 
Space, and in 2007 talks were launched on a new enhanced agreement that 
was supposed to provide a legal basis for, inter alia, closer economic inte-
gration. These talks have remained in limbo (Popescu, 2014, p.1). Russia 
and the Union have also committed themselves— e.g., in the “Road Map 
for the Common Space of  External Security”— to cooperate in the estab-
lishment of  a “greater Europe without dividing lines and based on com-
mon values”; in “the development of  principles and modalities for joint 
approaches in crisis management”; and “in the settlement of  regional con-
flicts, inter alia in regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders.” However, as 
Adomeit shows, in practice Russia used the conflicts over Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno- Karabakh as levers to retain influence 
over the domestic and foreign policy orientation of  the countries concerned 
(Adomeit, 2011, p.65).
The only authority instrument that was agreed in the framework of the 
Fourth Common Space and is still in operation, but a very important one, 
is Russia’s membership in the all- European Bologna Process, a series of 
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agreements between European countries aimed at ensuring comparability in 
the standards and quality of higher education, responsible for the creation of 
the European Higher Education Area. This was in October 2007, when the 
Russian State Duma passed the bill that brought Russia’s higher education 
system in line with Europe’s Bologna Process, and, as Haukkala argues, “In 
this space, and in stark contrast with the lack of progress in terms of norma-
tive convergence in the other spaces, the Union’s agenda seems to be inching 
forward in Russia” (Haukkala, 2010, p.177). However, for Haukkala, Russia 
joining the Bologna process is a “seeming anomaly” in the domain of Russia– 
EU relations, in the sense that it does not threaten Russia’s sovereignty at all 
(Haukkala, 2010, p.177). For me, the anomaly is more the fact that despite 
the current stage of Russia– EU relations, Russia still has not canceled the 
Bologna agreements.
In the mid- 2000s, scholars indicated that while Russia had a strong indi-
genous tradition of higher education, which had to be preserved in the process 
of accommodation to the Bologna system, this tradition was rather conserva-
tive and inert, plagued by corruption and sometimes by credibility problems 
in the West (Entin, 2005). Equally, one of the experts’ main concerns was 
the danger of blindly imposing external standards on Russian higher edu-
cation (Pursiainen and Medvedev, 2005). Today, after more than ten years, 
differences between the education systems and traditions still exist, and many 
problems persist (Kupriyanov et al. 2015). Very critical attitudes towards the 
implementation of the Bologna agreement in Russia’s higher education sys-
tem generally prevail among both practitioners and scholars. These attitudes 
give Russian authorities good reason for a decision to terminate membership 
in the Bologna Accords— a decision that would be fully in accordance with 
the general logic of Russia– EU relations. However, this has not happened, 
and that is a great stroke of luck, as the significance of Russia’s membership 
in the Bologna system goes far beyond education.
Despite numerous declarations and signed documents, Russia and the EU 
have never been strategic partners in the true sense of the word. In the ’90s, 
the rhetoric of partnership masked an attempt by the EU to establish author-
ity relations, which proved to be invalid as the EU failed to build momentum 
in the beginning of the ’90s and later could not introduce the principle of 
conditionality (with its coercive possibilities) in its relations with Russia. On 
the contrary, in the 2000s, it seemed that Russia was beginning to attain the 
possibility of using coercion with regard to the Union through the latter’s 
energy dependency on Russia.
Relations between Russia and the EU gradually came to an equilibrium 
that was beneficial for both sides. In Russia, President Putin was busy build-
ing the “great state” (see Chapter 2), while the EU was busy with enlarge-
ment. In both Russia and the EU, politicians relied on the continuing external 
tensions as a mechanism for generating internal consensus while implement-
ing the respective transformations of  their political systems (Busygina and 
Filippov, 2008, p.216). As Popescu (2014, p.1) notes, “summits turned less 
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mercurial and became mainly box- ticking affairs.” This gradual deteriora-
tion of  relations between Brussels and Moscow created a void in which mem-
ber states were left to develop their own relations with Russia almost fully 
in accordance with their national priorities, whether those were dependence 
(or independence) of  national economies on Russia’s gas, capital or exports. 
Trade volumes were growing to the satisfaction of  both sides. The basis of 
this equilibrium was the ever- growing lack of  connection between the eco-
nomic and political components of  the relations. Filippov describes this as 
follows:
The multi- level and multi- agent design of Russia’s relations with Europe 
resulted in a counter- intuitive trade- off  in Russian foreign relations— 
the better the economic relations with the West, the greater the tensions 
that could be sustained in political relations. For instance, the greater the 
mutual energy- trade dependence between the EU and Russia, the more 
the Russian government can afford political tensions with the EU with-
out causing a rupture. … With the high energy prices of the 2000s, EU– 
Russia relations began to manifest an increasing lack of connection 
between their economic and political components: as Europe’s reliance 
on trade with Russia increased, political relations deteriorated.
(Filippov, 2009, p.1843)
An attempt to close this growing gap between the economic and political 
elements of relations was made under Medvedev’s presidency through the 
Partnership for Modernization initiative of 2010, which could have turned 
into a powerful EU authority tool— had Russia really wanted modernization. 
But this was not the case, and the attempt brought miserable results.
Generally speaking, at the beginning of “Medvedev’s time,” many in 
Russia hoped for domestic liberalization and, as a consequence, better rela-
tions with the EU. But these hopes were soon betrayed, and no real policy 
changes occurred. Under Putin’s constant supervision, Medvedev continued 
to address the task of protecting the domestic political system from external 
influence and interference (Moshes, 2012, p.18). Whatever Medvedev’s inten-
tions, his real policy choices were highly constrained by the framework of 
Putin’s state- building project.
The Partnership for Modernization was launched by the EU and Russia 
at a summit in Rostov- on- Don with the aim of complementing and energiz-
ing high- level political dialogue, as well as multisectoral dialogues in areas of 
common interest, by helping Russia to diversify and revitalize its economic 
model (Fischer, 2013). This initiative seemed timely, taking into account the 
fact that modernization had become the most popular issue under Medvedev’s 
presidency, and that he repeatedly declared that Russia would face terminal 
decline unless it radically reformed its economy. Moreover, a survey published 
by the EU– Russia Centre in the beginning of 2010 showed that Russian poli-
cymakers overwhelmingly believed that Russia needed external help with 
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modernization (Barysh, 2010). And if  so, there were no other candidates 
for the role of an “external helper” but the EU. With regard to the partner-
ship, the EU’s idea was to stop lecturing Russia and to offer help in Russia’s 
own interests, and encourage cooperation which would focus on technical, 
environmental or social issues. That, in turn, could then facilitate progress 
on more contentious political and economic issues (Barysh, 2010, p.28). It 
was expected that the EU’s help with modernization would produce a spill-
over effect and in the longer run contribute to making Russia more account-
able, better governed and democratic. However, with President Putin’s return 
to office in 2012, the Partnership collapsed, and modernization issues faded 
away, at least relative to the rhetoric of Medvedev’s time.
While the Russian leadership was busy with state- building, the EU was 
changing as well, in particular with regard to Russia. With the 2004 enlarge-
ment, the EU expanded to include East- Central European countries as well 
as three former Baltic republics of the Soviet Union. All these countries dis-
trusted Russia and feared its imperialist ambitions (Motyl, 2003, pp.24– 25). 
The track of Russia’s subsequent political development under Putin only 
validated these quickly resurging suspicions. The enlargement also drastically 
increased the gap in attitudes among EU member states towards Russia. As 
Carta and Braghiroli (2011) show, the least friendly of these are located in 
Central Eastern Europe: Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia 
and Lithuania. These new EU members insisted that the EU’s Eastern policy 
required special attention, and that the EU had to develop special relations 
with the Eastern European countries beyond EU borders. The UK was the 
most hostile to Russia among the major member states; Italy, Greece and 
Austria were among the most supportive.
Leonard and Popescu argue that the enlargement sharpened the split in the 
EU between two approaches towards Russia. The first approach— supported 
by Germany in particular— defended the view of Russia as a potential partner 
that could come closer to the EU through a process of “creeping integration.” 
The second (with Poland as its main proponent) saw Russia as a threat and 
advocated the strategy of “soft containment” in order to limit its expansionist 
tendencies (Leonardt and Popescu, 2007).
New member states soon articulated their position towards Russia, with 
Poland the most active state in this regard. When the PCA between the EU 
and Russia expired in 2007, both Brussels and Moscow expressed the inten-
tion of negotiating a new deal; however, Poland vetoed negotiations due 
to the Russian ban on Polish meat imports. In fact, the Polish government 
showed that joining the EU did not necessarily mean following the course 
of the “European core” members. Rather, it was quite the opposite: by join-
ing the Union, Poland acquired a channel for defending and even advancing 
its national interests. The Polish leadership spoke about its “unique mis-
sion” in the EU, being a “guardian of the memory of totalitarian crime in 
Europe” (Geoffrey, 2006, p.144). In subsequent years, negotiations on the 
New Basic Agreement between the EU and Russia developed slowly, without 
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any significant results, as politicians on both sides had weak incentives to seek 
a compromise. On the contrary, both in Russia and the EU, politicians relied 
on the continuing external tensions as a mechanism for generating internal 
consensus while implementing the respective transformations of their polit-
ical systems (Busygina and Filippov, 2008, p.216).
In the 2000s, Moscow did not want to launch a real political conflict with 
the EU, no matter how helpful such a confrontation would have been for man-
aging its domestic audience. This logic, however, did not work with regard to 
Russia’s post- Soviet neighbors. Filippov argues that the
The Russian government had many reasons to believe that managed 
conflicts in the post- Soviet space would not cause a real breach with 
their Western counterparts. The resulting political tensions with the 
West would not be likely to reach a level that would harm their trade 
relations.
(Filippov, 2009, p.1829)
As the “five- day war” with Georgia has shown, these calculations proved 
to be correct. Moscow successfully separated its foreign policy from its 
domestic audience (Busygina and Filippov, 2013), and marginalized the 
EU in foreign affairs by concentrating on bilateral relations with individual 
member states instead. This explains why, despite growing political differ-
ences between the EU and Russia in the 2000s, most observers expressed 
confidence in the prevalence of  the cooperative status quo, which seemed 
to have been ensured by the shared rationale of  maintained economic 
interdependence that would keep the growing political differences muted 
(Busygina and Filippov, 2013). As the PCA expired in 2007, Russia and 
the EU began to negotiate a new Basic Agreement, though without defini-
tive progress, as well as the visa liberalization regime on which the Russian 
leadership strongly insisted.
As Moshes (2012, p.19) rightly argues, despite few real changes in Russia’s 
approach, the EU tended to positive evaluations with regard to Russia. In 
fact, there was some progress in the relations between Moscow and certain 
EU member states, for instance the normalization of Russian- Polish rela-
tions, an improved Russian- Danish understanding, and a certain softening 
of Russia’s approach towards the Baltic states (Moshes, 2012, pp.23– 24). This 
was another confirmation of the fact that while the EU was busy with internal 
transformations, its member states were very flexible in dealing with Russia. 
In addition, Brussels was not too worried with regard to Russia’s potential 
rise and growth in global influence, taking into account the country’s eco-
nomic and social problems. This attitude would have been quite reasonable 
had Russia continued moving along its existing track, but it suddenly made a 
“knight’s move,” annexing Crimea and supporting separatists in East Ukraine.
The international calamity with regard to Ukraine has abruptly changed 
the situation and, insofar as the European actors are concerned, triggered a 
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process of realignment to a new and completely distinctive equilibrium via the 
mechanisms of multilevel governance.
From 2014 onwards: coercion against coercion
As Kahneman and Tversky stated, when actions can produce either gains 
or losses, and the probabilities of both outcomes are either unknown or 
equal, loss aversion produces a phenomenon known as the status quo bias 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, cited in Molm, 1997, p.119). And under 
conditions of uncertainty, choices favoring the status quo tend to dominate 
decision- making (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988, cited in Molm, 1997, 
p.120). However, Putin acted in contradiction of this logic with regard to 
Crimea. In making the decision to annex the peninsula, the Russian lead-
ership must have understood that in geopolitical terms there would be an 
exceptionally high price to pay, not only in terms of Russia’s reputation in 
the world but also in terms of its relations with the West, particularly with the 
EU. Nevertheless, Putin chose to do this, an act which seems to go against the 
rational approach (Simonov, 2014, p.236). But his choice seems less irrational 
if  we assume that he underestimated the level of uncertainty in Russia’s rela-
tions with the West, and believed that the West would “swallow” its actions 
with regard to Crimea in light of the five- day war in Georgia, the status quo 
would be preserved and “business as usual” would continue with the EU. If  
so, he miscalculated. Judging by the reports in global media, the Russian lead-
ership grossly underestimated the scale of the world’s reaction, and in particu-
lar, the willingness of the EU to stand against Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
(White and Troianovski, 2014; Yardley and Becker, 2014). Some Russian 
observers suggested that if  the Kremlin had known about the extent of the 
Western reaction, it would have acted differently (Overchenko, 2014). Russia’s 
calculation was also to take the EU by surprise, and, indeed, the Union was 
unprepared. As Speck notes, the EU never intended to get into a geopolitical 
confrontation with Russia; rather, it has “sleepwalked” into it (Speck, 2014). 
Nevertheless, to Russia’s unpleasant surprise, it managed to mobilize and to 
produce a joint reaction.
As Molm (1997, p.121) points out, actors who have the incentives to apply 
coercive strategies often do not risk doing so because they are too dependent 
on their partners, as the costs of such actions are expected to be very high. In 
addition, the probability of making a certain decision (in our case, the decision 
to impose sanctions) decreases hugely if  each actor among those who make 
the joint decision is a veto player and unanimity is needed to make a decision. 
Considerations of the EU’s dependence on Russian energy imports, and the 
extreme difficulty of agreeing on joint sanctions under conditions of required 
unanimity, brought the experts and mass media to the conclusion that attempts 
to reach an agreement on sanctions against Russia among the 28 EU members 
would eventually fail. In June 2014, the TV channel Russia Today, referring 
to “confidential sources,” argued that “Preliminary consultations show that 
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today almost no leaders of EU states find it necessary to impose trade and 
economic sanctions on Russia” (Russia Today, 2014b). According to the same 
channel, “France, Germany, Luxembourg, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, 
Slovenia, and EU President Italy see no reason in the current environment for 
the introduction of sectorial trade and economic sanctions against Russia and 
at the summit, will block the measure” (Russia Today, 2014a).
However, these predictions proved false, although of course there were 
considerable difficulties due to the divergences in the member states’ posi-
tions. Some national economies felt the impact of the EU’s economic sanc-
tions and Russia’s retaliatory embargo on a wide range of food exports more 
than others. It was clear that the burden of any joint sanctions against Russia 
would be highly unevenly distributed across and within the European econo-
mies. Some EU members, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Italy, rely 
heavily on Russia’s gas deliveries and energy; others, such as Finland, suffer 
from Russia’s ban on exports of dairy products. These countries have only 
reluctantly gone along with sanctions, which is not surprising.
Since March 2014, the EU has repeatedly agreed to impose increasingly 
restrictive sanctions on Russia. As Freedman (2014, p.25) argues, the main 
Western effort was to deter yet more Russian aggression. In announcing the 
sanctions, the EU observed that
Any further steps by the Russian Federation to destabilize the situation in 
Ukraine would lead to additional and far- reaching consequences for rela-
tions in a broad range of economic areas between the European Union 
and its Member States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on 
the other hand.
(The Council of the European Union, 2014, 
cited in Freedman, 2014, p.25)
On March 3, 2014, as a direct reaction to the issue of Crimea, Russia’s par-
ticipation in the G8 was suspended. The EU also considered freezing bilateral 
talks on visa matters and on the New Agreement with Moscow. As early as 
March 17, the first list of sanctions against 21 Russian officials was elaborated. 
Following the entrance of Crimea and Sebastopol into the Russian Federation, 
12 additional names were added to the list and subjected to visa bans and asset 
freezes. Crimea was put under a special import ban regime: all export goods 
from Crimea and Sebastopol had to be granted a certificate of origin by the 
Ukrainian authorities, which was not possible in practice. In July 2014, the 
list of Russian persons under individual sanctions was expanded by 72, while 
the assets of Crimea and Sebastopol in the territory of the EU were frozen. 
Gradually, by November 2014, the number of persons under sanctions rose to 
132, while the number of entities under the EU asset freeze rose to 28. The ten-
dency was reinforced in 2015, with the same measures used against another 19 
persons and 9 entities “involved in actions against Ukraine’s territorial integ-
rity.” June 2015 saw a tightened grip of sanctions against Crimea: imports of 
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products from the peninsula were officially banned, EU- based companies were 
obliged not to invest into the peninsula in any form, cruise ships were legally 
prevented from stopping in Crimean ports (except in case of emergency) and 
exports of technological products to the peninsula were strictly limited. The 
most recent prolongation was extended to March 15, 2017. Special sanctions 
against Crimea are not time- bound, according to the EU’s strategy of nonrec-
ognition. The final number of persons subjected to anti- Russian sanctions (as 
of September 2016) is 146, and the number of entities is 37 (The Council of the 
European Union, 2016). The classification of targets includes
private entities and individuals via visa bans and freezes on assets; finan-
cial markets by banning long- term EU loans for the five main state- owned 
banks (Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank (VEB) and 
Rosselkhozbank); the energy sector through restrictions on Rosneft, 
Transneft and Gazprom Neft activities; the defense industry by means of 
blacklisting dual- list Russian technology manufacturers.
 (Dolidze, 2015, p.1)
Each new round of  sanctions required EU institutions to secure the 
unanimous support of  member states. Such successful consensus- building 
is a remarkable institutional achievement of  the EU and an important step 
in the development of  the EU’s common foreign policy. The EU’s response 
to Russia’s annexation of  Crimea indicates that the Ukrainian crisis has cre-
ated new opportunities for moving the EU’s institutions towards a common 
foreign policy. As Lehne argues, “The Ukraine crisis could transform EU 
foreign policy, much like the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks trans-
formed U.S. foreign policy” (Lehne, 2014, no pagination). While the domes-
tic politicians of  EU member states openly demonstrated divergences and 
disagreements over the proposed sanctions, in the end the European national 
leaders unanimously supported sanctions in the European Council. The 
Russian politicians failed to anticipate this institutionally induced differ-
ence between public statements by national leaders at the national level and 
their actual consensus at the European level (Busygina and Filippov, 2015).
In Russia, President Putin proceeded from the conviction that the West (and 
the EU in particular) was plotting the destabilization of his regime even before 
the introduction of anti- Russian sanctions (Bechev, 2015, p.346). Therefore, 
imposing “tit- for- tat” sanctions against the West was quite logical, being sim-
ply the transformation of ideas into actions, as well as “punishment” for the 
West and a signal that Russia was “not afraid.” As I wrote in Chapter 1, non-
democracies’ aim in imposing sanctions would be not to change the target’s 
political regime or even policy, but to change the behavior of the target only 
with respect to the sender. This was exactly the Russian case.
Russia’s first sanctioning list appeared on August 7, 2014 and included the 
US, the EU, Canada, Australia and Norway. The second sanctioning list (of 
August 3, 2015) added Albania, Montenegro, Iceland and Lichtenstein. The 
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so- called “Veto Russo” included a ban on imports of agricultural products in 
such categories as fish, meat, milk products, fruit, nuts and vegetables (Gazeta.
ru, 2015). It was sealed in law that goods from the sanctioning list must not 
come from Europe into Russian territory. However, interestingly, trade of these 
goods was not banned as the respective law on trade of sanctioned foods was 
rejected during the legislative process (Amirjanyan and Kondratyev, 2016). This 
resulted in the massive flow of illegal reexport of these items (falsely labeled) to 
Russia through its borders with Kazakhstan and Belarus (the “Belarusian oys-
ters” phenomenon). Initially, the Russian establishment presented the product 
embargo to the population as a necessary measure to respond to Western sanc-
tions. Then the narrative was changed: it was stated that Russia had chosen 
import substitution as a strategy aimed at the development of national agri-
cultural firms. This was supported by an appropriate policy towards the mass 
media. For instance, the Russia 24 channel started the program Vesti s Poley 
(“News from the Fields”), aimed at covering successes in Russian agriculture. 
There began to appear messages on how the product embargo has triggered 
agricultural productivity in the regions, such as in Ingushetia (see, for instance, 
Regnum, 2016). Occasionally, the establishment has made attempts to show 
the electorate “fair play” and care for domestic consumers. In March 2016, 
news emerged that San Marino will provide Russia with cheese and meat prod-
ucts (Fomchenkov, 2016)— as San Marino is a small peaceful country, its par-
mesan appears less harmful than that from other states in Europe.
As a result of the product embargo, imports of foods from Europe to 
Russia fell by over 40 percent (Bulin, 2015). The pan- European farmers’ asso-
ciation Copa- Cogeca estimates the overall losses of European farmers and 
agricultural cooperatives at €5.5 billion (Michalopoulis, 2016). The product 
embargo hit farmers in the Baltic states, Austria and Belgium, as well as in 
the CEE countries (Teffer, 2015). Nevertheless, their discontent has so far not 
resulted in a change in the EU’s approach to Russia. In response to Europe’s 
prolongation of sanctions towards Moscow, Russia prolonged its product 
embargo to the end of 2017.
The timing of the product embargo coincided with falling oil prices, which 
resulted in high inflation rates. This impacted on Russian citizens, but did 
not lead to public resentment. According to the opinion poll conducted by 
Levada- Centre in May 2016, 44 percent of those questioned experienced con-
siderable difficulty in purchasing food, but 75 percent of respondents said that 
Russia had to continue its policy despite Western sanctions (Levada- Centre, 
2016). The argumentation in support of this position includes such mottos as 
“we should support domestic farmers,” “this is a response to sanctions against 
Russia” and “Russian products are better than Western ones” (Zhuravlev, 
2016, no pagination).
As the Russian sanctions regime was repeatedly violated by Russian com-
panies, what followed was the demonstrative and widely publicized liquid-
ation of EU food products on Russia’s borders that started in the summer of 
2015 (Makarychev, 2015, p.313).
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Besides economic coercion, Russia began to actively “penetrate” into 
European societies, canvassing and looking for supporters, and striving to 
split the EU along various dimensions. This Russian “coercive soft power” 
was packaged in a rigid framework of Kremlin- designed narratives and 
themes (Lutsevych, 2016, p.4). In late 2014, the New  York- based Institute 
of Modern Russia published a report that outlined how the Kremlin manip-
ulates the media, ethnic tensions, trade and financial transactions abroad 
to further its own ends (Trudolyubov, 2016). Trudolyubov (2016) gave an 
example of a news story by Russia’s state- run television in January 2016 about 
the alleged rape by migrants of a German girl of Russian origin in Berlin. 
German prosecutors said the allegations were not confirmed. But the Russian 
media succeeded in blowing the incident out of all proportion, stoking anti- 
immigrant protests and resentment among Germany’s nearly six million 
Russian speakers. The general idea is simple: to show that the EU as well as 
its member states are not able to control the situation, and “our girls are raped 
in the streets.” Since finding support within Russian- speaking groups in West 
European countries became a priority, the “Russian Germans” that were pre-
viously labeled by mass media as nonpatriots that left their Motherland are 
now— with the “flexibility” inherent to the Russian mass media— declared to 
be almost “defenders of Russia’s national interests abroad.” Similar methods 
have been employed to mobilize compatriots in EU countries, for instance, in 
Britain (Forsberg and Haukkala, 2016, p.187).
Russia has also supported the Italian right- wing opposition Northern 
League, whose representative described Russia in the European Parliament as 
“a major economic partner for Italy and Europe, and as a model example of 
national identity and protection of family.” In October 2014, members of the 
Northern League formed the Friends of Putin group in the Italian Parliament 
(Phillips, 2014). Experts stress that
Russian organizations have begun to cooperate with and support radical 
and anti- establishment groups in the West. This includes extreme right 
parties, such as the Front National in France, but it also appeals to some 
representatives of the Linkspartei in Germany. The crucial factor here 
is that these groups can contribute to weakening the existing European 
(value) system. Thus Putin’s Russia has become a partner to many anti- 
US, anti- EU and anti- globalization groups in the EU. By defying the US, 
the West, and the “bureaucrats” in Brussels, Putin becomes a surface on 
which a possible alternative can be projected. In this way, Moscow plays 
on various existing fears and frustrations in Western societies.
(Meister and Puglierin, 2015, p.5)
Another Russian strategy was to strengthen the split between the EU mem-
ber states by choosing the “weakest link”— a state that has either been strongly 
hit by the crisis, or a state that is deeply dependent on Russia economically 
and, furthermore, has a government known for extreme populism. It is clear 
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that in the first case we are talking about Greece hit by the Eurozone crisis, to 
which Russia has repeatedly offered financial help and talked about investing 
in Greece’s pipeline infrastructure. In the second case, it is Hungary under 
the Orban government. Indeed, the Hungarian case is the most telling one. 
Experts express deep concern about Russia’s “penetration” into Hungarian 
politics, building a corruption network and working mainly through the 
Fidesz party. As Hegedűs shows,
Three business deals in particular— the Paks Nuclear Power Plant deal, 
the MET gas supply scheme, and the modernization of the subway cars 
on the Budapest Underground Line 3— offer examples of high- level pol-
itical corruption linked to Russia at the expense of the Hungarian state 
budget. Not only are they making it possible for private individuals con-
nected to the Fidesz party to amass enormous fortunes, but these deals 
are also increasing Hungarian dependence on Russia.
 (Hegedűs, 2016, p.4)
For instance, the nuclear deal was not discussed publicly, and the government 
made its decision without any announcement. Not only does the deal greatly 
strengthen Hungarian dependence on Russia, it prolongs it by approximately 
fifty years (Hegedűs, 2016, p.4). As Hegedűs (2016, p.7) concludes, “Bearing 
these networks of corruption in mind, it could be rather difficult for the 
Fidesz- led Hungarian government to free itself  from the Russian grasp with-
out tremendous political injury.”
Moscow claims that what it is doing is merely copying the instruments and 
techniques that the West itself  uses and considers legitimate for the purpose 
of promoting democracy in Russia and the post- Soviet states (Meister and 
Puglierin, 2015, p.1). But this is not about “copying.” What Russia does is 
called “hidden coercion,” which supplements other coercive instruments and 
contributes to manipulating and weakening the opponent. These tactics— 
which are incidentally not cheap— are aimed at undermining European unity 
and the Union’s capacity to act. Furthermore, as we see in Hungary, Russia’s 
links to the politics of individual EU member states provide it with unprece-
dented access to those states’ policymakers (Hegedűs, 2016, p.7).
Notes
 1 I consider the EU to be a “rising power,” though the sources of its “rise” are fun-
damentally different from those of a “rising state power,” in particular from those 
of Russia (see Busygina, 2017).
 2 At that time this was not yet the European Union, but the Community.
 3 TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) was 
designed as a tool to assist and to guide political and economic transformations 
in 13 recipient countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan.
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5 Russia and the EU
No winners in the common 
neighborhood
The political map of Eurasia is laid out in such a way that Russia and the 
EU have a common border and, furthermore, there are countries on the map 
that form the area of a “common neighborhood” (CN). This area represents 
simultaneously the Western- facing side of Russia and the Eastern- facing side 
of the EU, consisting of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia. Both Russia and the EU have particular interests with regard to 
these countries and therefore formulate goals that stem from these interests. 
In pursuit of said goals, both major powers use the power instruments that 
they have at their disposal. The aim of this chapter is to explain the power 
relations that Russia and the EU establish with the CN countries, as well as 
the choices CN countries make in favor of one major power or the other.
What is Russia’s and the EU’s interest in the CN area? Economically, these 
countries, with their relatively small markets (with the exception of Ukraine), 
are not very promising partners, so the main interests of both Russia and 
the Union lie outside the sphere of economy. However, this does not mean 
they are similar. Russia’s main interest in the CN countries stems from the 
necessity to build a coalition to confirm its aspirations to great power status. 
CN countries are suitable for this purpose as Russia has the capacity both to 
reward and to punish them. Russia needs coalition partners, and the problem 
is that there are physically not enough potential candidates— countries that 
would be geographically close (and not at the other end of the world like, 
say, Venezuela), reliable, and that could be firmly and permanently bound 
to Russia. The deficit of potential coalition partners pushes Russia to per-
ceive each country that could enter a Russia- centered coalition as having great 
value. From this perspective, the CN countries look exceptionally attractive, 
given their dependency on Russian energy supplies, as well as the cultural and 
historical affinities that these states share with Russia. Moscow has regarded 
this area as within Russia’s sphere of influence, an area in which Russia has 
“special,” “vital” or “privileged” interests (Adomeit, 2011, p.63). “Special 
interests” imply “special rights” for these territories, though these rights have 
never been formally specified. However, as Freedman stresses, informally 
“Moscow felt that it had the right to intervene in the affairs of former mem-
bers of the Soviet Union” (Freedman, 2014, p.17). In fact, Moscow has never 
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treated the sovereignty of these countries as inviolable, whereas the principle 
of Russia’s undivided and uncompromised sovereignty was and remains the 
cornerstone of the Kremlin’s political philosophy.
The task of building a coalition around Russia and the apparent “availabil-
ity” of the CN countries has made the Russian establishment think that these 
countries are doomed to make a “final choice” between Russia and Western 
Europe. According to Moscow, if  the elites of the CN countries do not rec-
ognize this necessity or make the wrong choice, then there are ways to “help” 
them choose the right path— that of joining a Russia- centered coalition. It 
is not by chance that Russian leadership always demands and expects assur-
ances of “eternal love” (“Russia is our best friend”) from the leaders of CN 
states. This is strongly evocative of the Soviet past, and the mode in which the 
leaders of fraternal socialist countries addressed Leonid Brezhnev.
The fulfillment of Russia’s goals does not lead to changes in the CN coun-
tries; on the contrary, Russia’s general principle is to support the status quo 
in these states, or to assist their return to the status quo if  its foundations 
have been shaken (by a “color revolution,” for instance). An integral part of 
this strategy is a policy of “managed instability” in countries torn by separat-
ist conflicts. Thus, Russia supported separatist Transdniestria in its political 
bargaining with Moldova, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in their fight for 
independence against central authority in Georgia. Moscow established rela-
tions with these entities’ governments, and launched the process of granting 
Russian citizenship to people living in their territories. This strategy provoked 
periods of destabilization in Moldova and Georgia, and the artificially cre-
ated instability was “managed” by Russia’s military and peacekeeping forces 
(Kuznetsova, 2005, no pagination).
In contrast to Russia, the EU has tried to maintain the attractiveness of the 
“European model” for neighboring countries without offering them prospects 
for membership, but rather by deepening economic and political cooperation. 
Thus, the goal of including these countries in its coalition was not a question 
on the Union’s agenda. At the same time, the Union has never attempted to 
force the CN countries to make a “final choice” between the Russian and 
Western European coalitions. The European strategy toward the  CN was 
established in the first place on the basis of the need to strengthen the EU’s 
security and increase internal consolidation. In order to create the neces-
sary prerequisites for the acceleration of political cooperation and further 
economic integration, the EU has developed a set of authority instruments 
based on the principle of conditionality to ensure the Europeanization of 
its common neighbors. Thus, the desired security of the EU borders implies 
forced short- term instability in the CN countries, induced by the course of 
Europeanization. Yet this forced instability has nothing in common with the 
“managed instability” pursued by the Russian government as an integral part 
of its strategy toward neighboring countries.
The images of the CN countries’ “desired future” presented by Russia and 
the EU are, alas, incompatible. Not only are the interests and strategic goals 
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of Russia and the Union within the CN area principally different, but equally 
different are the power instruments and power relations that the two domin-
ant players offer to their counterparts there. The EU relies mainly on author-
ity, modifying the instruments that it used in preparing the great enlargement 
of 2004, while Russia relies on the systematic use of coercion, making its 
instruments progressively more sophisticated. In the literature, Russia and 
the EU are defined as competitors, and their “common neighborhood” is 
commonly referred to as a “battlefield” (incidentally, this “battlefield” def-
inition appeared long before the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and subsequent 
events [Löwenhardt, 2005, cited in Gower and Timmins, 2011, p.1]). However, 
Russia and the EU are competitors of a special kind, and their competition is 
far from traditional in nature.
What we observe in the CN area is in fact the outcome of a two- level game. 
The first level is the relations between the two major powers. As Trenin (2005, 
p.7) has rightly noted, it is clear that “The overall state of EU– Russia rela-
tions will be a key variable in the future development of the countries that lie 
between them.” At the second level are the relations of each of the CN coun-
tries with Russia and the EU. CN countries have a choice between the EU and 
Russia, which is conditioned by various domestic factors (whether this choice 
is “final” or “fated” is another question). Meanwhile, the relations between 
Russia and the EU (at the first level) are designed in a way that the CN coun-
tries can neither make the choice in favor of both powers at the same time 
depending on the domain, nor refuse to choose between them. At the same 
time, in making their choice, the CN countries must take into consideration 
“the shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984, cited in Molm, 1997, p.118)— the 
likelihood that the choice they make now will influence how the major pow-
ers will respond to them later. This means, in particular, the possibility of 
being punished by Russia for a choice in favor of privileged relations with 
the EU. The CN area clearly demonstrates the possibilities and constraints 
of using authority and coercion by major powers with regard to subordinate 
counterparts.
Russia: why building a coalition is so important
In Russian official and unofficial political discourse, the area of the former 
Soviet Union (which includes all the countries of the common neighbor-
hood) is referred to as “post- Soviet space.” Focus is directed onto the shared 
 historical legacy. The Russian establishment has continued to use this concept, 
combined with another concept of the “near abroad” (blizhnee zarubezh’e), 
which puts Russia in the center and places each post- Soviet country in a cer-
tain category depending on its political and economic distance from Russia. 
Geographic proximity to Russia— be it immediate proximity or not— is the 
key location feature for all countries of the CN. The Russian vector of their 
foreign policy is (and will remain) by default the most important one. In 
developing relations with the CN countries, the Russian leadership bases its 
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calculations on this feature, while pursuing the goal of building a sustainable 
Russia- centered coalition and preventing the growth of the influence of third 
states (or their alliances) in the common neighborhood.
From the 2000s onwards, Russia has undertaken numerous attempts to 
show the world its growing might as a “genuine” great power. But why does 
Russia need a coalition1 to prove it? In comparison with the bipolar world 
system, in the contemporary world the role of coalitions has increased sig-
nificantly. In other words, coalitions matter. However, there are many differ-
ent kinds of coalition, and there are different principles of classifying them. 
One is to make a distinction between coalitions without a hegemon (like the 
EU) and those with a hegemon (for instance, NAFTA, or all coalitions in the 
post- Soviet space with Russia’s participation). Regarding the latter, theoret-
ical approaches to international relations, for all their differences, share a pos-
ition on the key role of alliances/ coalitions around (and also against) states 
that claim great power status. In fact, it is the ability to form and to maintain a 
coalition that proves the legitimacy of a claim to great power status. This sta-
tus cannot emerge as a result of individual claims— it requires recognition by 
other actors in the first place. Thus, great power status implies that the coun-
try “is treated in the calculations of other major powers as if  it has the clear 
economic, military and political potential to bid for superpower status in the 
short or medium term” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.35). However, such rec-
ognition can be granted not only by major powers, but also by smaller ones, 
in the form of building a coalition around the great power. Therefore, great 
powers need to compete for potential coalition partners, and the competition 
intensifies, as, unlike in the times of the bipolar world, countries can relatively 
easily change coalitions. This means that other states have the choice (admit-
tedly conditioned by many factors, but a choice nevertheless) of whether to 
join a coalition with certain “great powers” or not. This capacity for choice 
significantly increases their role in international relations.
Great powers face particularly complex problems with regard to coalition- 
building. To be sustainable, coalitions with a great power assume that this 
power takes on a disproportionally large part of the costs of maintaining a 
coalition, while the contribution of lesser members is much smaller (Olson 
and Zeckhauser, 1966; Sandler and Hartley, 2001; Fang and Ramsay, 2009). 
But this is only part of the story, and one which is not too problematic as in 
most cases great powers take on such costs without objection (though the 
concrete size of the costs can obviously be a matter for negotiation). The 
other part of the story is how to create conditions, i.e., guarantees, that would 
put constraints on the unlimited domination of the great power in a coalition. 
This problem can be reformulated as a problem of the demand for the other 
coalition members to trust in the great power’s commitments. Guarantees of 
these can only emerge when the great power is a (liberal) democracy, when 
smaller coalition members can rely on its domestic institutional mechanisms 
and form reliable expectations with regard to the great power’s decision- 
making process.
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All of the above allows us to formulate some preliminary conclusions with 
regard to Russia. In order to convince the outside world of its great power 
status, Russia needs a coalition, and this is not a luxury, not even a volun-
tary choice, but a necessity. Many in Russia declare that “Russia is fated to 
be a great power” because the “list” of great powers is set a priori (meaning 
that competition for partners is unnecessary). However, such declarations are 
hardly convincing even for their authors— in reality, Russia needs a coalition 
to prove its claim to great power status, and Russia does indeed fiercely com-
pete for partners. Russia is ready to bear large costs for maintaining its coali-
tion, and does so. However, it is not possible in the Russian case to solve the 
problem of trust and to guarantee the credibility of Russia’s commitments. 
Therefore, it would be logical to expect increased use of coercive tools by 
Russia against its coalition partners, as well as the entry of weaker countries 
into the coalition— those which cannot count on reliable allies and are forced 
to side with their powerful neighbor.
Generally speaking, there is nothing surprising in the economic integra-
tion processes around Russia; it would be more surprising if  such processes 
were not developing. From the economic viewpoint, neighboring countries 
join Russia- centered integration projects because Russia is the biggest and 
most accessible market for their exports. It is also rich in natural resources, 
which is particularly important, for instance, for Belarus (Yarashevich, 2014). 
Russia is a source of investment, which is highly relevant for the economies 
of its satellites. However, Russia’s ambitions go far beyond economic integra-
tion. Russia seeks to form a rigid political coalition, similar to those of the 
days of the bipolar world, a task which is extremely difficult, if  at all possible, 
nowadays.
How does Russia build its coalition? What power instruments does it use? 
Creating a legal institutional framework (or frameworks) seems like a logical 
first step. Indeed, several integration projects with Russia as a hegemon have 
been launched since the beginning of the ’90s. This “integration fever” started 
with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 
1991. More recent integration projects include the Eurasian Customs Union 
of 2010 between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. In January 2012, the three 
countries agreed to establish even closer economic ties by signing an agree-
ment to form a “common economic space,” which later transformed into 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), starting in January 2015. Armenia 
became the fourth member of the Union, and the Kyrgyz Republic joined as a 
fifth member in May 2015. Moscow played a pivotal role in all these projects. 
Analyzing the CIS, Adams observes that “Without Russia, there would be 
no Commonwealth” (Adams, 1998, p.51). The same applies to all other post- 
Soviet integration projects.2
What is surprising, however, is how many countries Russia has lost between 
the era of the CIS and of the Eurasian Union. The CIS followed a principle of 
accepting all comers: all 12 former Soviet republics (minus the 3 Baltic States) 
joined the Commonwealth. Now the number of members in the Eurasian 
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Union has more than halved— only those with which Russia has managed 
not to spoil relations, and those who have no real choice, have remained. The 
scale and composition of the Russian coalition indicates that the “resource” 
of Russia’s allied neighbors has been exhausted (at least for now). Therefore, 
every individual member of the coalition is critically important: Russia can-
not afford to lose any of them.
When an institutional framework is created, be it in the loose form of the 
CIS, or in the form of the more consolidated EAEU, order in the coalition 
can be maintained either by granting rewards, or by using punishment (coer-
cion). The former took place in the early ’90s, but more demonstratively than 
as part of a consistent strategy. As Kuznetsova argues
Even in the early 1990s, when Russia was passing a painful period of eco-
nomic reforms, it continued to provide financial support to the former 
Soviet republics. The provision of technical credits and the rescheduling 
of old debts was a common practice at that time. Perhaps the new sov-
ereign states took this for granted, but in reality this was simply a good-
will gesture on the part of Russia. Incidentally, Russia has never received 
those debts: after long and difficult negotiations, they were formalized as 
state debts— only to be recognized as repaid under various pretexts.
(Kuznetsova, 2005, no pagination)
For instance, in the case of Ukraine, the repayment was for basing Russia’s 
Black Sea fleet in Sebastopol (Kuznetsova, 2005). This paints quite an idyllic 
picture. However, in reality, according to Drezner’s calculations, in the ’90s 
the Russian state used economic sanctions against former Soviet republics 
39 times in order to extract concessions and influence important policy deci-
sions. Drezner claims that these sanctions were successful in 38 percent of 
cases. With regard to the countries of the common neighborhood, instru-
ments of coercion included raising tariffs on exports to Russia (Azerbaijan) 
and reduced energy subsidies and/ or supplies to energy importers (Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova) (Hillebrand and Bervoets, 2013, p.2).
During the 2000s, the Russian government continued using economic 
leverage to reap economic benefits and to increase political influence over the 
CN countries (Hillebrand and Bervoets, 2013, p.2). Russia had an impressive 
array of coercive tools at its disposal to exert pressure on the countries of 
the common neighborhood, the most obvious of them stemming from these 
countries’ energy dependency on Russia. Thus, Russia’s energy leverage over 
its neighbors included supply interruptions (total or partial), threats of sup-
ply interruptions (covert or explicit), manipulation using pricing policy (pref-
erential prices and their cancelation), usage of existing energy debts, creation 
of new energy debts, and hostile takeovers of companies or infrastructures 
(Larson, 2006). Sanctions also went far beyond energy issues, and the expla-
nations for introducing them became increasingly sophisticated. The favorite 
one, used for the internal audience, was the concern of Russia’s authorities 
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for the health of Russian citizens— for this reason, Moldavian wine and 
Georgian mineral water were embargoed (as containing harmful impurities), 
as were Ukrainian candies (because of carcinogens). Interestingly, Russia pre-
sented its coercive instruments as more “gracious” ones than the EU’s author-
ity tools: by using coercion, Russia could strike (punish) suddenly and then 
quickly provide reward simply by stopping coercion, while the EU’s authority 
approach in form of Europeanization would “torture” target countries’ popu-
lations for much longer and with unclear results. Similar arguments are often 
used to explain why the Baltic states “have made the wrong choice in joining 
the EU”: that this decision was fatal for the local population. These countries 
have even received the derogatory nickname Vymiraty (“emirates” combined 
with a Russian word for “dying out”).
Russia has not only economic but also ideological tools at its disposal 
for building a coalition. The proximity of the values and ideological norms 
of potential counterparts is a facilitating factor for the formation of coali-
tions. With this regard, Russia offers the overarching concept of the “Russian 
World” (Russkiy Mir) to its coalition members. This is promoted by a collec-
tion of nongovernmental organizations used as instruments of Russia’s soft 
power, a concept understood by authorities in Moscow as “the power of coer-
cion rather than that of attraction” (Lough et al. 2014, p.3). At the same time, 
the “Russian World” is presented as a reward to its members— as the honor of 
belonging to something genuine, morally right and eternal.
The “Russian World,” a combination of words that Putin first officially 
used in 2001, in his speech before the first World Congress of Compatriots 
Living Abroad, is defined by Laruelle as follows:
The concept of the “Russian World” offers a particularly powerful rep-
ertoire: it is a geopolitical imagination, a fuzzy mental atlas on which 
different regions of the world and their different links to Russia can be 
articulated in a fluid way. This blurriness is structural to the concept, 
and allows it to be reinterpreted within multiple contexts. First, it serves 
as a justification for what Russia considers to be its right to oversee the 
evolution of its neighbors, and sometimes for an interventionist policy. 
Secondly, its reasoning is for Russia to reconnect with its pre- Soviet and 
Soviet past through reconciliation with Russian diasporas abroad. Lastly, 
it is a critical instrument for Russia to brand itself  on the international 
scene and to advance its own voice in the world.
(Laruelle, 2015, p.1)
In the mid- 2000s, the Russian government began to set up the groups and 
organizations that were to bring the message of  the “Russian World” into the 
public space. These organizations included the Russian World Fund (2007), 
the Foundation for Compatriots (2009) and the Gorchakov Foundation 
(2011). The Federal Agency for CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad and 
International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) were 
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established in 2008. After Putin returned to office in 2012, even more 
money was streamed to these NGOs: the Federal Agency received $78 mil-
lion annually from the state budget, and the smaller agencies (the Russian 
World Fund, Compatriots, Gorchakov, etc.) received $22 million divided 
between them (Lough et al. 2014, p.3). One of  the main target groups for 
Russia’s ideological influence in the direct neighborhood is youth. Moscow 
aims at consolidating pro- Russian young people and providing them with 
access to Russian public figures and standards of  journalism and diplo-
macy. For this purpose, various forums were established for pro- Russian 
youth from neighboring countries— Seliger International, Dialogue for the 
Future, Balkan, Caucasus and Baltic Dialogues, Slavic Integration Forum 
etc. (Lough et al. 2014, p.4). Not only does Russia invite and educate people 
from abroad, it directly sponsors the activities of  Russia- friendly associa-
tions in these countries, in particular, in the states of  the common neigh-
borhood (Laruelle, 2015, p.10).
One of the advantages of the “Russian World” is its flexible geography. The 
Russian World Fund defines the “Russian World” as consisting of
not only Russians [Russkie], not only Rossians [Rossiyane], not only our 
compatriots in the Near and Far Abroad, émigrés and their descendants. 
It also includes foreign citizens, speaking Russian, studying it, and all 
those who are honestly interested in Russia and care for its future. … In 
forming the Russian World as a global project, Russia is creating for itself  
a new identity, new possibilities for effective cooperation with the rest of 
the world, and new incentives for its own development.
(The Russian World Fund, 2015, cited in Laruelle, 2015, p.13)
The concept implies that if  you belong to the “World,” wherever you are, it is 
a global power that stands up for you. In this sense, the “Russian World” is a 
truly global ambition.
Each great power needs to constantly affirm its status, most of all by 
maintaining a sustainable coalition. Russia has many tools for this purpose, 
though they are primarily coercive and designed in the form of short- term 
tactics. The threat that some coalition member may leave is ever- present (the 
examples of Georgia and Ukraine perfectly demonstrate this). By insisting 
that Russia’s partners must make a “final choice,” Russia wants “eternal guar-
antees” (almost blood oaths) of its partners’ devotion. But this is not going 
to happen.
EU: modest offers produce modest results
Compared to Russia’s “Napoleonic plans” with regard to the common neigh-
borhood, the EU’s interests and plans towards this area are much more mod-
est. Apart from the frozen conflicts scattered around the area, the EU did 
not focus on the states comprising the CN until the emergence of the EU’s 
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European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), initially outlined in 2003 (Gower and 
Timmins, 2011, p.1). Of course, declarations have been made: as Averre notes,
the EU’s approach to its Eastern neighborhood constitutes an extension 
of the internal “European project,” based above all on norms and values 
which place good governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law, as well as an attractive economic model for modernization, at the 
forefront of its policy concerns.
(Averre, 2011, p.9)
However, I suspect that the basic rationale behind the EU’s concern for the 
CN countries was the aim of gaining greater security (and, therefore, more 
quiet) after the unprecedented Eastern enlargement of 2004, without paying 
an excessively heavy price in terms of both commitments and money.
There would be no ENP (and later no Eastern Partnership) without enlarge-
ment, “the EU’s perpetual motion engine” (Forsberg and Haukkala, 2016, 
p.194). Due to enlargement, the strategy of extending the European zone of 
peace and stability eastwards (by creating a “ring of friends”) appeared on the 
EU’s agenda. The ENP was the first carrot that the EU offered to the coun-
tries of the CN in an attempt to provide guidance for their economic and pol-
itical transformations by “re- injecting the EU’s normative agenda” (Forsberg 
and Haukkala, 2016, p.195) and granting financial support for adherence 
to it. Russia was the only country that rejected this interaction framework. 
Other EU initiatives— the Black Sea Synergy3 (launched in 2007), as well as 
the Northern Dimension (1997)— were tools complementary to the ENP.
However, the bargaining game of promoting various member states’ inter-
ests beyond the EU borders did not end with the ENP. France supported further 
implementation of the Mediterranean Union project with special focus on the 
EU’s southern flank, while Poland, putting special attention on the unequal 
treatment of southern and eastern EU neighbors, has been actively trying to 
develop and to promote an initiative supporting Eastern neighbors, especially 
Ukraine and Georgia (Łapczynski, 2009, p.145). Even before entering the EU, 
Poland was trying to push the European Union towards the  creation of an 
Eastern Dimension policy, drawing on the example of the Finnish Northern 
Dimension initiative launched in 1997 (Meister and May, 2009). Inside the 
EU, Poland found an ally, Sweden, and the two member states proposed the 
Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) focusing on the Union’s eastern flank. 
The European Council approved the EaP, and the Commission officially pre-
sented its proposal in December 2008 (Łapczynski, 2009, p.143). The EaP 
became a new authority instrument and the EU’s first attempt to propose an 
agenda of gradual convergence only to the large group of post- Soviet states 
(though without the prospect of full membership), namely Belarus, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Compared to the ENP, the EaP represented a remarkable shift in the scope 
and depth of authority relations: while the ENP was initially developed on 
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the basis of political, nonbinding instruments (e.g., Action Plans offering 
guidance for reforms in each partner country), the EaP proposed a new con-
tractual framework consisting of Association Agreements (AAs) together 
with Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) premised 
on massive legal convergence with the EU’s acquis communautaire (Delcour, 
2015, p.317). The Eastern Partnership is based on the foundations of shared 
ownership, responsibility, differentiation and mutual accountability, wherein 
each partner can freely choose the level of ambition and the goals to which it 
aspires in relations with the EU (The Council of the European Union, 2015). 
For the incumbent political elites of the six countries it was important that the 
EU’s offer did not (at least initially) entail political costs for them, as the EU 
mainly focused on sectoral conditionality related to the trade acquis (Delcour 
and Wolczuk, 2015). In addition to sector reforms, EU support within the 
EaP framework is given to promoting civil society, local and regional cooper-
ation, etc. A new generation of Action Plans for each country, some includ-
ing “clear benchmarks and linkage to the alignment towards EU legislation, 
standards and norms,” have been drafted and signed. Importantly, assistance 
funds to the partner countries are distributed in a way that reflects progress in 
implementing reforms and according to the principle of differentiation. With 
those partners who wish to make a far- reaching commitment to the EU, new 
individual and tailor- made AAs can be negotiated. These agreements would 
establish, in particular, advanced cooperation on Common Foreign and 
Security Policy/ European Security and Defense Policy, and on developing a 
Comprehensive Institution Building Program (CIBP) that would help partner 
countries to improve administrative capacities in all sectors of cooperation 
with the Union (Łapczynski, 2009, p.151).
As Bechev (2015, p.344) shows, from a purely functional viewpoint EaP 
is moving forward and advancing its economic mission, at least vis- à- vis the 
frontrunners— Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. However, as a security pro-
motion and democratization tool the Partnership gets low marks. Indeed, 
there are few issues on which scholars of European politics agree, but, as 
Schimmelfennig observes, in the literature there is broad agreement not only 
on the overall inconsistency of the EU strategy, but also on the generally low 
impact of the EU on democracy and human rights in noncandidate third 
countries (Schimmelfennig, 2012, p.18). There are various grounds to criticize 
the authority instruments that the Union is applying to the CN countries. 
For instance, even before the political crisis in Ukraine, experts noted that the 
“Russian factor” had eclipsed the real domestic problems of the EaP coun-
tries, and they were much more rarely discussed than Russia’s development, 
which had taken pride of place in the debates (Youngs and Pishchikova, 2013). 
Furthermore, the Union’s attention was dispersed very unevenly between the 
CN countries: the spotlight was suddenly placed on whichever country was 
assigned frontrunner status among the other countries of the Neighborhood 
during a particular period. At different times, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
performed this role (Kobzova, 2015), while others remained in the darkness.
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There is an interesting argument that explains the interrelation between 
stability (as the “grand” EU goal within the CN space) and change. As Börzel 
(2011, p.15) writes, “The Commission and the member states should acknow-
ledge that the main goal of the EU’s external relations with its neighbors is 
promoting stability rather than change.” However, changes are inevitable, as 
the reforms that the Union’s political conditionality prescribes for these coun-
tries necessarily lead to increasing instability, as any reforms do, at least in the 
short or medium term. From this standpoint comes the statement that the EU 
strategy within the CN is self- contradictory by nature. Pänke describes this 
contradiction as follows:
The EU exposes a dual face in its regional policies, aiming at the mar-
riage of two principles: stabilization in the Union’s own interest and 
Europeanization as norm transfer. Both principles mutually restrain each 
other in terms of efficiency and lead to a pretense, in which both sides of 
the partnership imitate integration … The conflicting principles of stabil-
ization and Europeanization reflect the imperial nature of the European 
Union. Terming EU regional politics as imperial, does not imply an 
aggressive and consciously applied policy of expansion, e.g. aiming at the 
exploitation of resources, but rather identifies an incremental approach 
of norm diffusion based on asymmetrical relations of power to stabilize 
the peripheries— typical for historical empires, as Rome in ancient times, 
or Habsburg in the 19th century.
(Pänke, 2015, p.351)
This argument, however, can be challenged. Yes, it would be ridiculous to 
deny that Europeanization initially leads to a decrease in the stability of sub-
ordinate countries, but in the medium to long term, stability should emerge 
and be sustainable on a new basis. The idea is to achieve a new quality of sta-
bility that is expected to emerge as a result of Europeanization.
Besides that (and those who evaluate the EaP should take this into 
account), the success of the Partnership does not fully depend on the EU. 
Authority relationships are quite complex: dominant powers should be able 
to develop and offer authority instruments, while subordinates, and this is no 
less important, should be able to properly apply them to their benefit. Thus, 
the “difference in potentials,” i.e., the mismatch between the EU institutions 
and policies on the one hand, and domestic ones (which is to say those of 
the subordinate country), which must be prepared to change, on the other. 
Börzel and Risse have shown that the difference in the degree and character 
of possible changes across different domestic environments is considerable. 
There must be mediating factors facilitating or prohibiting domestic change. 
Facilitating factors include the virtual absence of veto actors and the pres-
ence of supporting institutions (following the logic of rationalist institution-
alism), or the presence of “norm entrepreneurs” as “agents of change” and a 
cooperative political culture (sociological institutionalism) (Börzel and Risse, 
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2000). Also, as Börzel shows with the example of Western Balkan countries, 
the EU’s authority tools lead mostly to formal institutional change, rather 
than to the transformation of informal institutions and behavioral practices. 
Uncontested sovereignty and sufficient state capacity in subordinate coun-
tries are mandatory conditions for making Europeanization work (Börzel, 
2011, p.14).
Literature on the CEE accession countries confirms that the effectiveness 
of the EU authority tools highly depends on a credible accession perspec-
tive, when the countries see clear, not illusive, potential to enter the Union. 
The absence of this “golden carrot” of membership drastically decreases the 
transformative power of the EU (Tocci, 2005), and damages its international 
credibility as a “normative power,” creating a new “capacity- expectation gap” 
(Hill, 1993; Holland, 2003). Börzel (2011, p.15) asks a fair question:
Why should the European Neighborhood Countries and other countries 
engaged with the EU make any efforts to fulfill EU expectations for the 
respect of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good govern-
ance, if  the EU is neither willing to reward those, who comply, nor is 
capable of punishing others, who do not?
The CEE countries have credible possibilities before them, but these of the 
CN area do not. In its relations with EaP countries, the Union has made a 
shift from a “more for more” approach (which implies positive conditionality 
and strong authority) to a “less for less” approach (which is negative condi-
tionality and much weaker authority) (Parmentier, 2013). From the other side, 
however, membership, even if  offered by the EU, is not feasible for countries 
with problematic state capacity and the presence of a power in close proximity 
that puts severe constraints on their domestic political development, in par-
ticular, blocking incentives to engage in Europeanization reforms.
Russia, the EU and the choices of “common neighborhood” countries
The differences in Russia’s and the EU’s approach to the common neighbor-
hood is evident— this is true both in their general strategies and in terms of 
the use of concrete power instruments. Moscow and Brussels possess drastic-
ally dissimilar foreign policy tools (Makarychev, 2015, p.314), and the funda-
mental disparity between them lies in the scale and frequency of coercion. But 
to see and stress this difference is not the end of the story; it is the beginning. 
Scholars often tend to explain the divergence between Russia’s and the EU’s 
approaches towards the common neighborhood by placing it into a postmod-
ern/ modern dichotomy. Thus, the EU seeks to extend a European “postmod-
ern” security community, without offering the CN countries the prospect of 
accession. This is done through trade and assistance programs to encourage 
the maximum possible convergence with European norms and values, and the 
rule of law— this was the main idea of the ENP and the European Security 
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Strategy (The Council of the European Union, 2003; also see Cremona 
and Hillion, 2006, p.3), and was reinforced in the European Commission’s 
Communication on the Eastern Partnership (The European Commission, 
2008). The EU’s approach involves the exercise of normative or civilian power 
to project security and create prosperity. On the other hand, Russia seeks to 
maintain or recreate a traditional, realist “sphere of influence” by manipulat-
ing a range of hard and soft power instruments to exploit its predominant 
structural power in the post- Soviet space (Gower and Timmins, 2011, p.6). As 
Averre (2011) argues, there is a deep- rooted incompatibility between the EU’s 
use of postmodern, normative power and Russia’s use of modern, structural 
power, an incompatibility which presents a range of complex challenges to 
developing any tangible meaning to the concept of “strategic partnership” 
between the two actors.
The postmodern/ modern dichotomy does not, however, explain how and 
why these differences emerge. In the previous chapters I attempted to explain 
what constrains the use of authority and coercion instruments by Russia and 
the EU. Here I would like to stress one of the manifestations of the differ-
ence that is particularly clear in the case of the CN area. The authority tools 
that the Union uses with regard to the CN countries presuppose some use of 
coercion (depending on the particular tool). For Russia, on the contrary, the 
tools are predominantly coercive with the appearance of authority- building, 
while the concrete country- specific situation suggests the form of said appear-
ance. Moreover, while directed against a specific target country, the coercion 
diffuses into adjacent territories, increasing the degree of instability there, so 
the coercer creates security problems for the larger region. The key point is 
that the combinations of authority and coercion within Russia’s and the EU’s 
general approaches are principally different despite the fact that they may 
sometimes appear similar.
The temporal aspects of these relations also deserve mention. Bechev 
(2015, p.342) argues that Russia can mobilize (coercive) power resources to 
attain short- term goals, while the EU’s policies are calculated for the long 
term and pursue structural change at the level of institutions, norms and 
practices. In comparison with Russia, the EU is less flexible as it is legally 
constrained in ways that Russia is not.
Long before the political crisis in Ukraine, scholars began to define the rela-
tions of Russia and the EU with the CN countries as a competition. For instance, 
Adomeit argued that the Putin system and the EU’s aim of “integrating Russia 
into a common European economic and social space” are mutually exclusive 
and the reality of the EU– Russia relationship in the common European neigh-
borhood has not been that of a “strategic partnership” and cooperation but of 
competition (Adomeit, 2011, p.64). However, this is competition of a special 
kind, with, as Bechev defines it, sui generis forms. He states that
While Russia cannot replace the EU as a purveyor of functional integra-
tion, the EU is in no position to effectively balance and contain Russian 
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might with coercive means. In consequence, the competition between 
Moscow and Brussels is at its most acute in the area of discourse. What 
we witness are two rival narratives: Europe’s story of political, economic, 
and institutional transformation in line with its liberal democratic credo, 
on the one hand, and a counter narrative blending traditionalism, reli-
gious values, nostalgia for the Soviet past, and the historical myths of 
victimhood and resistance linking Russia to its neighbors, on the other.
(Bechev, 2015, p.341)
The discourse, however, cannot maintain itself, especially given how tense and 
even dramatic it is. It needs to be supported and confirmed by certain activi-
ties of both rivals, in other words, by the use of power instruments. As Bechev 
nicely puts it, “the EU and Russia operate at very dissimilar wavelengths” 
(Bechev, 2015, p.342).
The main problem, which has both theoretical and practical aspects, is that 
authority cannot be a response to coercion, while the opposite is possible, 
and coercion can be a response to authority at least in the short run. One 
consequence of this fundamental incompatibility is the mutual inability of 
Russia and the EU to predict not only the strength of reaction with regard 
to each other’s actions, but sometimes even the character of this reaction (in 
Chapter 4 I attempted to show this with the example of the EU sanctions 
against Russia).
Russia’s self- exclusion from the ENP has had the effect of creating a 
competitive agenda between the two major actors (Haukkala, 2008, p.38). 
Russia’s reaction to the Eastern Partnership was much more negative— from 
the start, the initiative was denounced by Russia as an attempt to extend the 
EU’s sphere of influence into its neighborhood (Freedman, 2014, p.18). The 
Union did not fully appreciate how potentially threatening the EaP would 
appear to Moscow (Freedman, 2014, p.23). Meanwhile, in Moscow, the ini-
tiative caused sincere confusion and indignation: “Where do you think you’re 
sticking your nose?” In Russia, the Partnership was perceived as the first 
truly— and dangerously— political initiative of the Union, aimed at bringing 
six post- Soviet countries, Russia’s “legitimate booty,” into the EU’s orbit and 
separating them from Russia. At that time, Russia’s approach had already 
changed: it did not want to spend more time coaxing the leadership of these 
states to enter the coalition around Russia— rather, it was now ready to pun-
ish the disobedient. The EU repeatedly stressed that the EaP initiative was not 
directed against Russia and that partner countries needed to maintain good 
relations with Russia as well, but all in vain. The Russian side reproached 
the Union and its member states for numerous examples of direct pressure 
against EaP members, pressure which it felt had a distinct anti- Russian orien-
tation (Malysheva, 2014, p.43). In its turn, the European Parliament passed a 
resolution condemning Russia for allegedly pressuring the post- Soviet coun-
tries to prevent them from signing association agreements with the EU at the 
Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2013. However, it may be 
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useful to stress that even if  the EU did not fully take into account how hurt 
Russia could feel with regard to EaP, this was still an authority instrument 
for a transformational economic effect— an offer that the six countries could 
either accept or reject voluntarily. The EU thus did not change the rules of 
the competition— Russia did it on the very day of the annexation of Crimea.
The common prediction with regard to the ENP and the EaP was that their 
impact on the domestic and foreign policy orientation of the six countries 
concerned was likely to be small, and that Russia would retain “good cards” in 
the competitive game with the EU (Adomeit, 2011, p.67). However, the reality 
proved much more complex. First, the Russia– EU rivalry has led to a deep 
divide in the area of the common neighborhood between the countries that 
joined the Eurasian Economic Union (i.e., Belarus and Armenia) and those 
that signed the AAs and the DCFTAs offered by the EU under the Eastern 
Partnership (i.e., Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) (Delcour, 2015, p.316). 
Although the course of development of these countries is primarily framed by 
external actors’ interests and agendas, these interests affect domestic practices 
through the power instruments that the major powers use. As Delcour (2015, 
p.317) argues, “While the decision of these countries is certainly shaped by 
external players’ stimuli and pressures, it derives primarily from elites’ inter-
pretation of these stimuli and pressures.” In Chapters 6, 7 and 8 I will explain 
in detail how this happens in Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine respectively.
Azerbaijan is the only country in the CN that has chosen to keep a distance 
both from Russia and from the EU, and is able to do so. Falling far short of 
the democratic standards envisioned by the EU, the country does not need a 
level of integration with the Union that could pose even a minimal threat to 
its incumbent political establishment. It also has no dependency on Russia 
with regard to energy resources, and this gives Azerbaijan freedom of maneu-
ver, unlike Armenia. Baku’s loyalty to Russia will always be doubtful, so when 
faced with the need to choose between Azerbaijan and Armenia as a coalition 
member (the relations between them make it impossible to choose both at the 
same time), Russia has chosen Armenia.
Azerbaijan is the most “independent” among the six CN countries, while 
Belarus (see Chapter 6) and Armenia are the most “dependent.” Both coun-
tries have taken part in all Russian- led regional initiatives in the post- Soviet 
space. Between 2010 and 2013, faced with an imperative need to launch 
modernization, Armenia increasingly expanded its political and economic 
cooperation with the EU (Delcour, 2015, p.321). This was a case of “silent 
Europeanization” (Delcour and Wolczuk, 2015), when the country’s leader-
ship was not vocal in highlighting its achievements in the sphere of European 
integration and never expressed any membership aspirations. It seemed as 
if  Armenia was trying to cooperate with the Union without Russia’s know-
ledge, while simultaneously maintaining security cooperation with the lat-
ter (Delcour, 2015, p.322). This strategy is understandable— Armenia was in 
no position to resist Russia; it was not self- sustaining and was under con-
stant pressure. In September 2013, during Armenian President Sargsyan’s 
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negotiations with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Sargsyan announced that 
Armenia would not be initiating an agreement with the EU, but would join 
the Customs Union and, later on, participate in the building of the Eurasian 
Economic Union.
Moldova, Georgia (see Chapter 7), and Ukraine (see Chapter 8) have made 
a choice in favor of Brussels, though the sustainability of this choice may be 
doubtful. Moldova, being the poorest country in Europe, nevertheless had 
more power to resist Russia than Armenia— when Moldova was warned by 
Russia not to sign an Association Agreement, neither references to the con-
tested position of Transnistria, nor Russia’s embargoes of Moldavian wine 
exports had any effect. Moldova still signed the Agreement with the EU. As 
in Armenia, for Moldova the EU’s offer was perceived as a model for the 
country’s modernization (Delcour, 2015, p.320), and this was the main reason 
for an official choice in favor of Europeanization. However, it is not easy to 
translate official commitments into practice. Moldova was slower to do so 
than others within the ENP framework, and it was also slow in the imple-
mentation of legislation within the EaP. The main reason for this was that the 
adoption of laws in line with EU demands stumbled against vested interests 
in sensitive areas such as judicial reform and the battle against corruption 
(Delcour, 2015, p.320).
In other words, even if  the choice is made in favor of the EU, its imple-
mentation strongly depends on the capability of the subordinate country to 
“master” authority instruments in its territory and to overcome the resistance 
of those groups that would prefer to keep the old status quo. The fulfillment 
of the choice also depends on the quality and strength of the authority instru-
ments. As Delcour (2015, p.320) shows, the EU has not exerted any pres-
sure (apart from the soft recommendations contained in the annual progress 
reports) on the country’s elite and oligarchs. Finally, Russia’s efforts to oppose 
Moldova’s pro- European choice also play an important role. In this regard, 
Russia has its own agenda— it supports Moldovan political and societal 
actors who are less favorably inclined towards the European choice. Moscow 
facilitated the emergence of new actors inside the country, including the Party 
of Socialists (PSRM), which supports canceling the Association Agreement 
with the EU. It also supports the Transnistria and Gagauzia regions, focusing 
on their individual identities and close economic links with Russia. In these 
regions, Russia’s image is that of a powerful and friendly country, a protector 
against a threat of a Moldovan unitary state based on Romanian heritage, 
and an alternative to integration with the EU (Delcour, 2015, p.321).
Fairly recently, an important signal about the change in Moldavia’s exter-
nal choice came with the republic’s presidential election in November 2016. 
Igor Dodon, a pro- Russian candidate from the Socialist Party, won the race, 
promising to pursue closer ties with Russia by canceling the Agreement with 
the EU in favor of joining a Eurasian economic union (EurActiv, 2016). Such 
plans obviously contradict the current Moldavian government’s pro- European 
stance, making political conflict within the country almost inevitable. The 
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situation is complicated by the fact that, according to the election results, this 
split between “pro- Russians” and “pro- Europeans” divides the country into 
almost equal parts— similarly to the situation in Ukraine prior to the crisis.
All in all, the division that cuts across the common neighborhood currently 
appears as follows. Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia belong to one side, the 
European camp, while Belarus and Armenia belong to the other, the Russian 
camp. Russia has lost Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the last being the most 
important country in the long term. Russia’s revisionist behavior and exten-
sive use of coercion have produced considerable threats to pan- European 
security. In the words of Japaridze (2013, no pagination), Chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee of the Parliament of Georgia, in the common 
neighborhood there is a “regional architecture of such a kind that would not 
exclude Russia but would not provide for its leading role, either. … Being 
‘with Russia,’ but not ‘in Russia’ might become our common goal.” This is an 
appealing sentiment— the problem, however, is how to constrain Russia, as its 
leadership equates “with” and “in” with regard to this area.
Notes
 1 The terms “alliance” and “coalition” embrace all possible forms of associations of 
states— from commonwealths to communities, unions, confederations and federa-
tions (Snyder, 1997). An alliance or coalition is a commitment, formal or informal, 
that binds sovereign states to cooperate in certain spheres in aid of certain goals. 
Regardless of the form of alliance (coalition), reliable commitments are crucial 
(Walt, 2009).
 2 The Eurasian Union has “two fathers”; it is a personal project for both President 
Putin and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev.
 3 The Black Sea Synergy involves Armenia, Azerbaijan, (Bulgaria), Georgia, 
Moldova, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine and was intended to develop concrete 
initiatives in regard to transport, energy, environment, fishery, migration and 
organized crime.
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6 Belarus
Strangulation in a fraternal embrace
Belarus is a small country, but small countries can still set records. While 
Belarus is not a member of  the Council of  Europe, its president Lukashenka 
is currently Europe’s longest- serving political leader. Belarus remains the 
only European state which has not joined the Bologna Process, which aims 
at the creation of  a single European space for university education. The 
country is also known for its extremely hostile media environment and for 
having one of  the worst records on freedom of expression. Here is a small 
but telling detail: in 2005, the Independent Institute for Socio- Economic 
and Political Studies, which studies political processes in Belarus and is 
independent not only in name but in the nature of  its research, moved to 
the European Humanities University in exile in Vilnius, Lithuania, due to 
increasing repression at home.
Having such an advantage as a geographic location in the central part of 
Europe, Belarus is nevertheless a deeply peripheral country in the worst sense 
of the word. And therein lies its tragedy. We usually use the word “tragedy” in 
regard to a country when talking about violent conflicts and the victims they 
produce, but tragedies can come in some very different forms. In Belarus we 
observe an enduring but hidden tragedy where a European country’s human 
development is artificially constrained for decades by state authorities. It’s 
noteworthy that the population doesn’t perceive the situation as tragic— it is 
used to it and considers its life to be normal, even better by comparison, say, 
with all the turbulences that the Ukrainians are experiencing now. But this 
habit of being content with little (indeed, very little) is also one of the dimen-
sions of the nation’s tragedy.
This tragedy has its explanations, and the most important of these relates 
to Russia, or more precisely, the authority- like relations between Russia and 
Belarus. While constraining the freedom of Belorussian authorities, these 
relations nevertheless place them in a “comfort zone” by facilitating the main-
tenance of an ineffective status quo within the economy, and control over 
society.
Some experts often talk about the special “Belarusian way.” I am not con-
vinced by the reasoning that the “Belarusian way” can definitively be said to 
exist because it is not imposed by state authorities but “is supported actively 
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by Belarusian society as it is congruous with expectations and demands of a 
significant part of the country’s population” (Vadalazhskaya and Matskevich, 
2008, p.5). Equally insufficiently convincing is the argument that explains 
President Lukashenka’s popularity by his matching the “Belarusian peasant 
archetype” (Okara, 2001, cited in Ioffe, 2004, p.104). Ioffe (2004, p.108) argues 
that the infamous Belarusian conservatism has peasant roots, comparing it 
with the conservatism of the regions of southern Russia’s “Red Belt.” I would 
say that this conservatism, or more precisely, its sustainability, is greatly exag-
gerated, just as it was with the Red Belt, which was the subject of heated 
discussions in the ’90s and which today no one remembers.
On the contrary, in my opinion, it would be absolutely feasible to com-
mence true political and economic modernization in Belarus with EU assist-
ance and to achieve fairly rapid results, though not under current conditions. 
Under those, even the European Union’s attempts to at least establish closer 
relations with Belarus are on the whole doomed— there are just too few 
“points of entry” into the country’s system.
The “Belarusian system”— how and why does it persist?
When talking about the “Belarusian system,” I  am referring not merely to 
the economy, but also to identity issues, the political regime and the type of 
social contract between the elites and society, as well as external sources for 
preserving the Belarusian status quo. These constituent elements are closely 
interrelated; they support each other and together form a system.
For all post- Soviet states, the first years after the break- up of the Soviet 
Union were decisive with regard to nation- building. Belarus is not an excep-
tion, but rather exceptional in how little the country was able to achieve. The 
“Belarusization” project has overall failed. Bekus argues that the fate of the 
Belarusization policy was sealed when in 1994 Alyaksandr Lukashenka took 
presidential office. As early as May 1995
he initiated a referendum in which Russian was introduced as a second 
official language. In practice this meant that all achievements in promot-
ing Belarusian were reversed, and the very idea of forcefully replacing 
Russian with Belarusian was brought to an end.
(Bekus, 2014, p. 34)
In contrast with other post- Soviet states, in Belarus in particular an anti- 
Soviet identity rooted in Belarusian language had no chances to develop. In 
turn, this has led to the weakness of an opposition that has lacked the basis 
for mobilization of activists or popular support (Way, 2006). Incidentally, 
today this lack of individual identity is clear to see in the images of Belarusian 
cities: they combine the cultural narratives of the Soviet era with features of 
faceless mass consumption (Shirokanova, 2010, p.377).
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This was (and still is) the foundation for the establishment of the coun-
try’s political regime. A weak opposition and constant support from Russia 
led to the consolidation of the authoritarian rule of President Lukashenka, 
who during his reign has not experienced serious threats to his rule either 
from other branches of authority (horizontal), or from oppositional elite 
groups or political parties. (Such a situation can’t fail to recall Russia, where 
President Putin also did not face any serious threats to regime consolidation). 
But a political regime can’t be held only on the personality of the president, 
however beloved and popular. The Belarusian bureaucracy is large and com-
posed of two sizeable groups— Soviet- era bureaucrats and supporters of the 
Belarusian president, many of whom come to the capital from the deep prov-
inces of the country. The liaison between the two groups has proven to work 
quite successfully (Bohdan, 2013, p.5). As Nalbandov (2014, p.87) writes, 
“Belarus is among those consolidated authoritarian regimes, especially with a 
high degree of legitimacy (but not legality), which quite naturally would show 
‘better’ from political and economic standpoints than the number of liberal 
democracies.”
The Belarusian president claims that his system rests on opposition to 
Western- style capitalism and market economics, and avoids “throw[ing] 
unprepared people into the market abyss” (Lukashenka, 2002a, cited in 
Ambrosio, 2006, p.422). It has been defined by scholars as a “Soviet theme 
park,” which “establish[es] a Soviet- type model, without a Communist Party” 
(Åslund, 2002, cited in Ambrosio, 2006, p.422). Using surveys conducted in 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, McAllister and White show that nostalgia for 
the Soviet past is both widespread and persistent in all these countries, but 
only in Belarus do these feelings have implications for contemporary political 
opinions (McAllister and White, 2016).
In terms of economic policy Belarus is also a special case in Europe; a lot 
has been written about the main features of the country’s economy, such as 
preservation of key elements of central planning, and a marked degree of 
monopolization in most industries that results in a lack of competition in 
domestic markets. Belarus attracts very little direct foreign investment, and its 
investment climate is poor. The service sector is heavily underdeveloped, with 
incomes and wages extremely low (Havlik, 2009). Belarus is highly depend-
ent on Russian supplies of raw materials and energy. In the last few years the 
economy has shown a dangerous decrease in growth (Eastern Europe Studies 
Centre, 2014, p.1); modernization attempts— understood mainly as capital 
investments without changes in incentives and type of management— have 
failed (Eastern Europe Studies Centre, 2014, p.2). Another negative trend is 
gradual diminishing of labor resources since 2008, in particular due to exter-
nal migration, which contributes to significant human capital losses (Antipova 
and Fakeyeva, 2012, p.129).
This picture contains nothing positive, though the above- mentioned fea-
tures do not fully describe the situation. The Belarusian economy also has 
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another, more encouraging, side. The Country Report of the Bertelsmann 
Foundation (2015) tells us that
Compared to other post- Soviet republics, excluding the Baltic states, 
Belarus appears to have a relatively high level of socioeconomic devel-
opment. The Human Development Index ranked Belarus in 53rd place 
worldwide in 2013, the highest among CIS countries and higher than 
two EU member states, Romania and Bulgaria. According to the World 
Bank, Belarus has the lowest poverty rate within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and one of the lowest Gini coefficients in the 
world. The 2011 economic crisis which swept Belarus actually narrowed 
inequality as the relatively rich were hit hard by the crisis.
(BTI, 2016, p.15)
The social contract between the Belarusian authorities and society is built 
on the motivations of stability and safety, and the idea that any changes in the 
system would undermine these achievements. As a result, the state exercises 
total control over society while the latter gains state patronage in form of state 
support for various social groups as well as for economic sectors (for instance, 
agriculture with an inbuilt system of social protection). This social contract is 
supported by the vast majority of Belarusians; the proportion of those who 
wish to change the contract with the state has never been significant and is 
dropping further, in particular, as a result of the situation in Ukraine.1 It is 
worth noting that this type of social contract (control of society in exchange 
for state patronage) existed and demonstrated its efficiency in Belarus even 
before it was introduced in Russia. In Russia, President Putin introduced such 
a contract during his second term in office, when it was transformed from 
the previous contract— control in exchange not so much for patronage, but 
for “Russia as great power” and the feeling of national pride— by the end 
of the 2010s. Belarus is a quiet country indeed: not only do mass protests 
not occur, but there is no reason to expect a sudden rise in political activism 
and therefore a break with Belarusian tradition (Wilson, 2012). Balmaceda 
explains it through the clever use of subsidies from Russia by Lukashenka’s 
administration— with their help he avoids economic reforms, and conse-
quently, the large groups of sufferers inevitable during the first stages of 
reforms do not arise (Balmaceda, 2014). However, there is another explan-
ation for the lack of protests, which lies in citizens’ concerns over the highly 
uncertain redistributive consequences of political reforms, and is applicable 
not only to Belarus, but also to Russia (Busygina and Filippov, 2015).
As I will show in the next section, the “Russian factor” is clearly present in 
all elements of the Belarusian system. Ioffe (2004, p.102) believes that Belarus 
“simply cannot be understood and categorized on its own. To be sure, it does 
possess some defining socio- cultural features, but each of them can be dis-
cussed sensibly only in conjunction with Russia…” [emphasis added]. The 
current status quo in Belarus is based internally on Lukashenka’s autocratic 
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leadership and externally on Russian economic subsidies and political support 
(Nalbandov, 2014, p.88). This statement allows us to formulate the conditions 
under which reforms in Belarus could be launched (although, of course, with 
no guarantee of success).
Russia and Belarus: in a fraternal embrace
With no other republic of the former Soviet Union does Russia have such 
close relations as with Belarus, and on the surface relations between the two 
countries look almost idyllic. As official propaganda in both countries period-
ically reminds us, this is a relationship of brotherly and eternal love. It comes 
down even to claims that the countries “flow into one another,” whereby, 
despite huge differences between Russia and Belarus in terms of territorial 
size, population and size of national economies, heaven knows which is the 
extension of the other: Belarus of Russia, or Russia of Belarus. “Russia,” 
writes Akudovich, “is not to the east of the Belarusian lands, Russia is the 
east of Belarus. It means that Russia by means of its certain contour (just like 
Europe) is naturally situated inside our own selfness” (Akudovich, 2006, cited 
in Bekus, 2014, p.38). Such a claim sounds truly strange, and strongly resem-
bles the experience of Hašek’s Good Soldier Švejk in the madhouse where 
he met a patient who argued that inside the globe there was another sphere, 
much larger than the outer. However, the absurdity is not important; what 
is important is that claims of this kind seek to grasp the essence of relations 
between the two countries— their extraordinary, and not situational but exist-
ential closeness.
Indeed, Belarus is a permanent member of all Russia- centered integration 
projects. In the ’90s this was the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO)— Russia has two strategic military bases in Belarus. In 2007 Belarus 
entered a Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan, and then the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which was officially launched on January 
1, 2015. This last project allowed Lukashenka “to extract more subsidies from 
Russia— such as the $3 billion in loans that he obtained in 2015 for continuing 
to go along with the EEU” (Krivoi and Wilson, 2015, p.4).
The history of Russia– Belarus relations contains lamentable chapters as 
well, the most important of which is the story of Gazprom and Belarus’s gas 
vulnerability. The former has exploited this through pricing policy, namely 
subsidies with the threat of increased costs, as well as through restriction of 
gas supplies, ranging from small reductions to a full cut- off  (for more infor-
mation, see Bruce, 2005). However, this story did not undermine the general 
climate of friendship, and the “institutional culmination” of rapprochement 
between the two countries took place in 2000, when Russia and Belarus rati-
fied a treaty that established a Union State. The treaty guaranteed equal labor 
rights for citizens of both countries, “removed border controls, and was 
intended to lay the foundation for the unification of legislation and creation 
of a single economic space and single currency” (Nice, 2012, p.5). However, 
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one feature of this Union State is the lack of a single constitutional act that 
would determine the status of the State as well as its citizens. Let us examine 
the inner workings of this state without its own status or citizens.
As Silitsky (2006, p.30) argues, the political cooperation of Russia and 
Belarus is an example of cooperation between two “preemptive authori-
tarianisms,” where one of the reasons for this cooperation is that “smaller 
authoritarian regimes often need backing and cover- up from larger ones that 
possess more resources and influence on the international arena.” Silitsky 
(2006, pp.6– 7) defines preemption as
a strategy to combat the democratic contagion that is pursued in anticipa-
tion of a political challenge, even when there is no immediate danger of a 
regime change. Preemption thus aims at political parties and players that 
are still weak. It removes from the political arena even those opposition 
leaders who are unlikely to pose a serious challenge in the next election. 
It attacks the independent press even if  it reaches only small segments 
of the population. It destroys civil society organizations even when these 
are concentrated in a relatively circumscribed urban subculture. Last but 
not least, it violates the electoral rules even when the incumbent would 
be likely to win in a fair balloting. This type of preemption (attacking 
the opponents and the infrastructure of the opposition and civil society), 
that can be named tactical preemption, does not exhaust the repertoire of 
available means of combating democratic contagion. Another, more pro-
found instrument, is institutional preemption that consists of tightening 
of the fundamental rules defining the political game, once again, before 
the opposition becomes strengthened.
Preemption as a regime strategy is indeed important in the cases of Russia 
and Belarus: the regimes in both countries have extensively used (and con-
tinue to use) it, learning from each other. Interestingly enough, it is the dom-
inant Russia which is learning from the subordinate Belarus, which was first 
to apply the strategy. Thus, the Belarusian regime, by easily suppressing 
democratic protests in 2006 and 2010, sent the Kremlin the signal that the 
“color revolutions are over” (Padhol and Marples, 2011; Tarkowski, Fathy 
and Melyantsou, 2011) and then preemptively began to restrict internet access 
and blogging websites, close independent media outlets and suppress NGOs, 
presenting them as a fifth column. In Russia this strategy was applied system-
atically somewhat later, generally after the 2011– 2012 protests.
Ambrosio (2006), stressing that the relationship between Russia and Belarus 
has been a political success for both Lukashenka and Putin, defines it as an 
antidemocratic alliance aimed at insulating Belarus from political reforms. 
But what gives this alliance sustainability, bearing in mind that it is not pos-
sible to rely on the credibility of commitments made by nondemocracies?
According to Ioffe, the most important thing that maintains these rela-
tions is the control that Russia has over Belarus: “But what is truly unusual 
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about Belarus,” argues Ioffe, “is the degree to which external factors control 
every fibre in its national fabric, every facet of Belarus’ ethno- national setting: 
the economy, politics and indeed language and identity” (Ioffe, 2004, p.110). 
The country’s information sphere is dominated by its powerful neighbor. As 
Krivoi and Wilson (2015, p.5) show, Russian TV channels are more popular 
in Belarus than domestic ones: of those watching television, over 65 percent 
watch Russian state TV as their main source of news.
Wierzbowska- Miazga (2013, p.6) continues the topics of control and dom-
ination: “Moscow’s long- term goal is to establish control over the Belarusian 
economy, which would also, in effect, allow the Kremlin to influence the way 
other areas of the Belarusian state are governed.” In my view, however, sus-
tainability also comes from another source, and that is the two countries’ 
mutual dependence.
Wierzbowska- Miazga paints a convincing picture of  Belarus’s compre-
hensive economic dependence on Russia. It is true that Belarus depends 
heavily on various subsidies from Russia, and that the volume of  Russian 
aid is rising. Russian energy subsidies to Belarus account for up to approxi-
mately 15 percent of  the country’s GDP (Alachnovič, 2015). Russia gives 
Belarus preferential pricing on Russian raw materials, as well as low- interest 
loans. Belarus purchases Russian oil without export tariffs (Wierzbowska- 
Miazga, 2013, p.7). It has also received money from the Anti- Crisis Fund 
of  the Eurasian Economic Community, controlled by Russia. In 2012 
Russia opened a credit line for the construction of  a nuclear power plant in 
Belarus (Wierzbowska- Miazga, 2013, p.8). Russia is constantly strengthen-
ing its presence in the Belarusian energy sector. As Wierzbowska- Miazga 
writes,
It has effectively monopolized the country’s gas market by securing not 
only an exclusive deal for the supply of natural gas to Belarus but also by 
gaining complete control over the transit and distribution of gas in the 
country. At the same time, Moscow has blocked the possibility of geo-
graphical diversification of energy production in Belarus by taking over 
the supervision of the construction and operation of a nuclear power 
plant in Belarus and by ensuring that it has full control over the export of 
electricity generated at the plant.
(Wierzbowska- Miazga, 2013, p. 16)
Belarus heavily depends upon oil from Russia, and for years the Russian 
Gazprom has been the sole supplier of natural gas to Belarus. Most direct 
investments come to Belarus from Russia, and Russia has a very substan-
tial presence in the Belarusian petrochemical and telecommunication sec-
tors. It is also Russia that purchases around 35  percent of all Belarusian 
exports (Wierzbowska- Miazga, 2013, p.22). This Russian penetration into the 
Belarusian economy has great inertia, so it is unlikely that the process will be 
reversed, certainly in a short- term perspective.
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However, this dependence is not unilateral; Russia also needs Belarus. It 
needs the Belarusian geographic location, as the Russian energy export to 
Europe runs through its territory. This transit role of Belarus becomes even 
more important as Moscow would like to limit the volume of gas transported 
via Ukraine (Wierzbowska- Miazga, 2013, p.11). But no less important— and 
more strategic— is the role that Belarus plays as proof for Moscow’s geopol-
itical ambitions. Belarus demonstrates that Russia is an attractive coalition 
partner, and that Russia really does have a coalition within post- Soviet ter-
ritory. Knowing the nature of the relationship between Moscow and Minsk, 
this proof is far from credible and cannot be taken seriously from a Western 
perspective, but the argument exists and is used at least for Russia’s domestic 
audience.
As we can see, the dependence between two countries has a highly asym-
metric character: The Belarusian economy “lives” through Russia, while for 
Russia Belarus is mostly a confirmation for its geopolitical ambitions. In 
addition, the two partners have totally unequal power with regard to politics 
and economy. In refusing to support Lukashenka and thus breaking off  cur-
rent relations, Putin would risk losing a weak ally as well as one of the argu-
ments that support Russia’s claims to regional power— and that’s it. It would 
not be fatal at all. But in the case of Lukashenka showing disobedience to 
Moscow, he risks losing the country, as without Russia’s economic support 
his social contract has little chance of working. It is not Russia but Belarus 
that has “defective sovereignty,” in particular in terms of its external dimen-
sion: its freedom of decision- making on key foreign policy issues is gradually 
decreasing.2
Thus, the degree of dependence between Russia and Belarus determines 
the closeness of their relations, while their asymmetric character, as well as the 
nature of the political regimes, determines their essence. Relations between 
Russia and Belarus are authority- like relations, which differ from genuine 
authority in that the commitments of both partners with regard to each other 
are principally not credible, and consequently their unilateral revision (more 
likely by the dominant power and not excluding the use of massive coercion) 
is always possible.
Recent disputes between Belarus and Russia over prices for Russian gas 
support the famous saying “With great power comes an even greater electricity 
bill” (Cool Funny Quotes, 2016). Indeed, since the beginning of 2016 Belarus 
has been attempting to obtain a discount on gas and not recognizing its debt 
to Russia. Lukashenka took the decision to increase the prices for transit of 
Russian oil through Belarus’s territory, and then announced his intent to open 
negotiations on oil purchase with Iran. As for Russia, Medvedev has declared 
that additional discounts on gas prices for Belarus are not being planned, and 
said prices will remain the same (Podobedova, 2016).
It is important to understand, however, that the situational conflicts and 
tensions that periodically arise between two countries do not change the 
basic character of their relations, and on the contrary, even support them. 
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From time to time Moscow needs to remind Lukashenka of his place in the 
system. This was the case with Russia’s sanctions against Belarusian dairy 
and meat companies, or the critical NTV documentary with the eloquent 
title Krestniy Bat’ka (“Godfather”), shown during the 2010 presidential elec-
tions. Furthermore, relations between Russia and Belarus do not develop in 
a vacuum, and in certain situations Lukashenka behaves in ways that defy 
Moscow’s expectations. For instance, in 2008 after the “five- day war,” Belarus 
refused to recognize the sovereignty of the regions of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, and the Russian leadership swallowed this disobedience as it under-
stood that too much pressure could result in destroying comfortable relations, 
while recognition would not lead to strengthening the pro- sovereignty coali-
tion because such a thing simply does not exist and is impossible to establish 
in the first place. Again, the cyclicality of Russia– Belarus relations does not 
change their basic character (Nice, 2012, p.6).
Both political elites and public opinion in Russia and Belarus support the 
idea of deepening integration between the two countries. However, Filippov 
observes that over more than 15 years the parties have been unable to agree 
on the details. The respective political leaderships are not capable of creat-
ing conditions that would provide guarantees for credible commitments. In 
practice, they can sign any commitments they want, but there is no way to 
convince their partner that they will follow them. Therefore, under “normal 
conditions” the compromise in the form of a confederative union is absolutely 
unreachable; the union is possible only in a case where Belarus is forced to 
seek Russia’s protection on any terms. Filippov (2007) claims that the case 
of Russia and Belarus is a brilliant illustration of how unpromising the idea 
of political integration around Russia is within the post- Soviet space.
Russia and Belarus can’t agree on a form of integration as they are not 
capable of  creating commitments. But do they really need to agree on this? 
Being connected by authority- similar relations, both sides follow their own 
interests and gain their own benefits. Under the conditions of  preservation 
of  authoritarian regimes in both the dominant and the subordinate state, 
they have found and supported the most convenient of  the feasible forms of 
symbiosis.
The issue of Russia’s plans to annex Belarus has been discussed since the 
beginning of the 2000s, and for obvious reasons these discussions have inten-
sified since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. In August 2002, at a joint 
press conference with Putin and Lukashenka, Putin suggested that the six 
regions (oblasti) of Belarus be accepted into the Russian Federation as con-
stituent entities, meaning the complete disappearance of Belarus from the 
political map. Lukashenka dismissed these remarks as insulting to his coun-
try, saying: “Even Lenin and Stalin did not get as far in their thoughts as 
splitting Belarus and including it that way in the Russian Federation or the 
USSR” (Lukashenka, 2002b, cited in Ioffe, 2004, p.108). Such provocations 
are one of the methods to keep Lukashenka “behaving properly,” but reliable 
calculations show that Russia is not interested in the annexation of Belarus, 
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as instead of a subordinated ally, it would have to deal with six more regions 
that would be subjects for financial redistribution from the federal center, and 
Russia already has too many of those. According to an opinion poll by the 
Independent Institute for Socio- Economic and Political Studies (June 2014), 
26  percent of respondents believed that the “annexation by Russia of the 
whole of Belarus or part of its territory” was “highly probable,” and another 
4 percent believed that it was “unavoidable” (Moshes, 2014, p.4). However, the 
respondents are obviously not people who can professionally judge the prob-
ability of such an event, and the answers to this question in essence reflect 
their feelings, be this fear, anxiety or hope.
Of course, certain media in Russia support discussions on Belarus’s acces-
sion into the Russian Federation. For instance, in 2015 a columnist from 
Russia’s Vzglyad website passionately argued that Lukashenka should hold 
a referendum on this issue. As is usual for such kind of publications, the dis-
cussion was in terms of “global transformation of the world,” “the agonizing 
West that seeks to destroy the world, and Russia first of all,” and “the time 
for self- determination— who are you and whom are you with?” Belarus must 
feel the “historical necessity” to make the “critical decision” because this is “a 
question of common survival and development” (Birov, 2015).
But these are not rational calculations. This is ordinary hysteria that never-
theless helps Russian authorities to deal with the subordinate state, never let-
ting it forget: if  it misbehaves, coercion is always possible.
EU– Belarus: very few “points of entry”
Against the background of the achievements of the “brotherly love project,” 
those of the European Union look very modest indeed: this statement is cor-
rect if  we, following Nice (2012, p.5), proceed from the assertion that Belarus 
is a case of political competition between the EU and Russia for their “com-
mon neighborhood.” Then, the logical conclusion is that the EU is constantly 
losing to Russia in this competition. Some scholars consider that the main rea-
son for this is the EU’s inconsistent approach toward Belarus and the inability 
of the Union to offer Belarus a “pragmatic deal” and demonstrate “realistic 
prospects of cooperation with Europe” (Bohdan, 2013, p.5; Marin, 2011). In 
my view, however, these starting points, and consequently the conclusions 
they lead to, are fundamentally misleading. There is no competition between 
the EU and Russia for Belarus— neither political, nor economic. There is no 
way for the EU to offer Belarus a “pragmatic deal” and demonstrate “realistic 
prospects.” Under current conditions there is exceedingly little that the EU 
can do for Belarus, and the results of this minimal offer are predictably small. 
In other words,
“Today the West could not offer any package to compete with Russian 
economic incentives or protect Belarus from a conflict with Russia, even 
if  it were inclined to do so. For the foreseeable future, interaction between 
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the EU and Belarus will be ad hoc and technocratic, not strategic. This is 
an outcome Moscow can tolerate.
(Moshes, 2014, p.5)
We can, of course, look for explanations of the EU’s failure with regard 
to Belarus in the persistent divergences within the EU, when member states 
prefer to develop bilateral relations with the country, decide to do so through 
modifying the EU’s common foreign policy and, as Marin argues, “lobby for 
other member states to follow their stance.” “Conversely,” continues Marin, 
“when the EU’s common foreign policy threatens their national interests, they 
revert to bilateral frameworks.” She illustrates this approach through Poland 
and Lithuania’s relations with Belarus (Marin, 2011, p.3). Furthermore, in 
her eyes, the member states are incapable of envisaging Belarus outside the 
frame of relations with Moscow. The result is “(too) many foreign policies 
on Belarus” (Marin, 2011, p.2). However, for the EU member states this is an 
absolutely normal mode of behavior— some of them are more interested in 
developing relations with certain third countries (like Poland and Lithuania, 
who are located in direct geographical proximity to Belarus), and some less. It 
is the nature of the EU common foreign policy that allows it to produce many 
national foreign policies instead of one strong voice. This problem has been 
intensively discussed within the EU for years, though so far even with regard 
to Russia, it is unclear if  the EU could sustainably speak in one voice with a 
country of such importance. And Russia is certainly not a country on the same 
“scale” as Belarus; it can create incentives for EU members to present a united 
front. Of course, the aforementioned persistent divergences are a legitimate 
explanation, merely not one special to Belarus, but relating to any country 
outside the EU. The key to the EU’s “incapability” with regard to Belarus lies 
outside the former: this is the authority- like relationship that has developed 
between Belarus and Russia and firmly tied the two countries together.
In building relations with Belarus, the Union does not have at its dis-
posal the main authority tool that it can use in relations with Ukraine and 
Georgia— its “golden carrot” of the possibility, if  a very distant one, of mem-
bership in the EU. Indeed, it would be a joke to talk about this today, so the 
general (and more or less feasible) aim of the EU toward Belarus is to stimu-
late gradual changes in public policies and people’s attitudes. To do this the 
EU has only two real means of operation: to use coercion against Belarus in 
the form of economic and political sanctions, and to selectively involve the 
country in EU initiatives and programs.
As an autocracy, Belarus is more inclined to become an alliance partner 
of another pragmatic player (Russia) rather than of a normative one (the 
EU) because the former does not require any reforms and does not threaten 
the stability of the elites’ positions in office. The conditionality toolkit lacks 
attractiveness for Belarus, as its economy is relatively successful compared 
to that of Ukraine and Moldova. Belarus is aware of the experiences of the 
Baltic states and Poland, where Europeanization was accompanied by the 
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closure of some enterprises. Authorities in Minsk are reluctant to replace 
their attractive model with a model in transition, which is inevitably associ-
ated with high costs (Hett and Meuser, 2016). As the EU admits its inability 
to establish authority relations with Minsk in the form of normative means 
of conditionality, and the Belarusian regime successively and “preemptively” 
violates human rights, the EU inevitably turns to using coercion. The story 
of EU sanctions against Belarus reminds one of a dance where both partners 
are walking on the spot.
The relationship between the EU and Belarus was institutionalized in 1994 
when both parties signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and 
sanctions were first imposed on Belarus as soon as 1996. They were suspended 
in 1999, and then reimposed after Minsk refused to grant visas to EU moni-
tors. In subsequent years, new sanctions— a visa black list and asset freezes— 
followed. In 2008 most targeted sanctions were suspended, and the thaw in 
EU– Belarus relations lasted until 2010. It ended after the fraudulent elections 
in December 2010 and the ensuing repression of the opposition. Sanctions 
were reintroduced and have gradually expanded in subsequent years (Gebert, 
2013, p.2). In 2012, the European Council introduced an embargo on arms 
and related materials; banned EU export to Belarus of equipment which could 
be used for internal repressions; and froze the funds and economic resources 
of a number of persons, entities and bodies. Most of the EU’s sanctions 
against individuals were targeted at the representatives of the court system 
(47.3 percent) and law enforcement employees (23.7 percent). The blacklist 
was expanded from 6 individuals in 2004 to more than 250 in 2014 (Krivoi 
and Wilson, 2015).
In early 2016 Belarus released a number of political prisoners, and EU 
officials decided to unfreeze the assets of the president and of 170 other 
Belarusian officials, although the arms embargo remained in force. President 
Lukashenka welcomed the lifting of sanctions with a symbolic visit to the 
Vatican. Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei made an 
official comment: “The lifting of sanctions means for us a possibility to nor-
malize relations with the EU. However, we will not do this at the expense of 
our relations with Russia, which remains our main economic, political and 
military partner” (Informburo, 2015).
Political prisoners were released, but no policy changes occurred in the 
directions desired by the EU. As Moshes and Racz (2015, p.7) show, the 
prisoners
were granted a presidential pardon in the same arbitrary manner as 
before, by dint of a personal decision issued by the president  … This 
means that in future anyone may easily be imprisoned again on polit-
ical grounds. It is worth remembering that the political prisoners were 
not rehabilitated, and from the point of view of Belarusian legislation 
they remain convicted criminals, which makes it practically impossible for 
them to participate in public politics.
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The EU sanctions, clever policy instruments though they were, have never-
theless failed to deliver the desired results, namely the end of political repres-
sions, and general liberalization (Gebert, 2013, p.2). As Moshes and Racz 
(2015, p.8) warn, “The West and the EU in particular should not mix individ-
ual, occasional positive steps with major systemic changes, and reward them 
as if  they were more substantial than they really are.”
The Union has made various attempts to establish an authority relation-
ship with Belarus, working in different formats. Thus, while under sanctions, 
Belarus was invited to participate in the Eastern Partnership cooperation for-
mat. This was the first broad instrument of EU political authority aimed at 
developing closer relations with the countries within Europe’s east (EurActiv, 
2011). As of September 2011 Belarus has temporarily withdrawn from the 
Partnership initiative and was not represented at the summit in Warsaw. 
Today, however, Belarus is still a member, and the only Eastern Partnership 
country with no frozen territorial disputes.
In 2012, the European Commission launched the “European dialogue on 
modernization with Belarusian society” and shortly afterwards also estab-
lished the REFORUM project, implemented by the Belarusian Institute for 
Strategic Studies (The European Commission, 2014a). Furthermore, it intro-
duced the MOST (Mobility Scheme for Targeted People- to- People Contacts) 
program (Halubnichy, 2015). Cross- border cooperation (that is, a form which 
is practically oriented, works at a “low politics” level and is intended to pre-
serve some cooperation even in case of political conflict at the level of “high 
politics”) was developed in the trilateral formats of Poland– Belarus– Ukraine 
and Latvia– Lithuania– Belarus. The initiatives were successful, but only on a 
limited scale. Belarusian authorities appeared awkward with regard to them 
but did not interfere much with their work.
In 2014 the EU introduced a wide spectrum of instruments to provide finan-
cial support for Belarus, including such programs as ENPI Bilateral, TAIEX, 
Erasmus Mundus, Tempus, Nuclear Safety and others. About 30 percent of 
the total EU funds for Belarus were invested in social inclusion, 25 percent 
in environmental protection, 25 percent in regional and local development, 
10 percent in support of civil society and 10 percent in support of capacity 
development (The European Commission, 2014b).
The EU has also been trying to mobilize higher education as an instru-
ment of authority; this instrument has proved its worth in most European 
Neighborhood countries, but Belarus has demonstrated very limited engage-
ment in the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) project and in the 
Bologna Process. According to Polglase, the reasons for Belarus’s exclusion 
from the EHEA can be abstracted into two simple points: first, the country 
failed to reform its system to standards acceptable by the EHEA member 
states, and, second, it proved not to be capable of ensuring academic freedom. 
In 2012 the Bologna Follow- Up Group assessed Belarus’s readiness to join 
the EHEA and stated that the principles and values of the Bologna Process, 
such as academic freedom, institutional autonomy and student participation 
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in managing higher education, were not sufficiently upheld in the country. As 
such, Belarus’s accession to the EHEA was blocked at a meeting of EHEA 
ministers (Polglase, 2013).
All in all, the EU has invested a lot of energy in trying to find the “points 
of entry” to Belarus by using different approaches. But both coercion and 
authority have achieved few results, giving weak, marginal and nonsustain-
able effects. The EU is simply “doing something” in the country— and that is 
all it can do under current conditions. It can only wait.
Bat’ka Lukashenka: a hostage to his own image
Belarus’s President Lukashenka is in a dual position: on one hand, it is he who 
is effectively responsible for the economic survival of his country by obtain-
ing subsidies from Russia; on the other, he is the guarantee that there will not 
be “too much Russia” in Belarus. This duality is clearly seen in his speeches, 
which, if  viewed together as an expression of his position, give a highly eclec-
tic impression. As he admits,
No one will replace Russia for us. And when we are in dialogue with the 
West, with the EU, with America, with others, we ask [only] one question, 
and I talk about this openly— will you replace Russia for us? No. Then 
why are you trying to pull us in?
 (Tut.by, 2015, cited in Krivoi and Wilson, 2015, p.3)
Lukashenka has obviously made his choice, but he still insists that Belarus 
does not want to have to choose between the European Union and Russia. 
“If  the partners which we’re in dialogue with try to insist that we have to 
choose between Russia, Poland or the EU, we don’t want to be put in this pos-
ition,” he said in March 2016 after Brussels lifted sanctions against Belarus 
(Makhovsky, 2016).
As Krivoi and Wilson (2015, p.4) argue, ironically Lukashenka’s model of 
survival depends on the credibility of his image as “the last dictator in Europe,” 
an image for which Russia is willing to pay. In other words, Lukashenka is a 
kind of hostage to his image, from which he currently benefits while being at 
the same time unable to change it if  he wanted.
Simultaneously Lukashenka emphasizes, at times very passionately, the 
primacy of his country’s national sovereignty. He has stated that “Those who 
think that the Belarusian land is part of what they call the Russian world, 
almost part of Russia, should forget about it! Belarus is a modern and inde-
pendent state” (Yahoo! News, 2015, cited in Krivoi and Wilson, 2015, p.2). 
As Nice argues, “The inconsistencies of Lukashenka’s foreign policy mask 
a deeper continuity— the consolidation of Belarusian statehood and identity 
as an independent state” (Nice, 2012, p.1). To demonstrate the statehood of 
his country, Lukashenka from time to time steps up campaigns to strengthen 
Belarus– Europe ties by sending envoys to European national governments 
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and welcoming embassies from the EU and the US. In April 2015 he also 
expressed his concerns about the rise of pro- Russian NGOs in Belarus. 
Lukashenka suggested that extremist Russian groups were active in his coun-
try and claimed he had “taken measures against them” (The official internet- 
portal of the President of Belarus, 2015).
It seems that such duality should give Lukashenka large room for man-
euver, but the reverse is actually happening: the amplitude of his tactical 
moves is rather small as the “red lines” that mark the borders of his oppor-
tunity corridor and that he cannot cross are not far from each other. Nice 
calls Lukashenka’s tactics a form of “sovereignty entrepreneurship” that he 
uses to trade political loyalty, with threats of geopolitical reorientation, in 
order to extract support from Russia (Nice, 2012, p.5). Scholars often stress 
Lukashenka’s skill at the balancing game (Krivoi and Wilson, 2015, p.3). What 
is important, however, is that this is not balancing between Russia and the 
West, but between Russia and the desire for sovereign statehood, while inter-
action with the West is rather an external expression of the latter alternative.
It is true that he balances between Russia and national sovereignty, and, as 
sovereignty presupposes independent foreign policy that is not oriented solely 
around Russia’s, it is also a balance between Russia and the West. However, 
this balancing game is played by the authorities of a country with already 
somewhat limited sovereignty, so the rules of this game and, therefore, the 
“scale” of balancing is defined not by Lukashenka, but by external forces, and 
permitted only by those forces.
Unlike the relations between Russia and other post- Soviet countries, the 
relations between Russia and Belarus are extraordinarily close and free from 
major crises, and allow Belarus to take a role of  a mediator, which neces-
sarily presupposes a certain distance (at least nominally) from both parties. 
After the “five- day war” of  2008 and the subsequent crisis in Russian- 
Georgian relations, Minsk took the role of  an intermediary in trade between 
the two countries, which also generated additional revenue for Belarus 
(Wierzbowska- Miazga, 2013, p.30). As Moshes (2014, p.2) shows, in the cri-
sis in Ukraine
Lukashenka has personally done a lot to emphasize the distance between 
the Belarusian and Russian approaches to Ukraine. Even though 
Lukashenka did not show any sympathy for the Euromaidan movement 
and called the change of power in Kyiv an “unconstitutional coup,” he 
immediately recognized the legitimacy of Ukraine’s new authorities and 
met with acting president Olexander Turchinov. After the May 25 election, 
Lukashenko congratulated newly elected president Petro Poroshenko on 
his victory and even attended his inauguration. Lukashenka recognized 
Crimea’s entry into Russia de facto but not de jure, and he publicly sup-
ported Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the maintenance of a unitary 
state. Consequently, Belarus refused to recognize the results of the inde-
pendence referenda held in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
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Minsk was accepted as a mediator by Russia and by the Western powers, 
though Belarus’s mediatory role should be understood with a high degree of 
conditionality, as a facilitator of negotiations rather than an actor capable of 
influencing their outcome.
Lukashenka’s commitments are in reality not credible— neither with regard 
to Russia, nor with regard to the EU. His periodic “flirting” with Europe is not 
a “turn to Europe,” if  a situational one, but rather no more than an attempt 
to show that he is capable of being an independent actor by interacting with 
a union of countries that is at least to some degree interested in what is going 
in Belarus. To commence genuine authority relations with the EU (let’s for a 
moment forget about the “Russian factor”) would at some point inevitably 
mean genuine, and not demonstrative, reforms, over which he may easily lose 
control. From the other side, Lukashenka’s commitments to Russia are stable 
only while maintaining the current status quo: the only thing that can turn 
Belarus away from Russia is obvious and irreversible weakening of the latter. 
If  this happens, and only then, can the European Union start to “work” with 
Belarus. The rise of Belarusian sovereignty will in all likelihood be conducted 
within the context of an authoritarian system, but this is surmountable with 
time as Belarus will remain a small Eastern European country without a self- 
sufficient economy. The EU knows how to work with this, but it does not 
know how to release Belarus from Russian influence.
Lukashenka, and following him the whole Belarusian nation, designates 
himself  as bat’ka, something between “father” and “daddy,” a title that is also 
actively used in the Russian army— the soldiers call low- ranked commanders 
bat’ka or batya. This warm and domestic name turns the nation into one big 
family where the bat’ka is the patron and defender of his numerous children. 
Consequently, he makes decisions for his entire nation, and nobody contests 
them. It was his choice to make Belarus into “a society largely without polit-
ics, even at the elite level” (Krivoi and Wilson, 2015, p.3). But one day it will 
have to learn them.
Notes
 1 According to the polls, only 3.6 percent of Belarusians support a “revolutionary” 
scenario similar to Kiev’s (Eastern Europe Studies Centre, 2014, p.1).
 2 Moshes and Racz (2015) mention the example of the vote in the UN General 
Assembly in March 2014, when Belarus had no choice but to vote against con-
demning Moscow for the annexation of Crimea, and the Eastern Partnership 
summit in Riga in May 2015 when it refused to approve a critical resolution on 
Russia.
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7 Georgia
The story of one coercion and two 
authorities
Unlike the Belarusian “society without politics,” Georgian society does have 
politics, both at the elite and at the mass level. Georgia is noted for its very 
dramatic political development. At the end of the ’90s, Georgia “became the 
frontrunner in the political emancipation in the Soviet Union after the Baltic 
republics” (Aphrasidze and Siroky, 2010, p.127). Over two decades after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars see a major distinction between 
Georgia and its former brother republics in the country’s second transition, 
which started after the Rose Revolution of 2003 (Aphrasidze and Siroky, 
2010, p.122). However, the question of whether this was a transition to genu-
ine democracy, or to a more effective state with increased coercive capabilities, 
remains open. The degree of sustainability of this transition is also unclear.
As Nodia (2005, p.69) argues, “the Georgian national project derives out of 
[the] desire for access to Western modernization.” This project involves perva-
sive political and economic participation by the EU and the US in the devel-
opment of Georgia as a democratic state. At the same time, Russia, which 
uses coercion as the main tool in its relations with Georgia, actively intervenes 
in this interaction as part of pursuing its own national interests. In its efforts 
to influence Georgia’s political course, Russia is confronted with the US’s and 
the EU’s authority relations, representing two different types which, however, 
are both perceived as legitimate in Georgia. The American type of author-
ity is primarily focused on military assistance and humanitarian aid, whereas 
Western European authority encompasses close multidimensional cooper-
ation with active exchange at various levels. For President Saakashvili the 
course toward Westernization and Europeanization has become his survival 
strategy. Whether it is being carried on by his successor is an open question.
Georgia: national context
Experts on Georgia like to stress its special nature, and its difference from 
other republics both in the Soviet and the post- Soviet periods. And indeed, 
this is true. During Soviet rule Georgia was a special republic in the Soviet 
Union, standing out not only due to its lovely subtropical and Mediterranean 
climate, but also with the irrepressible (at least, by Soviet standards) cultural, 
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political and entrepreneurial energy of its population. Georgian intellectu-
als were famous not only in the Soviet Union, but far beyond its borders. 
Political protests enveloped Tbilisi in the darkest Soviet times, such as in 1956 
after the exposure of Stalin’s personality cult, when Georgians protested 
against Moscow’s insult to their national pride. Protests spread in the capital 
again at the end of the ’70s— the years of deepest stagnation— when mass 
student demonstrations took place. In the Constitution of Georgia, it was 
written that there were two state languages in the country— Georgian and 
Russian. Protesters demanded to remove Russian as state language from the 
Constitution.
During the times of the Soviet command economy, in the absence of an 
alternative the entrepreneurial energy of the Georgian population concen-
trated in the “shadow economy.” As Shelley argues, “during the Soviet era, 
Georgians played a major role in the shadow economy of the entire USSR, 
and ethnic Georgians represented a large proportion of the thieves- in- law 
(the elite of professional criminals)” (Shelley, 2007, p.1). When Shevardnadze, 
the future president of independent Georgia, appointed the first secretary 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia in 1972 (under 
the patronage of the KGB chief Andropov), he vowed that he would clean 
up this Georgian “capitalist pigsty.” And he did indeed begin a campaign 
against underground business (tsekhoviki), but very soon new businessmen, 
patronized by Shevardnadze himself, replaced the previous shadow business-
men (Shved, 2016, p.184). The latter moved to the European part of Russia, 
mainly to Moscow, Leningrad and southern regions of Rostov- on- Don and 
Krasnodar.
Underground factories in the Soviet Union (tsekhi) specialized in small, 
simply manufactured and easily transportable consumer items such as “ladies’ 
underwear, meat pirozhki, brooches made of a couple of plastic cherries, or 
fashionably tailored artificial leather jackets” (Simis, 1982, cited in Sampson, 
1987, p.129). These factories were normally “hidden” inside official state fac-
tories, using them as covers to conceal the illicit use of supplies, funds, labor, 
transport and distributional networks (Sampson, 1987, p.129). Georgians ran 
underground factories throughout the Soviet Union and were known as clever 
and cunning businessmen. On the eve of the Soviet Union’s collapse there 
were many Georgians in Georgia and in Russia whom the “shadow economy” 
had made exceedingly rich. It is not by chance that a new saying appeared in 
Russia in the ’90s: “New Russians are actually ‘old Georgians’.”
After gaining independence, Georgia’s distinctive feature was an extremely 
high speed of political time. As Jones writes, “since independence (and till 
the Rose revolution) Georgia has undergone two wars of secession, a civil 
war, a number of failed (and badly planned) coups, and at least two assassin-
ation attempts on former president Shevardnadze” (Jones, 2006, pp.248– 249). 
“Georgian history is conflict, and therefore conflict is Georgian” (Jones, 2006, 
p.249). During the decade after gaining independence, all post- Soviet repub-
lics experienced significant challenges, but in the Georgian case, the challenges 
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were even greater than in other post- communist states (Nodia, 2005, p.44). 
As Nodia (1998, p.6) shows, there was a set of three main challenges for the 
new independent Georgia. The first challenge, which Georgia shared with all 
other newly independent republics, was the need to create a new Georgian 
political elite and to build new (and well- functioning) political institutions. 
The second challenge derived from the need to manage ethno- territorial con-
flicts (the conflicts between the Georgian political elites and the population, 
and the elites and ethnic groups in the regions that did not want to be part 
of the new Georgian state and pursued separate political arrangements for 
themselves, namely the Abkhazian and Ossetian minorities). The third chal-
lenge involved relations between Georgia and Russia. Each challenge repre-
sented its own institutional arena, and these three arenas were to some extent 
autonomous from each other, so the development of each had its own internal 
logic, though at the same time all three were strategically interrelated.
Three Georgian presidents attempted to cope with the challenges (and a 
fourth is now in office), each of them based on his own experience and ideas, 
and taking into consideration the constraining internal and external condi-
tions. The first was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who came to govern the country 
with his Round Table coalition as a result of the democratic elections in the 
fall of 1990. Gamsakhurdia came to power on a nationalistic wave, and it was 
the energy of this wave that he tried to use to build a Georgian nation- state. 
This first attempt was a failure. Per Gahrton described the first president of 
sovereign Georgia as a “tactical fanatic,” and an “attractive and even effi-
cient leader and a symbol of national liberation movement … [but] a catas-
trophe as executive administrator and president” (Gahrton, 2010, cited in 
Nalbandov, 2014, p.60). He failed to establish institutional mechanisms for 
dealing with the opposition, and this turned out to be fatal for him— the reign 
of the first Georgian president ended very quickly, after two weeks of fighting 
in December 1991– January 1992. What followed was a messy period when 
state institutions were almost completely dysfunctional. The economic crisis 
was dramatic: by 1994, Georgia was producing only 25 percent of the total 
output recorded in precrisis 1990, the last year when the country was stable. 
The weak Georgian central state lost the war in Abkhazia, which paradox-
ically contributed to the gradual stabilization of the country in the long run 
(Nodia, 1998, p.7).
Georgia’s second president, Eduard Shevardnadze, was a leader of a com-
pletely different character and political style. Having served as a minister of 
foreign affairs in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, he belonged to the Soviet 
federal nomenclatura, albeit having preserved close relations with his repub-
lic. Shevardnadze gradually solidified his support base, and his victory was 
finalized in the elections of November 1995 (Nodia, 1998, p.8). Thereafter, 
general stability in the country was maintained by using the president’s 
ability to mediate between different interest groups rather than by enforc-
ing common rules. Political parties were poorly developed, Shevardnadze’s 
“party of power,” the Citizens’ Union of Georgia, growing alongside the state 
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bureaucracy (Chiaberashvili and Tevzadze, 2005, p.189). The political process 
in Georgia was dominated by clans, wherein Shevardnadze’s own family was 
the largest and the most powerful, prevailing in major businesses and political 
posts (Chiaberashvili and Tevzadze, 2005, p.190). As for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, no significant efforts were made to truly integrate them into Georgia’s 
“mainland” during Shevardnadze’s reign. As Nodia (2005, p.47) writes, 
“Abkhazia and South Ossetia were turned into ‘frozen conflicts’— there was 
no war, but neither was there a settlement promising a lasting peace.” In gen-
eral, under Shevardnadze, known for his ability for mediation, the country 
could probably continue to exist and to live, but without sources for develop-
ment and growth. Shevardnadze’s legacy “is tarnished by unresolved conflicts, 
thousands of refugees, and absolute economic downfall, but, paradoxically, 
quite stable although stagnant domestic political environment” (Nalbandov, 
2014, p.62).
In November 2003, parliamentary elections took place in Georgia. The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe called them a “spec-
tacular fraud” organized by Shevardnadze’s political regime. Numerous falsi-
fications brought dissatisfied citizens to the streets of Tbilisi and other major 
Georgian cities. Mass protests were led by Mikheil Saakashvili (frontrunner 
of the National Movement), Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania (leaders 
of the Burjanadze- Democrats opposition bloc). The TV channel Rustavi- 2 
featured thousands of Georgian citizens paving the way to the capital city to 
voice their protest against the election results. On November 22, 2003, during 
Eduard Shevardnadze’s official speech in front of the new Georgian parlia-
ment, opposition leaders entered the conference hall guided by Saakashvili, 
who was holding a rose in his hand (which later gave the name to the revo-
lution). As Shevardnadze left the hall for security reasons, Saakashvili took 
the floor and proclaimed the victory of the revolution (Ria Novosti, 2003). 
Saakashvili accused Shevardnadze of massive manipulation of votes, and 
his followers stormed the Georgian Parliament (Nalbandov, 2014, p.69). 
Shevardnadze lost presidential office as a result of the Rose Revolution, 
meaning that two first presidents of Georgia were forced to leave office and 
did not give way to legitimate successors chosen through elections (Nodia, 
2005, p.66).
The most important feature of the Rose Revolution was its nonviolent 
character— something rare for post- Soviet politics. In addition, it is interest-
ing that it was the government and the people of Georgia rather than the 
opposition that became driving forces of the Revolution (Nodia, 2005, p.70). 
The Revolution brought to power Mikheil Saakashvili, who was fundamen-
tally different from Gamsakhurdia, and even more so from Shevardnadze, 
in terms of his background and political style. The Saakashvili govern-
ment’s first priorities were strengthening the state and fighting corruption, a 
Georgian chronic illness. Pursuing revolutionary nationalism instead of the 
ethnic nationalism of the early ’90s (Aphrasidze and Siroky, 2010, p.127), 
Saakashvili passionately (even aggressively) began to enhance state capacity 
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in Georgia, mainly the state’s police and military sector. As Aphrasidze and 
Siroky (2010, p.122) argue, “in focusing so centrally on the state’s coercive 
capabilities, we suggest that the government has neglected to address the infra-
structural and participatory aspects of state capacity.” However, stressing that 
the focus of the reforms was on the coercive capabilities of the Georgian state 
is not enough to understand them. Thus, describing Saakashvili’s reforms, 
Nalbaldov (2014, p.117) writes:
Anti- corruption activity, judiciary reform, revision of taxation— these are 
a few examples of institutional norm emergence. The process of norm cas-
cading started with the gradual transformation of Georgian society where 
the spillovers went beyond their functional areas and started affecting 
an increasing number of institutions. For instance, corruption, a typical 
Soviet- type Georgian institution, was eradicated not only in law enforce-
ment or judiciary but also in education, health, urban planning, etc.
In fact, Saakashvili’s government succeeded in modernizing the state in 
Georgia within a very short time period.
Burakova explains the tactical success of the reforms in Georgia by pla-
cing emphasis on three main components. The first is the consolidation of the 
whole state apparatus, as progress is impossible without a jointly developed 
position. The second component is an adaptive approach, meaning that the 
state should concentrate on feasible reforms rather than on all of them. The 
third component is the effective use of political capital— it should be invested 
quickly (rather than be saved for the future) and in a way that allows max-
imum returns (Burakova, 2011).
Various indicators prove the success of Saakashvili’s reforms. For instance, 
in comparison to Belarus and Ukraine (prior to 2014), Georgia was the least 
politically stable country; however, paradoxically, it also possessed the best 
indicators for effective governance. According to the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, Georgia was the champion of “Control of Corruption” 
(Nalbandov, 2014, p.24). In the Index of Globalization, produced by the Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology, which focuses on the economic, social and 
political openness of countries, Georgia was evaluated as the state most open 
to economic globalization (Nalbandov, 2014, p.28).
Many in Georgia have been predictably unhappy with Saakashvili’s tough 
political course. Berglund stresses that Saakashvili’s system of dominant- 
power politics enabled state- building reforms, but atrophied political com-
petition (Berglund, 2014). Political opponents have criticized Saakashvili for 
his authoritarian style of governance, for distorting the division of powers, as 
well as for voluntarist actions such as granting Georgian citizenship to 1,000 
Turkish nationals, bypassing regular procedures, and suddenly pardoning 200 
prisoners, some of them sentenced for murder, manslaughter or trafficking 
narcotics (Tsulukiani, 2013).
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Unlike Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze, President Saakashvili lost his 
office in a legitimate way: in October 2012, the United National Movement 
(UNM) party under Saakashvili lost parliamentary elections to its main con-
tender, the Georgian Dream, and the Dream named Giorgi Margvelashvili 
as its candidate for presidency.1 After the elections, Georgia’s fourth presi-
dent made the decision to grant amnesty to some 9,000 prisoners. They 
were sentenced during the times of  Saakashvili; therefore, such a defiant 
undertaking could be considered a principal departure from Saakashvili’s 
priorities. After Saakashvili’s departure from Georgia to start political 
activity in Ukraine, President Margvelashvili declared that his predecessor 
Saakashvili had “insulted” the Georgian presidency and the country when 
he chose to renounce Georgian citizenship in favor of  Ukrainian (Civil 
Georgia, 2015b). According to Georgian ex- prime minister Ivanishvili, 
immediately after Margvelashvili came to the presidential office, he showed 
himself  to be striving to obtain even more power than Saakashvili had 
(Gruzinform, 2016).
Russia– Georgia: costs and benefits of using coercion
For Georgia, relations with neighboring giant Russia are of the foremost pri-
ority. In the words of Nodia (1998, p.7), “if  you are a Georgian, you are likely 
(at least that is what I would expect from a lot, though not all Georgians) to 
choose relations with Russia as the factor that determines everything else.” 
On the other hand, while for Russia its relations with Georgia unquestionably 
matter, they do not belong among the first priorities of national foreign pol-
icy. Nevertheless, Georgia is an uneasy neighbor for Russia, and the Russian 
leadership is confident (or so it claims) that the European and Euro- Atlantic 
integration of Georgia is directed against Russia and represents a threat to its 
national security.
The Russian approach and interests with regard to Georgia (and other 
former Soviet republics) are explained by scholars in a variety of ways. One 
explanation relates to Russia’s geopolitical goals— “getting up from its knees,” 
Russia is making an effort to reassert itself  as a regional and global power 
(Galbreath, 2008), and to constrain Georgia’s development as regional power 
within the Caucasus. Others postulate that Russia’s approach is determined 
by its domestic policy. As Filippov argues,
For domestic purposes, the Russian government maintains some optimal 
level of “diversionary tensions” with the West, and achieves this through 
manipulating level of conflict with the post- Soviet countries. In particu-
lar, since 2004, Russia has used the conflict with Georgia as an instrument 
in this broader strategy of keeping political tensions with the US and 
Europe at the preferred level.
(Filippov, 2009, pp.1826– 1827)
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However, regardless of the explanation, in relations with Georgia Russia 
consistently uses one type of power in promoting its interests, and that is 
coercion in its various forms— from hidden pressure on the central Georgian 
government through support of the separatist ethnic regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia to economic sanctions and open military conflict. The 
only exceptions were, perhaps, the attempts in the very early ’90s to establish 
joint Russian- Georgian control over external Georgian borders,2 and Georgia 
joining the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the times of 
Shevardnadze. The CIS did not mean much in reality, though even this under-
taking by the Georgian president was perceived by Georgians as a sort of dis-
mantling of the national project (Nodia, 1998, p.11). Shevardnadze, however, 
took this political risk hoping that in exchange Russia would facilitate the 
integration of Abkhazia into Georgia (Filippov, 2009, p.1831). As we know, 
these hopes proved to be totally unfounded. Within the CIS, Georgia tried 
to follow its own line and pursued a policy of preventing the organization 
from becoming a Russian- led tool of supranational reintegration. Instead, 
Georgia began to actively cooperate with Turkey, and the GUUAM group, 
in opposition to Russian interests. The raison d’être of  the CIS was, in par-
ticular, strongly called into question by Georgia after Moscow’s recognition 
of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s sovereign status, because, as it turned out, 
commitments within the CIS framework do not prevent the violation of the 
territorial integrity of some of its members by others.
The reasons for Russia’s choice in favor of coercion are quite rational. The 
Russian leadership does not intend to tolerate the possibility of Georgia’s 
growing influence in the Caucasus, or its pro- Western orientation that finds 
support both in the US and in the EU. However, there are also no ways for 
Russia to include Georgia into the Russian post- Soviet coalition by using 
authority (as it did, for instance, with Belarus)— Georgia’s general distrust 
of Russia is too high, and it was Russia that was blamed in Georgia for the 
loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In addition, in Georgia’s case Russia 
cannot play the card of comprehensive dependency as it did with Belarus, 
where Moscow– Minsk authority relations are based directly on this kind of 
dependency.
As Kapanadze (2014, p.2) shows, Georgia’s economic dependence on 
Russia is very different not only from that of Belarus, but also from that of 
Ukraine, Moldova or Armenia. Four areas make the Georgian economy 
vulnerable in relation to Russia: investments, trade, energy and remittances. 
While Georgia is in real need of investments, immediate Russian FDI with-
drawal does not pose a serious threat to it. Georgia’s dependence on Russian 
energy is relatively low, and Azerbaijan remains its main trading partner in oil 
and gas. The only thing Russia can do, and does, is to use all possible levers in 
order to prevent the construction of transport corridors, so as to avoid trans-
portation of Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon resources through Georgian territory 
(LeVine, 2007). Thus, trade bans and a remittance ban are the most obvious 
instruments in Moscow’s arsenal, though the latter is a complicated tool that 
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implies credibility costs as well as practical challenges for Russia (Kapanadze, 
2014, p.3). All in all, under the given combination of conditions, using coer-
cion remains the only feasible strategy for Russia. But this is only the case 
with Georgia. With South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia has chosen the strat-
egy of building relations of extensive authority.
The first Georgian government under Gamsakhurdia introduced an eco-
nomic blockade against Russia by blocking the railway close to the city of 
Samtredia. As a result, economic communications between Georgia and 
Russia were interrupted earlier than was the case with other post- Soviet repub-
lics (Papava, 2012, p.71). However, a more powerful strike against Russian- 
Georgian relations came with Russia’s behavior during the Georgian wars 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the beginning of the ’90s. In its attempt 
to implement a state- building project, the Georgian leadership failed to estab-
lish clear national boundaries, which was very important as Abkhazia, like 
South Ossetia, borders Russia. Unlike South Ossetia, in Abkhazia the “titu-
lar nation” (Abkhazians) did not constitute a numerical majority; the largest 
community was the Georgian one that defended Georgia’s territorial integrity 
and opposed Abkhazian separatism. In pursuing their aspirations, Georgians 
in Abkhazia needed an ally, and this role was played by Moscow.
In August 1992, Georgian troops entered Abkhazian territory. Interethnic 
confrontation escalated into an armed conflict. By October 1993, Georgia 
had de facto lost its sovereignty over Abkhazia. The Moscow ceasefire agree-
ment, signed with Russia’s mediation in May 1994, legally alienated a part of 
Georgian sovereignty over the region in favor of peacekeeping forces under 
the auspices of the CIS (in reality, however, peacekeeping operations in 1994– 
2008 were implemented exclusively by the Russian military) (Markedonov, 
2012, p.64). As Nodia (1998) states, for the Georgian people, armed con-
flict between Georgia and Abkhazia was primarily a war with Russia: it was 
Russia that benefited from the war, with the rationale of punishing Georgia 
for its pro- independence orientation.
The situation was similar with regard to Georgia and South Ossetia. 
Military conflict ended with the signing of the Dagomys (Sochi) agreements in 
June 1992 by the presidents of Russia and Georgia (Yeltsin and Shevardnadze 
respectively). In July, peacekeeping operations began. Again, the agreements 
limited Georgian sovereignty over the conflict zone (Markedonov, 2012, p.95). 
Kemoklidze (2011) argues that Russia encouraged and supported separat-
ist movements under the cover of self- determination, and Georgia’s oppo-
nents in both ethnic conflicts were not only Ossetians and Abkhazians, but 
also Russians. “Russia,” writes Goldenberg, “was not acting in a neighbor-
ing fashion … but was intent on defending its own interests as the regional 
great power” (Goldenberg, 1994, p.108). In other words, officially Russia 
made statements of taking Georgia’s side, but in fact it played against both 
sides, encouraging the conflicts and subsequently making use of the results by 
becoming the main peace broker in both. By doing this, the Kremlin received 
important leverage over Georgia. In Georgia, the predictable consequence 
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of the conflicts was a radical change in Shevardnadze’s pro- Russian attitude. 
The country began to show political drift towards the West, culminating (for 
Shevardnadze’s reign) with the president’s promise of bringing Georgia into 
NATO (Nalbandov, 2014, p.61).
In general, during the Yeltsin era, coercion (as a strategic instrument 
against Georgia with different, at times quite sophisticated, forms) was not 
yet a conscious choice by the Russian leadership. Yeltsin’s administration was 
trying to preserve a military, political and economic presence in the Caucasus, 
but to spend a minimal amount of resources for this purpose. As Filippov 
(2009, p.1830) argues, “As with almost everything during the Yeltsin period, 
policy towards Georgia was characterized by bureaucratic chaos and ineffect-
ive implementation.” Yeltsin’s administration combined “coercive interven-
tions and peacekeeping operations” (Lynch, 2000, p.4) with various forms of 
economic, political and diplomatic pressure and positive incentives (Filippov, 
2009, p.1830).
From 1999 onwards, Russia began to increasingly accuse Georgia of pro-
viding support and refuge to Chechen terrorists. In August 2002, Russian 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov even called Georgia a “nest of terrorists” 
(Filippov, 2009, p.1833). This gave Russia an excuse to strengthen coercive 
measures against Georgia: Russia’s delivery of gas to Georgia was repeat-
edly cut off  during the winter of 2000 (causing the EU external affairs com-
missioner to criticize Russia for using gas supplies as a means of political 
pressure). In December 2000, Moscow imposed a visa regime for Georgian 
citizens (Filippov, 2009, p.1833).
With the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia, on 
the contrary, actively started to develop authority relations: the visa regime 
with Georgia did not apply to the residents of these regions, and Russia also 
accepted applications from Abkhazian and South Ossetian residents for 
Russian citizenship. Abkhazian residents received Russian passports via an 
organization called the Congress of Russian Communities in Abkhazia. In 
2002, it facilitated the issuing of 117,000 Russian passports within 22 days. 
In 2008, holders of Russian passports in Abkhazia received Russian state 
pensions of 1,600 rubles, which was 16 times the amount provided by the 
Abkhazian government on a monthly basis (Kirova, 2012). Following the 
recognition of Abkhazia’s status of an independent state, Russia’s passpor-
tization process was stalled. Moscow’s authorities resumed it only in 2014, 
under the strategic partnership bilateral treaty between Russia and Abkhazia 
(Kubatyan, 2013). Between 2003 and 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry also 
issued 32,519 Russian passports to the citizens of South Ossetia (the vast 
majority of its population) at a symbolic cost of 1,100 rubles (approx. €15) 
each (Kuprina, 2009). Georgian authorities labeled Russia’s passportization 
policy in the two separatist regions a “creeping annexation” of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.
As Baev argued in 2002, “Georgia is the only post- Soviet neighbor— and, 
in fact, the only country in the world— with which Russia has a protracted and 
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carefully cultivated political conflict that periodically escalates and generates 
serious military tension” (Baev, 2002, cited in Filippov, 2009, p.1834). In his 
opinion, Russia’s main purpose is to keep the US out of the region. Moscow 
has always been incomparably more concerned with a US presence in Georgia 
than with the EU’s efforts to exert influence through a normative approach.
With Saakashvili’s rise to power, Russia’s attitude to Georgia steadily dete-
riorated. I want to stress here that, in all likelihood, the Russian leadership 
hated no other politician as much as Saakashvili.3 They hated him for his 
independence, for his aggressive and sometimes adventurous political style, 
for modernization— and especially for the fact that he succeeded; for his very 
clearly defined Western orientation. As always in Russia, the mass media were 
sensitive to this hatred and understood the demand: “Georgian demagogue” 
was the mildest label that Saakashvili received in the Russian media. In 2006, 
Saakashvili took second place as the person with the most negative image 
in the Russian media: he ceded the first place to American President George 
W. Bush, but overtook notorious Chechen terror organizer Basaev, who was 
rated third (Filippov, 2009, pp.1836– 1837).
The Russian media severely criticized Saakashvili for his attempts to get 
rid of Georgia’s Soviet legacy by opening a museum of the occupation and 
ordering the demolition of a World War II memorial in order to erect a new 
parliament building in its place (Ragozin, 2016). The episode of Saakashvili 
chewing his tie while talking on the phone before his BBC interview became a 
newsmaker whereby the Russian media called a criminal psychiatrist to com-
ment on Saakashvili’s mental state. The tabloids issued a rich palette of satir-
ical comments ranging from Saakashvili’s inability to control his actions to 
his being hungry for American help to Georgia (Malpas, 2008). Saakashvili’s 
PR team was claimed to be unable to lobby for increased financial support 
from Washington (Rimple, 2013), which reportedly pushed him to sign a 
contract with an influential US lobbying firm, the Podesta Group, for it to 
provide Tbilisi with lobbying, government relations, PR and media services 
(Makarova, 2010). The Russian mass media welcomed Saakashvili being 
deprived of Georgian citizenship by condemning the “export of Georgian 
politicians” to Ukraine. Saakashvili’s appointment as head of Ukraine’s 
Odessa region was described as “spitting in the face” of the Ukrainian people 
(Sputnik International, 2015).
Interestingly, Saakashvili, realizing that the West expected constructive 
gestures of him, made some attempts to normalize relations with Russia. 
He declared a unilateral commitment to the nonuse of force to resolve issues 
of territorial integrity and repeatedly offered to open negotiations with 
Moscow. The Russian leadership, however, showed no flexibility and stood 
firm— Saakashvili was “unhandshakeable” and the improvement of bilateral 
relations could not occur prior to his departure from office. The position of 
Russia’s authorities only worked in Saakashvili’s favor, as he merely needed to 
demonstrate his good will towards Russia to his Western allies (Sharashenidze, 
2014, p.52).
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In 2006, Moscow began to step up economic coercion. Russia’s Chief 
Sanitary Doctor closed the country’s market to Georgian wines, mineral 
water and agricultural products (though this ban did not apply to Abkhazia). 
Officially, the sanctions were introduced due to the low quality of Georgian 
goods. At the same time, Russia declared a blockade of Georgia for all means 
of transport— aviation, rail, marine, automotive and postal. Persecution of 
Georgians, including Russian citizens, became widespread in Russia (Papava, 
2012, p.77). Some scholars argued that Georgia was fully lost for Russia eco-
nomically (Lunev, 2006, p.26). The transportation blockade was accompa-
nied by an informational one: in her book, Burakova quotes famous Russian 
satirist Zhvanetskiy, who exclaimed: “Tell us what is happening in Georgia. 
Because no one talks about it, there is a feeling that it’s a paradise there” 
(Zhvaneckij, 2010, cited in Burakova, 2011, p.10).
In Georgia, Saakashvili’s main problem turned out to be his inability to 
reach a settlement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which he had to do 
under unfavorable conditions. For Moscow, which had chosen to increase 
coercion against Georgia, the significance of these two “frozen conflicts” on 
Russia’s borders increased dramatically for the purpose of exerting pressure 
on Georgia. As Aphrasidze and Siroky write,
Russia’s policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia was critical to the 
escalation of tensions into violent conflict. Worsening relations between 
Tbilisi and Moscow, Russia’s growing ambitions in the former Soviet space 
and the western brokered independence of Kosovo all influenced Russia’s 
position regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia’s involvement 
in Georgia’s conflicts and support to the local regimes has never been 
a secret, but Moscow’s “hidden hand” turned into even more direct and 
open engagement in early August 2008. After Kosovo’s independence, 
Moscow began the de facto recognition of the Ossetian and Abkhazian 
regimes by setting up direct institutional links between Russian and cor-
responding public agencies in both regions.
(Aphrasidze and Siroky, 2010, p.133)
In fact, Russia was pursuing a policy of creeping annexation of the regions. 
All this led to a five- day war between Georgia and Russia within the territory 
of South Ossetia, as a result of which Georgia lost both South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia for good.
Russia blamed “certain foreign powers” for the outbreak of this war. 
According to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, these powers 
had “decided to test the strength of Russian authority and our peacekeepers” 
via Saakashvili, and even “to force us to embark on the path of militariza-
tion and to abandon modernization” (Lavrov, 2008, no pagination). Famous 
Russian foreign policy analyst Trenin (2009, p.144) also put responsibility on 
the US’s shoulders, arguing that the “Bush administration was responsible for 
not stopping Tbilisi’s attack on Tskhinvali, for sending apparently ambiguous 
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signals to President Saakashvili, for the Republicans ‘investing’ in ‘Misha 
[familiar form of Mikheil]’ as their own ‘social project’, and so on.”
Two unrecognized states emerged as a result of the war. The coalition of 
those who recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia included Russia (the first 
one to recognize both “states”), Nicaragua, Venezuela and some tiny states 
of Polynesia. However, in recognizing the independence of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, Russia has not found support among any of its formal allies 
under the Collective Security Treaty or its partners in the Eurasian Economic 
Community. According to Georgian law, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
are regions illegally occupied by Russia (Venice Commission, 2009).
Not surprisingly, Russia has sharply intensified its authority relations with 
both regions (especially in the military and political spheres) after the war. As 
early as September 2008 Russia and Abkhazia signed a treaty on friendship, 
cooperation and mutual assistance, assuming an increase in Russian military- 
political presence in Abkhazia. In 2009, both parties signed the agreement “On 
joint efforts in protecting the state border of Abkhazia,” which established the 
Border Guard Department of the Russian FSB in the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Markedonov, 2012, p.78). In 2010, Moscow and Sukhumi agreed to establish 
a joint military base for Russian troops in the territory of Abkhazia.
The planned Russian financing for Abkhazia for 2016 lies at 7.9 billion 
rubles. Official redistribution of financial help is within the jurisdiction of 
Russia’s Ministry of North Caucasus Affairs. Russia and Abkhazia are nego-
tiating over 14 projects concerning joint lawmaking in the customs sphere 
and in education. According to the Abkhazian prime minister, there are 350 
Russia- financed initiatives at work, with 184 of the sites that require major 
repairs to be totally reconstructed by the end of 2016 (Interfax, 2016). Indeed, 
Moscow cares about the increase of living standards in both regions com-
pared to the situation prior to 2008. This is a matter of prestige. Most of the 
Abkhazian citizens questioned in 2010 admitted that the situation in Abkhazia 
was better than that in Georgia and estimated the direction of their country’s 
development as generally correct (O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Toal, 2010).
South Ossetia has a very limited state capacity, even compared with 
Abkhazia. Being relatively independent in its domestic policy, it nevertheless 
lacks a strategy for progressive development and remains hugely corrupt. Its 
external policy is centered on its relations with Russia due to historic ties with 
Russia’s North Ossetia and to the demand for Russian financing.
In April 2010, Moscow signed an agreement to place a joint military base 
in South Ossetian territory. If  with regard to Abkhazia experts doubt whether 
the region can be categorized as a Russian protectorate, there is no question 
that this is the case with South Ossetia. The authors of the International Crisis 
Group’s report “South Ossetia: the burden of recognition” stated in 2010 that 
the region was no closer to real sovereignty than it had been in August 2008. 
The territory lacked genuine political, economic or military autonomy. It was 
Moscow that formed the largest part of its government, transferred 99 per-
cent of the budget and was responsible for the security of the republic (Crisis 
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Group, 2010, cited in Markedonov, 2012, pp.111– 112). In 2017, republican 
authorities are planning— quite predictably— to organize a referendum on 
joining the Russian Federation.
In accordance with Ossetia’s constitutional law “On state languages of the 
South Ossetian Republic,” Russian is one of the country’s state languages 
along with Ossetian. Moscow finances two religious foundations operating in 
the country, Renaissance of Orthodoxy and the St. Andrew Foundation, and 
supports the Caucasus Institute for Democracy, a soft power institution with 
branches in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as in Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia. Russian mass media in Abkhazia and South Ossetia include 
South Ossetian FM radio station Aizald- FM and Abkhazian newspaper 
Gudok- Abkhazia; locals also have access to Russian federal TV channels 
(Popescu, 2006). Rossotrudnichestvo (the Russian federal agency respon-
sible for ties with the CIS countries) has established offices in Sukhumi and 
Tskhinvali; the Russkii Mir foundation (Russia’s official state- financed cul-
tural foundation) is responsible for the promotion and popularization of the 
Russian language. About a third of Abkhazians speak only Russian and do 
not use the Abkhaz language in everyday life (Kirova, 2012). The leading par-
ties in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have practically the same titles as United 
Russia (“United Abkhazia” and “United Ossetia” respectively). Residents of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (with Russian passports) voted in Russia’s par-
liamentary elections of 2011, as Russia installed 12 polling stations in these 2 
breakaway entities.
So what did Russia gain and what did it lose by using coercion on Georgia 
and authority on Abkhazia and South Ossetia?
Russia lost Georgia. As Trenin (2009, pp.145– 146) argues,
The results of a referendum on the question of Georgia’s membership in 
NATO and leaving the CIS were very telling as a vote of no confidence in 
Moscow … Georgia has probably lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia for-
ever, but Russia, for its part, has lost Georgia as a friendly country for a 
long time to come, regardless of the personal make- up of its leadership.
This loss is not an economic one: after Saakashvili’s departure and the change 
of government in Georgia, Russia lifted restrictions on Georgian products, 
and trade resumed. Exports from Georgia to Russia have been showing a ris-
ing trend (Kapanadze, 2014, p.3). However, political traumas cannot be cured 
as easily, and the “loss of Georgia” is a political phenomenon. Furthermore, 
Russia suffered serious reputational damage in the eyes of the Western pow-
ers. And finally, the five- day war has demonstrated that the commitments of 
the CIS members are worth very little, and this poses natural questions about 
commitments in other Russia- centered integration projects.
What Russia gained were two economically weak regions, the recogni-
tion of which was apparently useless geopolitically, and the statuses of which 
are unclear as their existence as sovereign states is not recognized by the 
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international community. So far neither of the two is a success story: Russia’s 
“political revenues” from them are sinking while economic costs are rising, 
taking into consideration the growing number of “clients” in the Russian fed-
eral center’s patron– client arrangements. Indeed, economic support for these 
regions implies changes in the scheme of financial redistribution according 
to which Russia’s recipient regions gain financial transfers from the federal 
budget. In 2008, the Russian government invested 500  million rubles in South 
Ossetia’s economy. Moscow’s financial help to this minor satellite was at its 
highest in 2009 (when it reached the sum of 10.6 billion rubles). The total 
amount of financial help to South Ossetia between 2008 and 2014 lay at 
43 million rubles. This sum is exceptionally large: 41 billion rubles accounts 
for the revenues of Russia’s Leningrad oblast, with a population of 1.5  million 
people, compared to that of the approximately 53,500(!) residents of South 
Ossetia (Kommersant, 2016). Of the total financing volume, 30  billion rubles 
came as Russia’s state subsidies, 10 billion rubles were invested by Russia’s 
gas supplier monopolist Gazprom, 2 billion rubles were granted by the 
Moscow government and 1 billion rubles were obtained from charity dona-
tions (Sedakov, 2011). The revenues of South Ossetia’s budget for 2015 lay 
at 7.3 billion rubles, with 6.7 billion rubles being Russian subsidies. In 2016, 
Russia’s financial help will account for 8.2 billion rubles, of which 3.6 billion 
will be provided as part of the investment program issued by the Ossetian 
Government for 2015– 2017 (Latuhina, 2016).
The story of two authorities
Creating a positive international image of Georgia was an important element 
of President Saakashvili’s strategy (Falkowski, 2016, p.15). Since the times of 
his presidency, Georgia has been gaining a lot of sympathy from the West as a 
small but proud and brave country that opposes the giant Russia. Saakashvili, 
as a president educated in the US, was well able to use this image to appeal to 
the West for support of his reform course. Indeed, changes in Georgia were 
fostered and supported from outside by developing authority relations with 
two Western powers— the US and the European Union. However, these are 
authority relations of two different types. US relations with Georgia were 
developed primarily on the basis of security (mainly against the Russian 
threat) and democracy promotion, so the main instruments were institutional 
rapprochement with NATO structures as well as military and financial aid. In 
EU– Georgia relations the military component was absent, and the focus was 
placed on conditionality: Georgian involvement in the institutional arrange-
ments that the EU developed for neighboring countries (without the possibil-
ity of membership) in exchange for sustainable reforms.
By building authority relations with Georgia, the US (and NATO) and 
the EU shared responsibility over Georgia in a sense, though in different 
fashion. In no case was the EU’s policy in Georgia a reflection of  American 
interests in the country; both the US and the EU represent independent 
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(though interconnected) versions of  authority relations that should com-
plement each other for better exposure (though a lack of  cohesion between 
the US and the Union over governance and economic issues in Georgia 
is sometimes quite noticeable). Thus, according to Mchedlishvili (2016, 
p.1), the US was generally regarded through the lenses of  hard security 
and geopolitics, whereas the European Union and European governments 
were considered to be forces for a gradual spread of  democracy and institu-
tional efficiency. Unlike the US practice of  “exporting democracy” (includ-
ing by military means), in the Union democracy is treated primarily as 
a cultural value, which must evolve without external pressure and over a 
lengthy period of  time (Malysheva, 2014, p.43). In addition, the United 
States in pursuing its policy tends to regard the role of  traditional, ethnic 
and religious factors as less significant, and therefore frequently underes-
timates them. The EU, unlike the US, proceeds from the assumption that 
these factors are of  exceptional importance in Georgia, where their role is 
no less important than the national and state identity.
Initially, the US was much more active than the EU in developing relations 
with Georgia, as Nalbandov argues:
The United States has been the primary lobby state of Georgia ever since 
its independence, supporting it mostly financially. … Georgia regularly 
led the list of world states in terms of per capita U.S.  economic aid. 
Between 1992 and 2010, Georgia has received U.S.$3.3 billion.
(Nalbandov, 2014, p.63)
In 2015, Tbilisi received 20  million dollars of American Foreign Military 
Financing aid (Kucera, 2015). 2016 has witnessed the US- assisted launch of 
a five- year Economic Resilience Program for Georgia with a total funding of 
$15 million. Another $1 million followed as assistance from the Department 
of Labor for an International Labor organization program, in addition to 
the existing $2  million US contribution. In the field of education, in 2016 
the US funded three Fulbright Graduate Student Program scholarships for 
Georgia. Security assistance of $20 million was secured for Tbilisi through the 
European Reassurance Initiative. The U.S. Ambassadors Fund for Cultural 
Preservation has funded 14 preservation projects with more than $1 million 
(U.S. Department of State, 2016). In July 2016, the US Secretary of State paid 
a visit to Georgia, signing a bilateral memorandum for defense and secur-
ity partnership between Washington and Tbilisi, aimed at modernization of 
Georgia’s armed forces (Markedonov, 2016).
In the security sphere, the US’s projects with regard to Georgia include 
the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which began in 2002, and 
the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP; in place since 
2005). As part of these programs, the United States has funded reforms in the 
Georgian army, and provided equipment and training for soldiers and officers 
(Falkowski, 2016, p.20).
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One of the main US priorities in Georgia has been the country’s steady 
integration into NATO. The April 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit named 
Georgia (together with Ukraine) as an aspirant country for the first time, and 
stated that it “will become a member of NATO.” However, no concrete date 
was specified for when this event, historic for Georgia, would take place. At 
the Summit, the Baltic states, Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic sided 
with the United States in support of Georgian (and Ukrainian) bids for the 
NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), but this was thwarted by the “old 
Europe” states, in particular by Germany (Mchedlishvili, 2016, p.10). The 
US’s failure to persuade its allies to include Georgia in the MAP was a serious 
blow not only for Georgia, but for the Bush administration as well.
After this blow, the authority relations between Georgia and the US devel-
oped in such formats as were feasible. In January 2009, the US- Georgian 
Charter on Strategic Partnership was signed in Washington, DC, envisioning 
greater integration of Georgia into the Euro- Atlantic alliance; NATO’s prom-
ises to open its doors to Georgia’s entry into the alliance also remained in 
force. In November 2011, at the opening of the NATO- Georgia Commission 
in Tbilisi, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen named fur-
ther reforms as the condition for Georgia to join the Alliance, calling them 
“Georgia’s ticket to membership in NATO” (Civil Georgia, 2011).
After the change of government and Saakashvili’s departure, the Georgian 
Dream government continued to cooperate with NATO, in forms which 
included the involvement of Georgian troops in NATO operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the launch of the NATO– Georgia Joint Training 
and Evaluation Center in August 2015 (Falkowski, 2016, p.5). However, it 
seems that the question of Georgian admission to NATO is losing its urgency. 
The US did not finish the job; everything stopped halfway (Sharashenidze, 
2014, p.48). At the NATO Warsaw Summit (July 2016)  the Georgian gov-
ernment firmly demanded acknowledgment of Georgia’s progress in political 
and military reforms, hoping to participate in the MAP. However, no new 
members were invited to join the alliance as there was no political will for 
NATO enlargement.
Unlike those of the US, the presence of European institutions in Georgia 
was relatively small until the mid- 2000s (Sabahi and Wamer, 2004). The 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1999 was the only major 
legal institution that shaped relations between the EU and Georgia. It was 
the Rose Revolution in Georgia that prompted the European Union to 
include not only Georgia, but other countries of the South Caucasus into its 
Neighborhood policy in 2004, contrary to its previous decision to leave this 
issue for the more distant future (Nodia, 2005, p.70).
However, since the Russian- Georgian war, the vector of Georgia’s foreign 
policy has shifted away from the United States towards Europe, and the EU 
has also made some institutional “steps” towards Georgia. For Saakashvili, 
the rapprochement with the EU (preferably with the possibility of full mem-
bership in the Union) was of strategic importance. His reforms had a coercive 
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character and therefore led to the rise of much discontent and resentment. The 
reforms also failed to address the infrastructural and participatory aspects 
of state capacity. It was only the development of comprehensive authority 
relations with the Union that could make the reforms sustainable and irre-
versible, and turn Saakashvili’s tactical success into a strategic one. For the 
West, support of Saakashvili’s reforms has led to some reputational losses, as 
it continued to support them even when Georgia began to show increasingly 
authoritarian trends.
Saakashvili’s ambitious plans with regard to potential EU membership 
have remained unfulfilled, though some progress has been made. Georgia 
was invited to participate in the EU’s Eastern Partnership program initi-
ated in 2009, and a huge leap towards closer integration with the EU was 
made by signing the Association Agreement with the Union in June 2014 
(including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, or DCFTA). The 
Agreement came into force in September 2014. The ratification process of 
the EU’s national parliaments was completed in December 2015. Being the 
“classic” authority instrument of the EU, the Agreement contains serious 
reform commitments on the part of Georgia in exchange for visa regime lib-
eralization and access to the EU’s internal market. For instance, one of the 
conditions of the country’s EU Association Agreement was an obligation 
to pass anti- discrimination legislation. The parliament duly did so in May 
2014. The European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), which 
was established after the war in 2008, is still operating in Georgia and moni-
toring compliance with the Agreement. Finally, in December 2015 Brussels 
announced that the EU would abolish visas for Georgian nationals in 2016 
(Falkowski, 2016).
In 2007– 2013 the EU provided €452  million for Georgia within the 
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) program (for budget 
support, communication and energy infrastructure development, support 
for the private sector, internally displaced persons, etc.). Within the “Single 
Support Framework,” the Union committed itself  to funding Georgia on 
a scale of €410  million for the period of 2014– 2017. On July 1, 2016, the 
Association Agreement between Georgia and the EU entered into full force 
(Vedomosti, 2015). There is an operating project for combating money 
laundering and terrorism financing, with a budget of €500,000 co- financed 
by the EU (90  percent) and the Council of Europe (10  percent). In 2015, 
the European Assistance Package for Georgia accounted for €100  million. 
Half  of the sum was invested in the spheres of agriculture, food safety and 
quality standards. €30  million was invested in support of public adminis-
tration and public service delivery. €14  million was paid to assist Georgia 
in meeting European standards on energy, transport and combating crime. 
€6 million was given as subsidy to support civil society and engage it in the 
decision- making process (Civil Georgia, 2015a). Georgia has so far adopted 
over 7,000 European standards in the areas of safety and environment pro-
tection. Around 15 projects are currently in operation under the Mobility 
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Partnership. The EU contributes to Georgia’s economy vehicle by providing 
macro- financial assistance of €46 million. Georgian researchers have access 
to Horizon 2020, an initiative aimed at boosting innovation (The European 
Commission, 2015). The country also benefits greatly from the Union’s assist-
ance in the form of expert support (which concerns mainly the implementa-
tion of reforms and adaptation to EU standards) and training for the civil 
service and state functionaries. As Falkowski (2016, p.19) stresses, “Hundreds 
of development projects have been implemented year after year by Western 
development agencies, embassies and non- governmental organizations.”
However, not everything is so rosy in the EU– Georgia relationship. 
Disappointment came with the Russian- Georgian war. From the Georgian 
side, the disappointment was caused not only by the fact that both the US 
and the EU chose not to confront Russia openly, but also by the fact that no 
explanations were articulated as to the reasons for the war. Thus, the Report 
of the Independent International Fact- Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia could not definitively answer the question of why the August 2008 
war between Russia and Georgia had begun.4 Welt (2009, p.2) notes that “the 
Report aspired to produce a collective mea culpa: in effect, recognition by all 
parties that waging armed conflict and violating human rights are bad, and 
that all are to blame for taking part.” The EU’s Fact- Finding Mission failed 
to produce a common narrative regarding the causes of the war.
This is, however, no accident, but a reflection of the special character of 
the EU foreign policy arrangements that I attempted to explain in Chapter 3. 
According to Filippov, the
Western reaction to the Russian actions, meanwhile, is influenced by 
the background of strategically connected multi- level interactions that 
Russia has with its Western partners on various issues. In the case of 
the EU, these are interactions between the all- Union institutions and 
the Russian government, or Russia’s bilateral relations with member- 
states, or cross- border cooperation at the sub- national level. In the light 
of such a strategic linkage, it is reasonable to assume that while some 
actors in Europe focus more on the relations between Russia and the 
EU as a whole, other key actors are more interested in good bilateral 
relations or in economic cooperation. Similarly, some players focus on 
specific issues, such as security, environmental issues, energy supplies or 
democratic development. It means that the Council, the Commission, the 
Parliament, individual member states, regional blocs and sub- national 
governments of the member states are all likely to select different strate-
gies vis- a- vis Russia.
(Filippov, 2009, pp.1842– 1843)
“Unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” continues Filippov, 
“generated a fully predictable ostracism of Russia in the world” (Filippov, 
2009, p.1842). However, the problem is precisely that Russia’s behavior 
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did not generate ostracism; on the contrary, the US and the EU have sent 
Russia a clear signal that coercion works, and that they in fact recognize 
Russia’s special interests within the post- Soviet space. Russia has received the 
signal, and made it a presupposition for its subsequent actions in Ukraine. At 
the same time, the involvement of the Western powers in the Caucasian region 
(in particular, in Georgia) is diminishing (Falkowski, 2016, p.6).
Is Georgia still exceptional?
Is Georgia still exceptional among post- Soviet countries? Is Zurab Zhvania’s 
statement at the Council of Europe meeting in 1999, “I am Georgian and 
therefore I am European” (cited in Nalbandov, 2014, p.98), still correct? Is 
Georgia still of the same relevance to the political agenda of the West? Given 
the latest political developments in Georgia, these are not idle questions.
During his presidency, Saakashvili took a firmly pro- Western course, and 
this was a huge risk, as this choice meant starting an open confrontation 
with Russia, one whose scope and duration Georgia was not able to con-
trol or to predict. This courageous and outstanding reform experiment during 
Saakashvili’s rule in Georgia was the focus of attention for both the EU and 
the US.
Nalbandov, however, describes Georgia as a country that is “highly 
adaptive to fluctuations of the geo- political environments” mainly due to 
its geographic location (Nalbandov, 2014, p.97). Georgia is still located in 
geographical proximity to Russia, and, unlike the times of Saakashvili, the 
pro- Russian stance of the current Georgian leadership is highly conspicuous, 
despite its declarations that it is aiming at irreversible integration with the EU 
(Tsulukiani, 2013, p.2). Georgia is restoring relations with Russia— and not 
only in the cultural and economic spheres (such as sending Georgian athletes 
to take part in the Universiade Games in Russia in 2013 and Georgia’s partici-
pation in the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, as well as the resumption 
of Georgian exports to Russia), but also in politics, by making official state-
ments that show aspirations to rapprochement with Russia- centered integra-
tion projects. According to Falkowski (2016, p.25),
As far as relations with Russia are concerned, [the current Georgian gov-
ernment’s] policy has been different from that pursued by Saakashvili. It 
is a priority for the government to normalize relations with Russia and 
not to provoke Moscow, irrespective of the hostile actions it takes. Tbilisi 
has been trying not to raise the Abkhazia and South Ossetian issues on 
its own initiative.
Institutional and policy reforms in Georgia were strongly supported by 
the West, but as Nodia (2005, p.69) argues, “The country’s social and his-
torical experience with ‘Westernness’ is minimal. Never in its history has 
Georgia been in close contact with the West.” When developing authority 
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relations with US and the EU, the incentives of  the Georgian leadership 
were certain rewards associated with pursuing reforms that would bring 
the country closer to “Western standards.” Therefore, it is logical to expect 
that if  Georgian efforts were not rewarded, this would result in disappoint-
ment in Georgia’s “Western choice.” This disappointment is strengthened 
by the deterioration of  the economic situation: the country’s economy 
did not really improve. On the contrary, it contracted and did not provide 
the expected increase in employment (BTI, 2016). Stagnation has begun 
in Georgia; in some areas the situation seems to be reverting to the “pre- 
Saakashvili” status (including rising crime levels, corruption and nepotism) 
(Falkowaski, 2016, p.6). The Georgian economy has been adversely affected 
by the short- term effects of  the DCFTA agreement concluded with the EU 
(the need to adopt a number of  EU regulations, e.g., labor legislation, or 
the increase in electricity prices for households [Falkowaski, 2016, p.41]). 
All in all, so far there have been no tangible material results— no rewards 
for Georgia’s European choice— but Georgians want them, and want to 
feel them as soon as possible.
These “weak points” have been immediately exploited by Russia, which is 
trying to quickly “repair” relations with Georgia. For instance, direct flights 
between Moscow and Tbilisi have been restored, and Russia is increasing its 
cooperation with Georgia in the areas of energy and transport. The restric-
tions on Russian television broadcasting have been lifted (Falkowaski, 2016, 
p.27). There are more and more pro- Russian organizations in Georgia, used by 
the Russian state as “points of entry” to Georgia for further development of 
authority- style relations with the country. Among these pro- Russian organi-
zations are political parties (for instance, Democratic Movement– United 
Georgia), nongovernmental organizations (Eurasian Choice of Georgia and 
the Eurasian Institute), and the media (Sputnik Georgia and Georgia and the 
World) (Falkowaski, 2016, p.33). Many of them promote the central idea on 
which Russia’s authority relations with post- Soviet countries are based— the 
idea of the reintegration of the post- Soviet space around Russia. That which 
was unthinkable in Saakashvili’s days is now becoming the norm in Georgia. 
Overall, the idea is gradually gaining popularity that Georgia made the wrong 
decision by openly confronting Russia, and that it should instead have devel-
oped proper relations with it. Even Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and Russian 
support for insurgents in Eastern Ukraine, have not reversed this trend.
The elites of the country are highly split with regard to their attitude 
to Russia. In an interview with EUobserver in summer 2016, President 
Margvelashvili said that though Russia is a “factor” in Georgian policy- 
making, it does not have a veto on Georgia’s foreign policy. He also said that 
in order to retain influence, Russia is now ready to activate any of the frozen 
conflicts in its neighborhood and “to destabilize half  of the Eurasian contin-
ent if  need be” (Rettman, 2016). At the same time, the political clan of ex- 
prime minister and billionaire banker Ivanishvili, who exerts strong influence 
on the government, advocates a “pro- Russian” strategic choice by Georgia.
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The failure of the European project in Georgia would mean the failure of 
Western (first of all the EU’s) authority relations— with regard to Georgia, 
but also with regard to the neighborhood. It would also negatively affect the 
pro- European aspirations of countries like Ukraine or Moldova. And any 
stagnation in the development of authority relations between the EU and 
Georgia is a failure, as it shows the Georgian leadership that the EU’s interest 
in and support of Georgia is situational rather than long- term and sustain-
able. Under such circumstances, the Georgian leadership has few incentives to 
suffer the losses (even temporary ones) that result from maintaining authority 
relations with the Union. Authority relations of the EU type are developed as 
principally long- term relations; as they presuppose changes by the subordin-
ate, they can’t provide benefits in the short run, and in this sense they nega-
tively differ from the authority- similar relations that Russia is proposing to 
Georgia. With this in mind, the Georgian leadership has to make a strategic 
decision— either to confirm the choice made by Saakashvili, or to fundamen-
tally change it in favor of Russia. The idea of maintaining “proper” relations 
both with the EU and Russia, one proclaimed by the Georgian leadership, for 
all its apparent attractiveness, has no chance of working. These choices are 
different at their core, and there is no way to combine them.
Notes
 1 At that time, it was often said in Georgia that Margvelashvili was only a puppet in 
the hands of Ivanishvili, the prime minister (and billionaire).
 2 In 1992 Georgia and Russia signed an agreement on joint control of the Georgian- 
Turkish border.
 3 This was, of course, in the past. Since 2014, the main objects of hatred have been 
Ukrainian politicians.
 4 On September 30, 2009, the Report of the Independent International Fact- Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia was presented to the parties to the conflict, 
the Council of the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the United Nations (The Council of the European Union, 2009).
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8 Ukraine
The “battlefield”
Compared to Belarus and Georgia, Ukraine is considerably larger in territor-
ial size, and this alone hampers both the initiation and— more importantly— 
the completion of reform processes. This factor also significantly decreases 
the ability of the state to implement guidance of the country’s development. 
However, its large size is not Ukraine’s only difficulty with regard to successful 
reforms. Throughout its post- Soviet history, regional cleavages, expressed in 
electoral behavior and political attitudes, have been one of the central features 
of its political development. In all presidential and parliamentary elections, 
western Ukrainian regions have supported nationalist and pro- Western polit-
ical parties and politicians, while eastern regions have supported pro- Russian 
ones (Katchanovski, 2007).
A cleavage that splits the country into two communities comparable in 
size is the least favorable for building institutions acceptable to all. If  such 
a state is headed by a president (and the authority of the presidential office 
holder is real rather than symbolic), the president will necessarily represent 
one of the communities, while members of other equally- sized communities 
will feel slighted. This has increasingly been happening in Ukraine. Let us 
recall the second round of the 2010 presidential elections, when Kiev and 
sixteen regions voted for Yulia Timoshenko (who embodied the country’s 
“Western choice”), while nine regions and the city of Sebastopol supported 
Viktor Yanukovych as the “Russian choice.” These two parts of Ukraine were 
almost equal in terms of population size: 24 million lived in the western part 
of the country and 21.3 million in the eastern. During the worst crisis since 
the country obtained independence in 1991, a crisis Ukraine has been experi-
encing since 2014, this division has materialized as open separatism pursued 
by the eastern parts of the country and the appearance of the self- proclaimed 
Donetsk and Luhansk republics.
Regional cleavages pose a serious problem for national development. 
However, in Ukraine this problem is aggravated by the other major Ukrainian 
feature, the chronic weakness of the national central government. This brings 
us to the central problem of Ukraine, which is of decisive importance not only 
for its internal development but also for the country’s external positioning— 
the deficit of state capacity. I would hesitate to define Ukraine as a failed state 
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as many experts do (Bershidsky, 2015; Gil, 2015; Sapir, 2015), but the ques-
tion of “Ukrainian” independent agency is regularly raised by Ukraine’s own 
politicians and scholars. At various conferences, I  regularly hear the argu-
ment that Ukraine’s future is fully dependent on the relations between Russia 
and the West. And I ask myself: Where is Ukraine in this thesis?
The issue of how to increase state capacity greatly matters for Ukraine, and 
is currently much more relevant for it than regaining Crimea. Corruption and 
the rule of oligarchs, which have become the two most significant challenges 
for the country, cannot be tackled without an effective state that presupposes, 
inter alia, a powerful national center which would unite Ukraine in practice 
and not just declaratively. While it continues to remain economically depend-
ent on Russia, Ukraine is unable to create lasting authority relations with the 
EU, which require state capacity, and it may become subject to coercion at 
any time.
So far Ukraine’s political destiny has been that of a country trapped 
between two political entities that have significantly more political weight. 
This double asymmetry between the EU and Ukraine on the one hand and 
between Russia and Ukraine on the other hand places the country in constant 
tension, as its spectrum of external action is limited by the interests of the 
two dominant powers at its borders. Until recently Ukraine was incomparably 
more important for Russia than for the EU, however, this strategic import-
ance did not make Ukraine “the subject,” it rather remained an object of 
Russia’s geopolitical ambitions.
Both authority relations and coercive relations operate within a 
“superordinate- subordinate” framework, where Ukraine plays the latter role. 
Ukraine is and will very likely remain in a vulnerable position towards the 
EU and Russia in the years to come, but it can at least influence the degree to 
which this vulnerability plays out.
With regard to EU– Ukraine relations, the first criterion of authority rela-
tions, which is legitimacy, is partially in effect. Ukraine considers the EU to 
be in a position to place conditions on the bilateral relations between the two, 
but at the same time it finds the EU’s demands too strict and the required pace 
of reforms too fast. The EU, meanwhile, recognizes Kiev’s government as 
legitimate and has made it the sole negotiation partner speaking on the part 
of the whole population. The situation with the second criterion of author-
ity relations, which is their voluntary character, is not as straightforward 
as it might seem. Naturally, the European choice for Ukraine is associated 
with “rewards” such as access to the visa- free area and overall better living 
standards for the population. But disillusionment with these hopes is already 
present among ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, a voluntary choice requires 
the existence of options to choose from, which is currently not the case for 
Ukraine, taking into consideration Kiev’s attempts to disregard the Russian 
factor. The third criterion of authority relations, namely the ability of the 
actors involved to make credible commitments, is problematic as well. The 
EU is reluctant to grant Ukraine the possibility of membership, as Europe 
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perceives Ukraine as an unpredictable partner, able to withdraw its commit-
ments and to change its set of beliefs and attitudes in a way that is difficult to 
anticipate.
National context: much ado about nothing?
Ukraine became an independent state on January 1, 1992, when there was 
no consolidated political community enclosed within its borders. This was 
not unique to Ukraine: after gaining independence, the majority of former 
Soviet states faced similar challenges of state- and nation- building. Today, 
after 25 years of independence, both the state and the nation in Ukraine have 
still not been built. Again, this is not unique to Ukraine; many post- Soviet 
countries (including the largest) are in the same situation. However, in the 
case of Ukraine, this factor invites greater puzzlement— perhaps because 
more was expected from this developed, educated and (at least geographic-
ally) European country than from others?
To date, five presidents have ruled Ukraine. Leonid Kravchuk, the first 
president of the independent Ukraine, attempted to centralize power and to 
reproduce “a smaller version of the Soviet economy instead of a true market 
economy.” This system copied the governance style of the Soviet administra-
tive market economy. As Kravchuk left as a result of the 1994 elections, the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell by almost 50 percent (Wilson, 
2013, p.1). And that is all there is to say about him. With regard to the legacy 
that his successor, Leonid Kuchma, left Ukraine, scholars’ conclusions dif-
fer radically. Thus, according to Wilson, Kuchma succeeded neither in state- 
building nor in market reforms. He expanded presidential authority, but not 
to the benefit of the whole nation— instead he used this expansion to become 
the oligarchs’ patron. Thus, there were literally no obstacles that could emerge 
from the central authority, or from effective economic institutions, or from 
both, to prevent oligarchs from capturing the economy in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. Control over heavy industry, the core of the Ukrainian economy, 
was parceled out to rival regional clans by Kuchma in insider deals (Wilson, 
2013, p.1).
Kuzio holds a different view on the period of Kuchma’s reign. He con-
siders the period from 1994 to 1998 under Kuchma as a productive time of 
consolidation. The first three years of the Kuchma era were, according to 
him, exceptionally fruitful as they secured their reversibility of Ukraine’s 
independence (Kuzio, 1998, p.1). Territorial integrity was by 1997 no longer 
in question, as the inhabitants of Crimea gave up slogans calling for reunifi-
cation with Russia. And
between 1994 and 1997 Ukraine became a strategic asset of the West. 
The launch of economic and political reform, the peaceful resolution 
of domestic disputes, removal of the last nuclear weapons by June 
1996 and support for NATO enlargement were just some of the factors 
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which worked to convince the West that Ukraine was the “linchpin” of 
European security.
(Kuzio, 1998, p.2)
“By 1996,” argues Kuzio, “President Kuchma could claim that Ukraine had 
completed its state- building” (Kuzio, 1998, p.3). Kuzio’s statement is about 
the completion of state- building, but not nation- building. However, even this 
was premature: the Orange Revolution very soon proved that the Ukrainian 
state under Kuchma was not able to withstand pressure from below.
In December 1999, Kuchma appointed a pro- Western prime minister, 
Viktor Yushchenko, who launched economic reforms that boosted growth, 
but at the same time enriched the oligarchs (Wilson, 2013, p.1). The great 
East/ West geographic divide was combined with political, economic and cul-
tural fragmentation, allowing for several powerful centers of gravity, while 
the rivalry between them created an environment that negatively affected 
both political stability and economic development (Nalbandov, 2014, p.69). 
Corruption skyrocketed.
In 2004, thousands of Ukrainian citizens voiced their discontent with the 
governmental policy vector in the national capital over two months. This 
was the Orange Revolution, triggered by an attempt to falsify the presiden-
tial election results. The revote brought victory to the oppositional candidate, 
former prime minister Yushchenko, and this was seen by many as Ukraine’s 
breakthrough to democracy and an example for other post- Soviet countries. 
However, the Orange Revolution euphoria quickly turned into disappoint-
ment. It did change the elites, but did not change the system. After the failure 
of the Orange Revolution to fulfil its pledges, political regionalization in the 
country was exacerbated further (Nalbandov, 2014, p.71). As Wilson (2013, 
p.1) argues, “Moreover, pro- Orange voters were nearly all in Western and 
Central Ukraine, allowing defeated candidate Viktor Yanukovych, backed by 
Russia, to question the revolution’s legitimacy in the east and south.” Unlike 
Saakashvili’s government in Georgia, which was pursuing the course of 
reforms virtually at the same time, Yushchenko’s government appeared incap-
able of implementing real and tangible changes. Also unlike Saakashivili, 
Yushchenko’s reputation (as a pro- Western politician) did not stand him in 
good stead when it came to his country. At the same time, the failure of the 
Orange Revolution provided a powerful argument to the opponents of reform 
and supporters of stability in Russia: if  the Orange Revolution was supposed 
to be positive, then where were the results? The absence of progressive change 
means that the costs of reforms, such as political instability and falling living 
standards, are not only painful— they are borne in vain. Therefore, the best 
option for Russia, according to this line of argument, would be to preserve 
the status quo.
In 2010, Yanukovych won the presidential elections, mainly due to the dis-
illusionment of the revolution’s supporters and the increased hope for Russia 
as the only source of desperately needed funds. Unlike his predecessor, he 
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started his term by actively prosecuting his political opponents, trying to cen-
tralize power (taking into account the errors of the past), and to improve eco-
nomic resilience by means of raising the pension age. However, all this could 
not replace thorough economic reforms. Ukraine remained a rentier state, 
similar to Russia, but with a difference in the sources of revenue: in Russia, 
the state and oligarchs extracted rent from gas and oil sales, while in Ukraine, 
oligarchs and politicians extracted rent from energy transit. As Wilson (2013, 
p.3) wrote, “Various licenses and concessions depended on political favor, 
facilitating corrupt lobbying, and oligarchs manipulated the political process 
to ensure the supply of subsidized gas, coal, and electricity.” The existence 
of strong regional and sectoral interest groups and their constant struggles 
made the launch and especially the completion of thorough reforms virtually 
impossible. The rent- seeking strategies of the elites poisoned and perverted 
Ukraine’s political system and political institutions (Torbakov, 2001, p.468). 
Corruption levels under Yanukovych were extremely high. According to a 
survey conducted by Transparency International in Ukraine, in 2010 about 
34 percent of respondents admitted they had had to engage in bribery at least 
once in the previous 12 months. In 2011, Ukraine had the same corruption 
score as Tajikistan and its results were worse than those of Uganda, Togo and 
Nigeria (Glukhov, 2011). In 2012, the country was 144th in the worldwide 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2012). According 
to Ukraine’s union of employers, the main spheres where corruption schemes 
flourished were state procurement, fiscal service, customs, grain sales, lease 
of land and licenses for the development of natural resources. Ukraine’s offi-
cial statistics service published data according to which all state procurements 
during Victor Yanukovych’s reign were accompanied by bribes at a scale rang-
ing from 15 percent to 50 percent of the purchase’s total sum (Censor.net.ua, 
2014). In his article, Torbakov quotes Alexander Motyl, who describes the 
worst- case scenario for Ukraine as the country’s transformation into a cor-
rupt and impoverished state, or in Motyl’s words, “Zaireization”— Ukraine’s 
transformation into an Eastern European version of the former Zaire (now 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The essence of such a development is 
that “corrupt elites feed off  their state, their society, and their economy, ultim-
ately driving them all to possible perdition” (Motyl, 1998, cited in Torbakov, 
2001, p.471). This picture could be of Yanukovych’s Ukraine.
In the western parts of the country Yanukovych was hated as Russia’s 
protégé. However, curiously, in Eastern Ukraine people despised him for 
turning into a politician who was, as Kuzio (2015, p.456) remarks, “neither 
pro- Russian, nor pro- European, but pro- Yanukovych.” During his official 
time in power, negative attitudes towards him were very cautiously articu-
lated. Six days after Yanukovych’s escape from Ukraine, he participated in 
a press conference in the Russian city of Rostov- on- Don, where he claimed 
to be the only legitimate president of Ukraine and voiced an appeal for a 
coup d’état that would enable him to resume his presidential term. Ukraine’s 
new power holders, representing the interests of the inhabitants of Central 
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and Western Ukraine, used this occasion to open a legal investigation against 
him. Among the population of these regions, Yanukovych was openly treated 
as the political figure responsible for the Maidan shootings and a cowardly 
(“ostrich- like”) president who used his office to enrich himself  and his clos-
est circle, “the family” (Taylor, 2014). Soon after his exile, Ukraine’s General 
Prosecutor’s Office accused Yanukovych of unconstitutional power seizure in 
2010, as after his coming to presidential office, he altered the constitution by 
introducing amendments that significantly widened the head of state’s compe-
tences. What Yanukovych could not suppress during his reign was a civil soci-
ety that proved surprisingly resilient (Wilson, 2013, p.5). He was also unable 
to make the people forget the rise and euphoria of the Orange Revolution, 
even if  this collective action proved unsuccessful.
In the late fall of 2013, large- scale protests that soon came to be referred 
to as “Euromaidan” began in the national capital in response to the regime’s 
decision to renege on a promise to pursue closer relations with the European 
Union through the Association Agreement. The outrage of Ukraine’s citi-
zens was caused not only by the fact of the refusal to sign the document with 
the EU, but also by the manner in which it was made: very suddenly, with-
out any public discussion, on the eve of the Eastern Partnership summit in 
Vilnius. Protests intensified, and the government was powerless to tame them. 
It should be noted that the issue of the Agreement was only a trigger for the 
outbreak of large- scale protests. Among their deeper reasons were inability to 
tolerate an extremely corrupt political leader and absolute unwillingness to 
come under Russia’s authority (see Kurkov, 2014; Peisakhin, 2015; USAID, 
2015; Walker, 2016). Yanukovych fled the country in February, seeking pro-
tection (and money) in Russia. His ousting prompted the interim government 
to call an early presidential election. In February 2014, the parliament voted 
to return the balance of institutional power to the parliament and away from 
the presidency, a consistent with earlier constitutional revisions (Herron and 
Boyko, 2015, p.5).
Petro Poroshenko came to power on May 25, 2014, in the first round 
of  elections with a result of  54.7 percent of  votes. It may be noteworthy 
that prior to his political engagement, Poroshenko used to be a confection-
ary businessman (the owner of  the Roshen chocolate factory, rated 18th in 
the Candy Industry Top 100 in 2012). His political activity was launched 
when he invested in the creation of  the Party of  the Regions and then pro-
vided financial support for Yushchenko’s campaign. Before the Maidan 
started, Poroshenko was not a popular figure with Ukraine’s population 
and mostly remained in the shadows. But the then political frontrunners 
such as Arseniy Yatsenyuk (former leader of  the All- Ukrainian Union 
“Fatherland”) and Oleh Tyahnybok (leader of  the far- right Svoboda party) 
showed themselves to be incapable of  providing viable solutions in a crisis. 
Consequently, their popularity rapidly evaporated. Poroshenko was able 
to select the right niche for himself  by calling for a peaceful crisis reso-
lution, and successfully took the presidential office by riding the resulting 
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wave of  popularity (Palinchak, 2016). Soon after his election, Poroshenko 
announced the dissolution of  parliament in August, with early elections to 
be conducted in late October (Herron and Boyko, 2015, p.6). Herron and 
Boyko (2015, p.1) found the Ukrainian parliamentary elections of  2014 
to be an opportunity to investigate how state capacity is maintained in an 
environment where sovereignty is threatened. They came to the conclusion 
that these elections can generally be considered a success.
Of 29 parties registered for Ukraine’s parliamentary elections of 2014, 
6 reached a result over the 5 percent barrier and got through to the parlia-
ment. Voter turnout in Ukraine’s regions fluctuated around 52 percent, with 
the exception of Lviv Oblast, where it reached 70 percent, and the Luhansk 
Oblast, where it was only 32 percent (Ukraine Elections, 2014). Yatsenyuk’s 
National Front party came first (21.61  percent of votes), closely followed 
by Poroshenko’s Bloc (21.45 percent of votes). A total of 423 deputies were 
elected instead of the legally prescribed 450. Crimea and Sebastopol were at 
that point parts of Russia, with 12 majoritarian constituencies; Kiev’s Central 
Electoral Commission also banned the vote in 15 of 32 constituencies in the 
Donbass Region (Ria Novosti, 2014).
The resulting trilateral institutional arrangement between the parliament, 
the government and the president was fragile. A new round of Ukraine’s pol-
itical crisis, this time under Poroshenko, began when Minister of Economy 
Abromavičius declared his intention to resign. This event triggered a series of 
verbal firefights and a blame game within political institutions for the failure 
of the fight against corruption. In mid- February 2015, the parliament called 
the government’s functioning inefficient and opened a vote of nonconfidence 
against Prime Minister Yatsenyuk. As this attempt to remove him from office 
did not succeed, the Self- help and Fatherland parliamentary factions came to 
view his remaining as a deal between the oligarchs and government officials 
and left the parliamentary coalition as an expression of protest. However, 
after their exit, the coalition remained de jure because the Radical Party was 
still present (Khomenko, 2016).
Eventually, Yatsenyuk still had to resign, which was regarded by many as a 
result of shadow political bargaining among Ukraine’s “grey cardinals.” The 
reconfiguration of the parliament brought about the establishment of the new 
government under Volodymyr Groysman, the president’s protégé (Tischenko, 
2016). The reconfiguration allowed Poroshenko to proceed with the reforms 
of the Ukraine2020 program, for which the country was offered financial 
assistance by the IMF and the US. Experts argued that the balance of power 
had shifted significantly towards strengthening the president. Many feared it 
was a sign of Poroshenko entering a Yanukovych- like vicious cycle.
The new Ukrainian government included virtually no representative fig-
ures with whom the majority of citizens in the Eastern and Southern regions 
could identify. Nominated ministers were presented for “popular approval” to 
the Euromaidan before the vote in parliament, thus sending a strong and clear 
message to the East and South of the country: the interests of those who had 
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failed to accept the Euromaidan movement were not going to be taken into 
consideration (Halling and Stewart, 2014, p.2).
Following the annexation of Crimea, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions 
voiced aspirations that they could repeat this experience and join Russia by 
first gaining independence from Ukraine. On April 7, 2014, the Donetsk sepa-
ratists declared the independence of the Donetsk Republic, occupied local 
key infrastructural facilities and demanded that central authorities in Kiev 
officially bring the Donetsk region out of Kiev’s authority. The referendum 
on Donetsk’s independence took place on May 11 and was recognized neither 
by Kiev nor by external observers such as the EU and the US. On May 16, 
the Constitution of the Donetsk Republic was nevertheless adopted. It pro-
claimed Donetsk a parliamentary republic with two official languages. The 
“Russian spring” in Luhansk was a practically identical scenario. In response, 
Kiev’s General Prosecutor’s Office declared Donetsk and Luhansk terror-
ist organizations (Korrespondent.net, 2015). Ten days later, Kiev began an 
“anti- terrorist operation” against these entities in order to keep them within 
the country by any means necessary (War in Donbass, 2015). A  trilateral 
attempt (by the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine) to stop bloodshed in Eastern 
Ukraine by signing the 1st Minsk Protocol was unsuccessful. The authorities 
in Kiev refused to stop military coercion with regard to Eastern Ukraine, 
or to implement decentralization, improve the humanitarian and economic 
situation in the Donbass region or withdraw the military. Minsk II replaced 
the first arrangement in February 2015 and featured a leading role by the 
Normandy Four (Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia), but did not bring 
groundbreaking success either. Currently, a huge part of the Donetsk repub-
lic’s territory is controlled by Kiev’s authorities, with around one- third of the 
territory ascribed the status of “temporarily occupied land.” The Donetsk 
and Luhansk unrecognized republics have agreed on the creation of a soft 
confederation called Novorossiya.
At the moment, as has been the case throughout Ukraine’s post- Soviet 
history, its main problem is neither an absence of an authentic history of its 
own, nor a failure to formulate a common national idea in the years of inde-
pendence. The main problem is the chronic lack of state capacity. The rise of 
Ukrainian nationalism, which can be predicted and even expected, but mani-
fests at times in ways too wild even for tolerant European observers, comes as 
a result of a combination of three factors— excited masses, a weak and incap-
able state, and the “Russian factor.”
“My brother, my enemy”
Across the whole post- Soviet space there is no other country that is as stra-
tegically important for Russia as Ukraine. On this point, the fair and repeat-
edly quoted words of Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997, p.46) immediately come to 
mind: without Ukraine, he argues, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. 
I have some doubts as to whether Russia could build a Eurasian empire with 
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Ukraine, but without it, this project is unfeasible for certain. Russia used a 
targeted approach towards Ukraine, and it did its best to achieve its goal. 
And all in vain: no other country— both within the post- Soviet space and 
beyond— has brought so many disappointments to the Russian leadership.
Russia’s annexation of Crimean 2014 and its support for the separatists in 
Eastern Ukraine have led some observers to the idea of a “paradigm shift” in 
Russia’s foreign policy: from state- driven foreign policy to one driven by ethno- 
nationalist ideas (Rutland, 2014; Zevelev, 2014). However, even if  this para-
digm shift is really occurring, evidence for it must be sought elsewhere than 
in Russia– Ukraine relations, as nothing principally new is happening between 
the two countries. The entire post- Soviet political history of Russia– Ukraine 
relations is a history of ever- increasing coercion— from punishing Ukraine 
through cancelation of special prices on gas (it is known that if  rewards are 
regularly given, they can be withheld as a punishment, and vice versa) to 
its culmination in the annexation of Crimea and support for insurgents in 
Eastern Ukraine. Even the periods of “normalization” were in fact times of 
camouflaged coercion. Russia persistently continued its attempts to ensnarl 
Ukraine in authority relations and insisted that it should make a final choice 
between Russia and the EU (wherein it was implied that this choice would 
certainly be in favor of Russia). Russia’s insistence that Ukraine should make 
this choice implies that making the choice is an easy task, because Ukraine 
is not fully capable as a sovereign state and requires externally administered 
frameworks. As Kazharski (2017) argues, these were “de- sovereignizing” dis-
courses that legitimized Russia’s intervention in Ukraine’s domestic affairs in 
the eyes of Russia’s authorities.
Meanwhile, Ukraine was almost constantly showing signs of drifting away 
from Russia’s geopolitical space, and Russia activated mechanisms of polit-
ical and economic pressure in response. With regard to Ukraine, the auto-
cratic Russian leadership has used all its capabilities and displayed the art of 
coercive diplomacy by constructing threats that were combinations of deeds 
and words, but still has not reached its political goals.
Indeed, the Russian leadership had serious objective reasons for maintain-
ing hope for Ukraine’s “right” final choice. One reason was the divide between 
Western and Eastern Ukraine, where the latter is very closely linked to Russia 
culturally and economically. The other reason was the traditional depend-
ence of Ukraine on Russian gas (and the rent from gas transit to the EU 
countries), as well as on Russian investments— Russia has traditionally been 
one of the largest foreign investors in the Ukrainian economy. Nalbandov 
quotes the words of Boris Heifetz: “Russian businessmen own four out of six 
oil refineries, almost all nonferrous metallurgy plants; have special interests in 
the energy sector, steel industry and have begun the expansion in engineering, 
chemical industry, and the financial sector of Ukraine” (Heifetz, 2013, cited 
in Nalbandov, 2014, p.75).
Ukraine’s dependence on energy exports from Russia is an issue of critical 
importance, being one of the factors that set the format of Russia– Ukraine 
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relations. Ukraine depends on Russia for 60 percent of its natural gas (Larrabee, 
Wilson and Gordon IV, 2015), and this greatly corrupted Ukraine’s elites 
when, after 1994, Ukraine’s centralized energy system began to decentralize 
into the hands of gas traders. Around 95 percent of Russia’s energy exports 
to the EU pass through the territory of Ukraine, and so the EU member 
states are also dependent on Russia– Ukraine energy relations. Consequently, 
Russia can use its energy exports as political leverage not only for interfering 
with Ukraine’s internal affairs, but also for trying to affect the EU countries.
Russia’s latest transit contract with Ukraine was signed in 2009 and will 
expire in 2019. However, in early 2016, Kiev raised the price for Russia’s 
energy transit through its territory, which led to Moscow making an effort 
to ensure the availability of alternative transit routes. Nord Stream2 (an add-
itional branch of Nord Stream) and South Stream (which soon fell victim to 
the EU’s Third Energy Package) were projects planned for this purpose. The 
already functioning Nord Stream, which connects Russia and Germany via 
the Baltic Sea, is already filled to capacity and cannot fully substitute for the 
Ukrainian route. After the annexation of Crimea, Gazprom became able to 
build a new pipeline through the Black Sea by avoiding Turkey and bringing 
gas to the surface in Bulgaria. In February 2016, Gazprom signed a memo-
randum with the Italian company Edison and the Greek DEPA to organize 
gas supplies to Europe (Expert Online, 2016a). The joint Russian- European 
company New European Pipeline is responsible for the implementation of 
Nord Stream2. Gazprom owns 51 percent of the company’s assets, 9 percent 
are the property of the French Engie, and E.ON, Shell, OMV and BASF own 
10 percent each. Gazprom’s head Alexey Miller stated that gas supplies via 
Ukraine are 20 percent more expensive than those via Nord Stream2, which 
is to be launched in 2019 (Expert online, 2016b). The EU’s weak point with 
regard to the situation is that its energy security as a gas purchaser is con-
stantly endangered by the reliability of Russia as a gas purchaser and Ukraine 
as a transit area. The attempts of the European countries to diversify gas 
imports are perceived by Russia as hostile steps that question Moscow’s reli-
ability as a gas supplier.
After the collapse of  the Soviet Union, Ukraine continued to receive 
cheap energy from Russia, and it was in 1992– 1994 that Ukraine developed 
a massive debt to Russia for its imports (Balmaceda, 1998, p.261). In living 
with this debt for years, Ukraine gave Russia a continuous and trouble- 
free coercive instrument. In the winter of  1999, Russia introduced an oil 
embargo against Ukraine due to “alleged illegal reexport and stealing of 
gas, and foot- dragging on its gas debt to Russia” (Balmaceda, 2008, p.54). 
Until 1998, Russia– Ukraine gas relations were determined by government- 
level arrangements, according to which the country received: 1) discounted 
gas to resell to internal consumers (sales abroad were not allowed); 
2) “free” gas as a reward for facilitating transit through the country’s terri-
tory. Ukraine’s huge debt to Russia for the first type of  gas is explained by 
the fact that the country’s industrial plants wanted to pay by barter deals, 
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which did not suit Russia’s Gazprom gas monopoly. To solve the prob-
lem, the parties decided that Ukraine’s plants could sell their products to 
the CIS area via mediator firms, such as the Russian Itera between 1998 
and 2001, and Eural TransGas (led by the Ukrainian side) between 2001 
and 2004. But starting in the 2000s, Kiev began violating these arrange-
ments by selling gas instead of  secondary products to the mediator firm. 
A Ukraine- led broker company started reselling this gas abroad and get-
ting revenues due to the discounted rates at which Gazprom was exporting 
gas to Ukraine (Bershidsky, 2016). This situation triggered a series of  gas 
wars between Moscow and Kiev.
In June 2014, Russia cut off  gas supplies to Ukraine due to Kiev’s failure 
to pay back the energy debt (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon IV, 2015, p.13). 
A new gas agreement between Russia and Ukraine was signed at the end of 
October 2014 with the help of EU mediation. Ukraine partly paid its debt to 
Russia using money borrowed from IMF Western credits (Larrabee, Wilson 
and Gordon IV, 2015, p.13). It is clear that this was a measure that postponed 
the problem, rather than a productive solution. It can be argued that gas 
wars between Russia and Ukraine are likely to continue, at least until the two 
countries reach an agreement on the question of Eastern Ukraine (Larrabee, 
Wilson and Gordon IV, 2015, p.13). This endlessly repeated situation, where 
Russia holds all the cards, should push Ukraine’s leadership towards a health-
ier energy policy. So far, Ukraine has been one of the most energy- inefficient 
countries in the world (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon IV, 2015, p.13), much 
too lavish for a country with such a debt.
The recent conflict in energy relations between Russia and Ukraine con-
cerns Kiev’s unsanctioned extraction of gas during its transportation to 
Europe through Ukraine’s territory. After Ukraine tried to find a legal 
solution to Gazprom’s increased gas prices by appealing to the Stockholm 
Arbitrage Court (in 2014), Kiev also introduced a so- called virtual reverse gas 
scheme. Kiev made a deal with European ultimate gas consumers according 
to this model, such that the transit gas extracted by Kiev from Gazprom’s 
pipeline in Ukraine’s territory should be categorized as “reversed” (trans-
ported back from the ultimate consumer and sold to Ukraine). This “virtual 
reverse” scheme was defined by Gazprom as illegal for two reasons. First, 
the ultimate consumers do not own the gas until it has been physically deliv-
ered to their territory. Only afterwards does it become possible for them to 
manage this gas as their property and to resell it. Second, if  the gas has not 
been transported from the ultimate consumer via the pipeline to Ukraine, no 
gas supply has taken place in legal terms (Nikolaev, 2016). During the acute 
phase of the military confrontation in Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine’s Naftogas 
stopped gas delivery to Donetsk and Luhansk. In response, Gazprom started 
direct gas supplies to these entities and claimed Naftogas to be responsible for 
payment (Tretyakov, 2015). However, in July 2016, Naftogas declared Russia’s 
gas supplies to the “occupied territories” illegal and refused to pay out the 
$718.5 million debt for them (Mirnews.su, 2016).
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For Russia, the best proof of Ukraine’s final choice (and the signal of 
the country’s readiness to develop authority relations with Russia on the lat-
ter’s terms) would be its joining Russia- centered integration projects in the 
post- Soviet space. However, Kievhas showed a very cautious and selective 
approach with regard to this issue. Ukraine became a founding member of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at the end of 1991, but has 
firmly resisted any attempt to turn this project into a supranational organ-
ization. Ukraine has also held observer status within the Eurasian Economic 
Community since 2002, and it helped to establish the Single Economic Space 
in 2003, although it has remained outside the Collective Security Organization 
established in 2002 on the basis of a treaty that had originally been concluded 
ten years earlier (White, McAllister and Feklyunina, 2010, p.349).
A real blow to Russia came with Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2003. 
Russia’s President Putin had openly backed Prime Minister Yanukovych, and 
massive donations were invested into his campaign. But this strategy failed, 
and it was after the revolution that Russia commenced the first serious cam-
paign in mass media to discredit the revolution itself  and the government in 
Kiev, portraying the revolution as a phenomenon completely orchestrated by 
Western powers and a product of Western conspiracy, and the Yushchenko 
government as a Western puppet. Today we are already used to seeing terms 
like “fascists” and “neo- Nazis” describing the Ukrainian government in the 
Russian media, but in the early 2000s such a campaign represented some-
thing entirely new. As Freedman argues, Putin was deeply troubled by the 
possibility of color revolutions being initiated in Russia (Freedman, 2014, 
p.16), although there were absolutely no preconditions for it. In the eyes of 
the Russian leadership, Ukraine’s power holders engaged in a double betrayal 
of sorts: not only did they behave independently and establish a pro- Western 
government, but they also taught other countries in Russia’s neighborhood a 
very dangerous lesson. For example, Yushchenko made attempts to establish 
a strategic partnership with Georgia. During President Saakashvili’s visit to 
Kiev in March 2005, the two presidents signed a joint declaration on mutual 
support of aspirations to join the EU and NATO. They even launched a 
joint initiative that called for the creation of a Community of Democratic 
Choice (CDC) with the purpose of building a common front of democratic 
states in the region. In addition, Yushchenko attempted to revitalize GUAM, 
a regional group composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, 
transforming it into a formal regional organization. These initiatives have 
increased Moscow’s concern with regard to Ukraine’s external policy choices 
(Larrabee, 2007).
However, Russia’s fears never came true, as, to Russia’s delight, the Orange 
Revolution project failed. However, the Kremlin’s bet on Yanukovych as a 
president with a unique pro- Russian orientation has overall failed as well. It 
is true that, compared to Yuschchenko, Yanukovych placed less emphasis on 
western alliances and more on the improvement of relations with Ukraine’s 
Slavic neighbors, including granting the Russian language the status of an 
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official language equal to Ukrainian (White, McAllister and Feklyunina, 
2010, p.350). Even so, his thinking in general fluctuated between Russia and 
the EU— and with no apparent benefits for his country. Russia continued to 
exert pressure on Ukraine, which in August 2013 culminated in a temporary 
halt to all Ukrainian imports.
In November 2014, Yanukovych turned away from the EU and towards 
Russia, tempted by a $15 billion loan and cheap energy supplies (Freedman, 
2014, p.8). This was the last straw for the Ukrainian people, the “point of no 
return” and the final end to Russia’s hopes to establish authority relations 
with Ukraine. With the Euromaidan in late fall 2014, Yanukovych was gone, 
and after some time the new government in Kiev was established. Russia did 
not recognize the legitimacy of the new government, and defined the situation 
as “an unconstitutional coup and armed seizure of power” (Kremlin.ru, 2014, 
cited in Valdai Discussion Club, 2014, p.38). Initially Moscow stressed that 
Yanukovych would remain the legal president until the election scheduled for 
May 25. However, after Yanukovych fled to Russia, Moscow discounted his 
chances to retain leadership of the country (Valdai Discussion Club, 2014, 
p.35). Russian experts close to the Kremlin explained the Ukrainian events 
as “a materialized and politicized desire of one group of economic elite to 
‘hide in Europe’ from another group, [which] eventually became a fight of all 
against all” (Valdai Discussion Club, 2014, p.11) They also stressed— and in 
this I can agree with them— that the two most popular statements in Ukraine, 
“Ukraine is not Russia” and “Ukraine is Europe,” said nothing about Ukraine 
itself. Interestingly enough, some Western scholars, echoing their Russian col-
leagues, put the blame for the conflict in Ukraine at least implicitly on the 
West for its “lack of recognition for Russia’s values and interests in Eurasia, 
on the one hand, and the critically important role that Ukraine played in the 
Kremlin’s foreign policy calculations, on the other” (Tsygankov, 2015, p.280).
With Kiev in chaos, Russia turned to open coercion against Ukraine. 
Freedman (2014, p.9) describes Russia’s coercive actions in the following way:
On 27 February, Russian special forces combined with local activists to 
take over government institutions in Crimea, as well as Sevastopol, the 
home of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. On 18 March, they were annexed by 
Russia. That was not, however, the end of the crisis, as there were then 
a number of deliberate measures by Russia, again with local support, to 
destabilize Ukraine, largely by taking over government buildings in the 
main cities of eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, a substantial military cap-
ability was maintained on the other side of the border, ready to invade. 
In addition, efforts were made to further destabilize an already unstable 
economy through export embargoes and threats to gas supplies.
From start to finish, the annexation of the peninsula took less than two 
weeks. In the case of Crimea, Russia constructed a demand for authority rela-
tions with Russia by the local population exceptionally quickly and without 
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much care for its plausibility, and then satisfied this demand with equal speed. 
As Lanoszka explains,
Russia did not launch a traditional invasion to wrest Crimea away from 
Kiev’s control; instead, it fomented local pro- Russian demonstrations, 
inserted unmarked militia groups (“little green men”) to occupy official 
government buildings, and oversaw a local referendum to lend an air of 
legitimacy to the annexation effort.
 (Lanoszka, 2016, p.175)
In Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s position was not as strong as in Crimea. 
A  separatist scenario was implemented there when the Donetsk and 
Luhansk People’s Republics were proclaimed on April 7 and May 12, 2014 
respectively. However, while the population there definitely wanted more 
autonomy from Kiev (being convinced that its interests would be ignored 
by the new regime), it did not articulate an interest in joining Russia 
(Freedman, 2014, p.22). For Moscow, the difficulties of  occupying and 
governing a territory of  contested boundaries, and with a less coopera-
tive population, would be tremendous. Furthermore, at this time Moscow 
was already facing numerous practical problems in Crimea, such as issuing 
passports, introducing the Russian currency, changing legal frameworks, 
keeping shops supplied, making local services work, renaming the streets, 
etc. (Freedman, 2014, pp.22– 23).
Moscow fiercely denied that it was directly involved in armed hostilities 
between Kiev and the rebel groups of self- proclaimed republics. Nevertheless, 
it established authority relations with their leaders by providing separatists 
with diplomatic cover, heavy munitions and logistical support.
As the situation around Ukraine was highly incomprehensible, every-
body began trying to guess Putin’s intentions, and this guesswork and general 
confusion were converted into important elements of his coercive strategy. 
President Poroshenko was in principle ready to grant these two regions of 
Eastern Ukraine a significant degree of decentralization and autonomy, while 
the national government in Kiev would be responsible for issues of national 
policy. However, Putin’s plans were very different. At first, he wanted a radical 
change in Ukrainian territorial relations, turning the country into a decentral-
ized federation where territorial entities could veto foreign policy decisions, 
similar to membership in NATO and institutional rapprochement with the 
EU (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon IV, 2015, p.10). This plan, however, did 
not work out. The second best option for the Russian authorities was to keep 
two long- term “frozen conflicts” in the Eastern Ukraine. This, as we know 
from the Georgian experience, makes the state constantly vulnerable to coer-
cion, especially when the “freeze” can be lifted at any moment.
What are the costs of Russia’s political and military coercion with regard 
to Ukraine? According to Freedman,
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The main costs to be faced by Russia lay not in countervailing military 
pressure by NATO but in the loss of any prospect of Ukraine joining a 
Eurasian Union, along with its potential economic revival in association 
with the EU, and, more immediately, a sharp deterioration in Russia’s 
own economic position.
(Freedman, 2014, p.10)
In addition, developing Crimea’s structurally weak economy is an unprece-
dentedly costly project, as the peninsula threatens to become a major drain 
on the overall Russian economy (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon IV, 2015, 
p.7). Having annexed Crimea, Russia acquired five naval ports, a 645 km rail-
way and 6,255 highways (Sergeeva, 2016). However, the political strain has 
resulted in the cessation of railway traffic between Crimea and Ukraine. The 
Crimean recreational facilities that came to be Russia’s property leave much 
to be desired in terms of quality of services. The Federal Target Program 
presupposes an investment of 70 billion rubles (€978.5 million) by 2020 to 
develop the region. Russian authorities have also commenced a major infra-
structural project— building a bridge over the Kerch Strait— at a total cost of 
227.9 billion rubles (€3.2 billion) (Ria Novosti, 2016b).
In March 2016, the BBC conducted a survey of the inhabitants of Crimea, 
asking how their lives had changed following the annexation. Some said that 
consumer goods which used to be brought to the peninsula from Ukraine 
were being gradually replaced by Russian ones. Kiev’s attempt to engage coer-
cion against Crimea through a product blockade has largely failed. Kiev’s 
other coercive move— blackouts— was more painful for the citizens but was 
nevertheless perceived as a symbolic aggressive act towards Russia, and did 
not appear successful either. Because of logistics, prices for food in Crimea 
are drawing closer to those in Moscow, as average salaries are much lower. 
The citizens, however, hope that the bridge over the Kerch Strait will be a 
solution to their survival challenges (Nehezin, 2016).
As Paul argues, “Crimea has quickly become a millstone around Russia’s 
neck and this financial burden is likely to get heavier rather than lighter as 
time goes by and the realities of international isolation begin to hit home on 
the Peninsula” (Paul, 2015, p.4). And this is not just a matter of the finan-
cial burden on Russia’s shoulders, but also of the new and difficult problems 
that the act of annexation has created. One of them is the property losses 
that Ukrainian citizens are suffering in Crimea. Russia promised to protect 
private assets in Crimea, but this has not happened. Now many Ukrainian 
citizens are going to the European Court of Human Rights asking for “arbi-
tration to determine compensation for expropriation, damages or loss of 
value” (Ostryzniuk, 2014, p.8). In addition, Ukrainian companies, including 
Ukrnafta and Stabil among others, have submitted claims to The Hague con-
cerning protection of their property in the Crimea. Russia has declared that it 
does not recognize the jurisdiction of The Hague’s arbitration in these matters 
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(Ria Novosti, 2016a). But the Ukrainians do not intend to give up. This is 
going to be a long story…
Another problem arises with regard to the territorial waters surrounding 
Crimea. The Russian side believes that the inclusion of Crimea in Russia’s 
territory automatically means that the Crimean waters now belong to Russia. 
However, in this case “automatically” does not work: Kiev intends to apply to 
the Court of Arbitration. Ukraine is accusing Russia of violating the provi-
sions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Ukrainian Foreign 
Ministry’s statement says this is a matter relating to the waters of the Black 
and Azov seas and the Kerch Strait, including rights to the natural resources 
of the continental shelf  (Politforums.net, 2016).
Meanwhile, Russia also has to invest much to maintain the independent 
existence of the two unrecognized states in the Eastern Ukraine, after Kiev 
refused to provide public services to the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk. 
In Donetsk, approximately half  of the population are elderly people. The per-
centage of vulnerable social strata is also very high. Russia pays most of the 
expenses, although authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk prefer to say that they 
raise revenues from taxes (which is doubtful, as after the establishment of the 
economic blockade, many enterprises re- registered in the territory controlled 
by Ukraine’s central authorities, and began paying taxes to Kiev). It was offi-
cially recognized that there was not enough cash circulating in hryvnas, which 
is why Donetsk and Luhansk established a multi- currency zone allowing pay-
ments in Russian rubles as well as in dollars and euros. Russia’s humanitar-
ian aid to Donetsk was primarily in the form of medicine, building materials 
and food (Golunov and Artemev, 2015). Russia has sent around 580 thousand 
tons of humanitarian assistance to Luhansk since 2014 (Information Agency 
Regnum, 2016).
The informational space of the independent republics is completely out-
side the influence of Kiev’s authorities. After the establishment of governing 
institutions in Donetsk, the oldest traditional newspapers, Vecherniy Donetsk 
and Donbass, stopped being published. Instead, Donetsk began to issue a new 
newspaper, Novorossiya, and to run its first radio station, DNR. Internet pro-
viders were ordered to block access to over 40 Ukrainian websites (Censor.net.
ua, 2015). This, nevertheless, does not imply asymmetric rise of Russia’s influ-
ence over the informational space in the two unrecognized countries. Real- life 
conditions matter more than lofty ideals, and the Crimea- like euphoria period 
for the local population has already come to an inevitable end.
EU: the Ukrainian dilemma
Interestingly enough, Ukraine’s constant fluctuations between the choice in 
favor of Russia and that in favor of Europe were almost as unpleasant for the 
EU as they were for Russia. Indeed, it is difficult to maintain and to perpetu-
ally revive an interest in developing authority relations with a country whose 
strategic intentions are not entirely clear, and where power holders replace 
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necessary and already agreed- upon reforms with declarations of intent. Thus, 
up to the beginning of 2014, the EU did not consider Ukraine a prize worth 
extraordinary effort (Freedman, 2014, p.23). After the political crisis, the situ-
ation became very different, but no easier for the EU. The EU was caught 
by surprise by the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, and when it came to 
crisis management, many observers evaluated the EU’s efforts very poorly 
(Freedman, 2014, p.13). As Ukraine made its strategic choice in favor of 
Europe, the EU stopped wondering whether the country could be thought of 
as its geopolitical “prize” and became preoccupied with more practical issues 
such as what should be done after the “hot” stage of the crisis was over and 
the new government was in office. The Union almost immediately faced chal-
lenges related not only to the effects of the “Russian factor,” but to internal 
developments in Ukraine: the rise of militant nationalism, the split within the 
elites and the extremely low level of state capacity. All these processes and fac-
tors are poor preconditions for developing authority relations.
Ukraine had had a mixed record in its relations with the EU since the 
’90s. After gaining independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Ukraine received signals from the European Union that it would gain palp-
able advantages were it to behave like a democracy (Nalbandov, 2014, p.114). 
Under President Kuchma, the country failed to show reliable signs of trans-
forming itself  “into a fully European country, measured by stability and 
prosperity, rather than just a country which is located in Europe” (Tedstrom, 
2001, p.33). The EU was in doubt not only about the adherence of Ukraine’s 
 political class to European values— democracy, the rule of law, respect for 
human rights— but also about Kiev’s commitment to the establishment of a 
functioning market economy (Wolczuk, 2003, p.2).
Kiev’s relations with Brussels are based on a Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA), signed in 1994. Ukraine was the first CIS country to sign 
the PCA. The EU has offered the same type of agreement to the entire post- 
Soviet space (except the Baltic states). The main EU assistance program, 
TACIS, was also tailored for the entire post- Soviet space (and Mongolia). The 
contractual framework that established initial authority relations between the 
EU and the post- Soviet states offered little differentiation between the coun-
tries based on their geopolitical and economic importance. However, some 
differentiation was nevertheless present: both Ukraine and Russia were placed 
in the same category and offered more economic and institutional possibili-
ties by the EU than other countries. Thus, in their PCA, Russia and Ukraine 
(as well as Moldova) were offered the possibility of a free trade area with the 
EU, whereas other post- Soviet states were not. Russia and Ukraine acquired 
a more extensive institutional setup for contact with the Union. In order to 
enhance cooperation, the EU Common Strategies were adopted in 1999, also 
only for Russia and Ukraine (Wolczuk, 2003, p.16).
The PCA for Ukraine and Russia resembled the association agreements 
signed between Central and Eastern European states and the EU as a prelude 
to full membership. However, in contrast to such agreements, the PCA did not 
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envisage full access to EU institutions (Wolczuk, 2003, p.17). With regard to 
the PCA, the position of the pro- European Ukrainian elite was ambivalent: 
they considered this framework to be insufficient for Ukraine, which declared 
joining the EU to be its strategic aim. At the same time, the elites lamented 
that the PCA put unrealistic demands on Ukraine, the implementation of 
which could harm the country’s economy, which was only partially reformed 
and hence fragile (Wolczuk, 2003, p.18).
The evidence showed conspicuous breaches of the PCA from the Ukrainian 
side in the late ’90s. This was a result of a fundamental underestimation of the 
implications of the PCA’s demands, as well as of the ramifications of violating 
the laws and agreements to which Kiev had committed itself  (Pavliuk, 1999, 
p.12). As Sherr observes, “Ukraine’s political leaders have sometimes acted 
as if  they could achieve integration by declaration, or simply by joining and 
participating in international organizational and political clubs rather than by 
undertaking concrete structural changes” (Sherr, 1998, p.12). Wolzcuk (2003, 
p.2) stresses that the Ukrainian elites were either incapable or unwilling to 
bring about reforms in order to confirm their “European choice.”
Another cause for the EU’s concern with regard to Ukraine (and at the 
same time a possible explanation for the lack of incentives for Ukrainian 
elites to conduct reforms) is related to the country’s institutional design. It 
was the Ukrainian president who declared a “European choice” on behalf  
of his nation. The key documents outlining the goals and strategy approved 
in 1998 and 2000, namely the “Strategy of Ukraine’s Integration with the 
European Union” and the “Program of Ukraine’s Integration with the EU,” 
were adopted by presidential decree. This means that Ukraine’s European 
project is supported (at least declaratively) only by the president and his 
followers, and the “presidential” elite segment neither sought nor obtained 
endorsement from other institutions such as the parliament or society at large 
(Wolczuk, 2003, p.14). However, the pro- European commitments even of this 
segment alone were not fully credible. Some in the presidential administra-
tion continued to openly favor a “multivector” foreign policy, meaning simul-
taneous orientation both towards the EU and towards Russia. Equally, very 
few reformist policies were launched by the executive authority. As Wolczuk 
(2003, p.14) concludes, “Paradoxically, although it is the source of European 
aspirations in Ukraine, the presidency simultaneously appears to be the great-
est obstacle to realizing these aspirations.”
On its end, the EU has not always behaved in full accordance with its dec-
larations, and its official representatives have allowed themselves to say harsh 
words towards Ukraine. In September 2002, at the European World Economic 
Forum in Salzburg, Austria, when Ukraine’s President Kuchma was arguing 
that Ukraine should be incorporated in the EU as “a big Christian nation 
belonging to a united Europe,” Guenter Verheugen, a top EU official in charge 
of enlargement, retorted that Kiev had little chance of getting so much as a 
time schedule for accession (KyivPost, 2002). In Ukraine, this was perceived 
as a humiliating rebuff (Ioffe, 2004, p.113).
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In 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, the EU Common Strategy for 
Ukraine was adopted. The document added a degree of differentiation to the 
EU’s approach to the former Soviet countries. However, the implementation 
of the Strategy was given a poor evaluation by observers, as it reflected the 
general weakness of the CFSP (Wolczuk, 2003, p.20). In 2000– 2001, Ukraine 
unilaterally came forward with a number of initiatives to enhance cooper-
ation with the EU in justice and home affairs, security and energy transporta-
tion. Most of these initiatives were not accepted. The leading member states 
of the Union did not see Ukraine becoming a full member of the EU in the 
foreseeable future. In general, the EU’s policy towards Ukraine lacked clear 
vision, being poorly targeted and sometimes improperly managed (Wolczuk, 
2003, p.2). By the beginning of the 2000s, the mismatch in the EU’s and 
Ukraine’s agendas, as well as the gap between declarations and real inclina-
tions and capabilities that existed on both the Ukrainian and the European 
sides, became obvious.
What the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko’s victory promised were 
changes. After the Revolution, the EU “rediscovered” Ukraine, so to speak, 
and experts appealed for increased economic and political assistance for the 
country, expecting that this rediscovery would ultimately reshape Europe’s 
political map (meaning Ukraine’s membership in the Union) if  the state’s 
transformation under the new Yushchenko government were successful. 
These expectations were based on the assumption that Yushchenko was ser-
ious about domestic reforms, and therefore his push toward EU membership 
would become credible (Sushko, 2004). None of these aspirations were ful-
filled; the expectations were too high and too premature.
While Yushchenko made it clear that he believed Ukraine’s place in the 
EU was secured a priori— through being a European country and possess-
ing European values1— within the Union, the issue of Ukraine’s membership 
became a topic of heated debates. Poland was the most ardent supporter 
of Ukraine’s integration both into the EU and into NATO. A new strategic 
alliance was beginning to emerge between the two countries. Former Polish 
President Kwasniewski contributed greatly to mediating the roundtable that 
de- escalated the crisis in Ukraine in November– December 2004, ultimately 
leading to Yushchenko’s election as president. Moreover, on Kwasniewski’s 
personal initiative, Javier Solana, the High Representative for the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, became directly involved in the nego-
tiations, giving them a broader European character (Larrabee, 2007, p.35). 
Besides Poland, three Baltic States, the Central European countries (the 
Visegrad Four), as well as Slovenia, Austria, Finland and Sweden, were ready 
to launch a more ambitious strategy towards Ukraine than the PCA could 
offer. However, some of the older and stronger EU member states, namely 
Germany, France and the UK, showed much more caution, preferring to 
postpone the issue. Thus, the EU was split, whereas membership issues neces-
sarily demand a unanimous decision by all members. The positions of the 
EU institutions also differed significantly. While the European Parliament 
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called on EU leaders to provide Ukraine with a “membership perspective,” 
the Commission’s position was that the EU and Ukraine should first show 
substantial progress within the framework of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) (Wolczuk, 2005, p.1). This split has revealed that the EU cannot 
offer such an important authority instrument as the possibility of member-
ship merely to encourage a country’s democratic development. This instru-
ment is too valuable and should in no case be devalued.
Ukraine became a priority partner within the ENP, in connection with 
which a joint Action Plan was approved in February 2005 (White, McAllister 
and Feklyunina, 2010, p.350). Assistance to Ukraine was provided under the 
European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). In 2009, the 
EU’s new initiative Eastern Partnership (EaP) was established, and Ukraine, 
together with five post- Soviet states, was named a state of “strategic import-
ance” for the EU. Under the EaP, Ukraine, in particular, acquired new visa 
agreements, which replaced visas (for traveling into EU member states) 
with simplified permits for Ukrainians residing within 30 km of the border. 
Ukraine was central both for the ENP and for the EaP due to its long border 
with the EU and its market potential (Kapanadze, 2014, p.7).
However, the EU’s cautious approach with regard to Ukraine’s member-
ship prospects proved to be prophetic. Two years later, the Orange Coalition 
collapsed due to excessive political ambitions and personal animosities. It 
was replaced by the coalition headed by Prime Minister Yanukovych. To 
stimulate Ukraine to move forward with reforms, the EU opted for a strategy 
of small rewards such as market economy status, relaxation of visa restric-
tions and expanded educational opportunities. In 2010, when Yanukovych 
came to presidential office, Brussels considered it very important that he was 
democratically elected. The EU accelerated negotiations on the Association 
Agreement and visa- free regime with Ukraine, and it was only at the end of 
2010 when the European Parliament expressed its first serious concerns about 
his authoritarian tendencies (Haran and Zolkina, 2014, p.3). With regard to 
the West, Yanukovych’s idea was to “diversify” the country’s approach to the 
EU and to NATO: the law that laid down the foundations of Ukraine’s for-
eign and domestic policy excluded integration with NATO and established 
a policy of “nonalignment,” emphasizing the EU membership as a priority.
Since February 2014 the situation has changed dramatically. While the 
experts saw the Ukrainian elites as key driving forces for the country’s 
Europeanization and subsequent EU membership, the reality proved to be dif-
ferent. As Wolczuk (2005, p.3) argues, “society remains simultaneously divided 
and ambivalent about foreign policy orientation in general and although it 
is supportive of Ukraine’s EU’s membership, the elites do not face societal 
pressure for pursuing this particular foreign policy option.” Even so, the peo-
ple went to the streets of Kiev, insisting on a European choice for Ukraine. 
European governments began to move feverishly, trying, in Freedman’s words, 
“to sound resolute without being reckless.” As he describes the situation,
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High- level conversations continued with calls between national capi-
tals, emergency sessions of  international organizations and face- to- face 
meetings. In effect, Western capitals soon judged that there was little 
to be done in the first instance to reverse the annexation of  Crimea 
and so the focus was on preventing further challenges to Ukraine’s sta-
bility and sovereignty, and to that of  other vulnerable states, notably 
Moldova.
(Freedman, 2014, p.13)
Russian experts declared that with its position with regard to the Ukrainian 
crisis, the EU had in fact betrayed both itself  and Ukraine. A report by the 
Valdai Club stated that
The Ukrainian crisis revealed the complete incompetence and dependency 
of European politics. In fact, Europe effectively provoked the crisis, as it 
compelled Ukraine to sign the Association Agreement with the European 
Union on fairly disadvantageous terms, and ignored Russia’s opinion on 
the potential consequences of this political move. Many European offi-
cials and European Parliament members visited the Maidan at the begin-
ning of the crisis to encourage the protesters and to accuse Russia of 
imperial ambitions.
(Valdai Discussion Club, 2014, p.37)
Such connivance and non- compliance with declared European values, 
and a vision of the world in black and white, with deliberate blindness to 
its actual motley colors, has borne fruit hat the European strategists never 
expected as they shrugged off  Russia’s warnings.
(Valdai Discussion Club, 2014, p.38)
This critique— with regards to its tone and claims— was predictable. The EU, 
however, concentrated its efforts on building an institutional and financial 
basis for its authority relations with Ukraine.
The political chapters of the EU– Ukraine Association Agreement were 
signed at the EU Summit of March 21, 2014, and the remaining sections of 
the Agreement came into force on June 27. The Agreement replaced the EU– 
Ukraine PCA as the legal basis and framework for relations, establishing a 
shared commitment to a close and lasting relationship based on common val-
ues. The Agreement also included provisions for a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (DCFTA) that offered Ukraine a framework for modern-
izing its trade relations and for economic reforms— the opening of markets 
via the progressive removal of customs tariffs and quotas, and an extensive 
harmonization of laws, norms and regulations in various trade- related sec-
tors. All of this was intended to create the conditions for aligning key sectors 
of the Ukrainian economy to EU standards.
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There were also greater EU efforts with regard to more substantial financial 
aid to Ukraine. The Union agreed on a financial- assistance package of at least 
€11 billion in loans and grants from the EU budget and EU- based international 
financial institutions. The IMF funds were also important as without them the 
possibility of Ukraine’s bankruptcy was quite real. As Freedman notes, pay-
ments for Russian gas represented an additional economic burden for Ukraine, 
as their price was raised very steeply and very quickly (Freedman, 2014, p.27).
For the EU, it is clear what it can offer Ukraine, but only in very general 
terms. Halling and Stewart draw attention to the Ukrainian dilemma: on the 
one hand, Ukraine’s economy requires immediate assistance; on the other 
hand, there is a danger that such support would give the elite the impression 
that the West is placing virtually no conditions on the assistance provided, or 
that the danger from Russia is relieving the country of the need to observe 
any conditions (Halling and Stewart, 2014, p.6). The EU’s task is, therefore, 
to support the stabilization of the Ukrainian economy and to increase its state 
capacity and quality of governance, while constantly and strictly monitoring 
to ensure that the processes that develop in the country do not contradict the 
general idea of Europeanization, but contribute to it. That is why following 
the conditionality principle in relations with Ukraine is of vital importance 
for the EU.
Naturally, Yanukovych’s sudden refusal to sign the Association Agree-
ment, and the subsequent outbreak of  a major political crisis in Ukraine 
that followed, gave clear signals that the country’s political system was not 
mature enough to ensure internal continuity, to say nothing of  offering cred-
ible commitments to its external partners. After the acute stage of  the crisis 
was over, the European Commission revised its attitude towards Ukraine. 
The Commission’s President Jean- Claude Juncker declared on March 3, 
2016, during his speech in The Hague, that Ukraine can raise the question 
of  EU membership no earlier than in 20 years’ time. The tone of  the EU’s 
official declarations with regard to Kiev became exceptionally awkward, as 
it was clear that in this case “talk is not cheap” (Driedger, 2016). In another 
round of  negotiations concerning Ukraine’s EU membership, two antagon-
istic groups of  countries formed. The Baltic states, Poland, Great Britain and 
Sweden were in favor of  including the membership issue in Ukraine’s asso-
ciation agreement, whereas Germany, France, the Netherlands and Austria 
were bluntly against it (Pieters, 2016). Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte 
gave an interview a week prior to the referendum where the Netherlands 
voted against Ukraine’s EU membership. He said that Ukraine should never 
become an EU member because its role as a buffer state between Russia and 
the EU is of  strategic importance to Europe (DutchNews.nl, 2016).
Ukraine: a “coherent” foreign policy?
After Russia and Turkey, Ukraine is the most densely populated non- EU 
country on the European continent. It shares a long common border with 
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Russia as well as with the EU (bordering three EU member countries: 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). For Russia, Ukraine has been strategically 
the most important country within the post- Soviet space. It is significant in 
itself, meaning that the foremost priority for Russia is that Ukraine is with 
Russia— ideally through authority mechanisms, but if  they do not function, 
then through coercion. No trust equals no authority, and so there is no possi-
bility for Russia of establishing authority (or in Russia’s case, authority- like) 
relations with Ukraine in the foreseeable future. In this regard, coercion seems 
to be the uncontested option.
For the EU, the political crisis in Ukraine, its scale and speed of escal-
ation came as a shock, awakening the security concerns of days gone by. As 
Freedman (2014, p.9) argues, in the crisis “there were the seeds of something 
much larger, with immediate effects within the area of the former Soviet 
Union but extending much beyond.” All of a sudden, Ukraine became very 
important for the EU, though, unlike Russia, not in itself  but rather as a 
threat to stability in Europe. Stability and its preservation in Ukraine is the 
EU’s highest priority, while Ukrainian membership in the Union is not.
The EU is often criticized for offering Ukraine too little, keeping in mind 
the Union’s reluctance to offer the country potential for membership. This 
significantly weakens its leverage over Ukraine’s development, reduces sup-
port for pro- reform forces in the country, and makes Ukrainians more skep-
tical of the EU (Wolczuk, 2003, pp.4– 5). However, the EU has no problem in 
maintaining enthusiasm in neighboring countries, even in the most important 
ones. Membership in the Union is absolutely not a question of enthusiasm 
and sentiments; it is much more prosaic— a question of the will and capacity 
of the elites to conduct certain (often painful) reforms with the consent of 
larger social groups, and their capacity for making credible commitments. The 
EU’s cautious approach with regard to the membership issue is completely 
justifiable, especially in the case of Ukraine, where once high hopes and lofty 
ideals have been replaced with deep disappointment.
On the other hand, the Ukrainian leadership finds itself  at a stale-
mate. According to Haran and Zolkina (2014, p.1), none of  the various 
Ukrainian presidents have been able to conduct a coherent foreign policy. 
But what is “coherent” in Ukraine’s case? If  “coherent” means unidirec-
tional, i.e., directed exclusively toward the EU, then this is unattainable, 
and the question itself  is wrong. It is clear that no Ukrainian president 
can afford to alienate Ukraine from Russia (Barysch and Grant, 2004). As 
Petro (2016) argues, the main impediment to stability and economic growth 
is the government’s suicidal choice to cut the country off  from its main 
investor, Russia, as there is no alternative to Russian subsidies. He states 
that the West and Russia need to work together to promote Ukraine’s eco-
nomic development. Freedman, however, is of  a very different opinion. He 
believes that Ukraine as a cooperative project between Russia and the EU 
is impossible (Freedman, 2014, p.28). Deep and lasting reforms are needed 
for Ukraine to become closer to the EU, while entering a Russia- centered 
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coalition means, on the contrary, avoiding reforms. These two options are 
definitively not compatible.
Ukraine represents a very difficult case, as its current entirely under-
standable European orientation is coupled with the constant presence of 
the Russian coercive factor. This situation will continue in the future, and 
the only thing that could lighten this burden for citizens and for elites is to 
focus, throwing away temptations and ambitions, on building a capable state. 
As we saw in the Georgian case, the sustainability of EU– Georgia authority 
relations may be in danger due to the possible turning of the country’s lead-
ership towards Russia, which would call the credibility of its commitments 
toward the EU into question. For Ukraine, a turn towards Russia is not on 
the agenda, but its commitments could lose credibility due to the weakness 
of the central state and to the chronic deficit of state capacity. Building a 
capable state is the basic concern of Ukrainian elites and citizens, but the EU 
can significantly assist them in pursuing this course. So with regard to the 
EU, Ukraine’s leadership should by all means show its good faith, confirming 
that the country’s Europeanization is not a declarative resource utilized by 
the elites both for domestic and foreign policies, but their honest and cred-
ible strategy. The interventions of the “Russian factor” in Ukraine’s domestic 
affairs, as well as their effect on EU– Ukraine authority relations, is unavoid-
able, but the more successful Ukraine is in increasing state capacity, the less 
destructive their negative effects will be.
Note
 1 As Yushchenko explained during the Davos World Economic Forum in January 
2005: “I don’t feel comfortable striving to join Europe, I feel like I am a European. 
I  live in a European country and possess European values” (cited in Wolczuk, 
2005, p.1).
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9 Turkey
Not- so- terrible coercion, not- so- needed 
authority
Turkey is the only country among my cases that does not belong to the post- 
Soviet space. Being located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and con-
necting the Black and Mediterranean seas, Turkey occupies a key geostrategic 
position. In recent years, Turkey has attracted an extraordinary amount of 
expert and scholarly attention; it has managed to emerge as a prominent 
regional player with a strong economy, having tripled its GDP from $230 bil-
lion in 2002 to $820 billion in 2013. In 2015, Turkey was the 18th largest 
world economy by GDP according to the World Bank (2016). However, the 
big news from Turkey is not always good. It has also been a source of very sad 
stories— like the failed military coup with about three hundred dead, thou-
sands injured and nearly six thousand arrested. In the West, there were fears 
that the Turkish authorities could exploit the failed coup to crack down on 
political enemies and to reinforce authoritarian rule.
Turkey is often called “the most important political experiment,” which 
is to say the establishment of a country that is Muslim, democratic, secu-
lar, stable, economically strong and aiming to share European values. Turkey 
is debated as a candidate for membership in the group of “rising powers,”1 
and experts say that Turkey is a country with “near- rising” status (Önis and 
Kutlay, 2013). However, in this group Turkey stands alone, as Oguzlu (2013, 
p.774) argues:
[It] has finally reached the league of rising powers … However, Turkey 
cannot be put in the same category with other rising powers, such as the 
BRICS, for the main reason that Turkey has long been a member of the 
Western community and the Westernization/ Europeanization processes 
continue to shape Turkey’s ongoing identity transformation. Unlike other 
rising powers, Turkey’s claim to rising power status cannot be convin-
cingly understood and explained without taking into account Turkey’s 
decades- long interaction with established Western powers within the 
existing international institutions.
However, these truly amazing Turkish successes are only part of the 
story. The country is affected by numerous cleavages; it has yet to make its 
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strategic choice. Experts interpret this choice differently— as a choice between 
Islamism and Kemalist secularism, between conservative Anatolia and the 
modern coasts, between egalitarianism and elitism, or between democratic 
and authoritarian political choices. The supporters of the “Turkish model” 
bravely declare that the strategic choice has been made, but the newest polit-
ical developments make this declaration doubtful. The very recent years have 
been especially difficult: Turkey has increasingly been becoming a country 
under martial law with a dramatic increase in government spending, above all 
on defense. In fact, antiterror operations have become almost the main driver 
for the country’s economic growth. Turkey is now one of the world leaders in 
the quantity of migrants that come to its territory, while the effectiveness of 
its state institutions is decreasing (Shlykov, 2016b).
The Economist explains the uniqueness of Turkey’s geopolitical location in 
the following way:
Few countries occupy a geopolitical space of such sensitivity as Turkey, 
or have played such a range of critical and overlapping international 
roles. It has been a gateway and a bridge to Europe, most dramatically 
in recent months for hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, as well 
as a conduit for energy supplies. It has been a buffer to revolutionary 
Iran, and a barrier to Russia’s southward ambitions since long before it 
joined NATO in 1952 (and even more so since Vladimir Putin decided to 
leap into Syria’s maelstrom). It has been an anchor to the ever- turbulent 
Middle East, and in some ways also a model to other Muslim countries 
of a relatively tolerant, relatively democratic and economically quite suc-
cessful government.
(Rodenbeck, 2016, p.12)
Turkey borders the European Union, and the Black Sea connects Turkey with 
Russia. Both Russia and the EU are Turkey’s most important economic part-
ners, and its relations with both are strained. Russia cannot exercise power 
over Turkey by playing a dominant role within authority relations. The only 
theoretically possible framework for this would be Russia’s neo- revisionist 
concept of Greater Europe— an alternative vision of European unity based 
less on full- scale institutional integration, and more on a variable geometry of 
engagement whereby both Russia and Turkey could overcome their outsider 
status in Europe (Sakwa, 2010). But the Ukrainian crisis has killed that con-
cept. With regard to Turkey, Russia pursues a policy of “carrot and stick”— 
the situational and selective use of coercion.
Unlike many other EU candidate and neighboring countries (Ukraine 
being an extreme case), Turkey has, at least until very recently, suffered 
much less from a lack of  state capacity. The other features that make it 
principally different from other countries in the EU’s periphery are its ter-
ritorial size, its key geostrategic location and its economic and military 
capabilities. This lack of  a power differential between the EU and Turkey 
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(Müftuler- Bac, 2016) greatly constrains the EU’s ability to make itself  the 
dominant partner in EU– Turkey authority relations. Despite the declared 
goal of  Turkey’s accession to the EU, the EU has reached the limits of  its 
power to extend its rules to Turkey, while a combination of  domestic and 
external factors has made the Turkish leadership abandon the country’s 
steady rapprochement and further full membership in the Union as its sur-
vival strategy.
The Turkish model: Did it ever exist? Does it now?
In this section I study the questions of what the “Turkish model” is and the 
sources of its sustainability. These questions are important as they allow us to 
proceed to others: how resistant is the model to external coercive influences, 
and how capable of establishing and developing authority relations?
As Altunisik shows, the history of the Turkey- as- a- model argument goes 
back as far as the ’50s, when Turkey endeared itself  to modernization theo-
rists. A blow to them came in 1960 when the democratically elected civilian 
government was overthrown by a military coup. Civilians regained power 
a year later, but another coup occurred in 1971, causing unrest and polit-
ical polarization, and then a third came in 1980 (Kubicek, 2013). Since then, 
the “Turkish model” argument has gradually come into use again: President 
Clinton’s Special Assistant Anthony Blinken stated that
Turkey sits at the crossroads— or, if  you prefer, atop the fault lines— of 
the world. Because of its place … its history … its size … and strength, 
and most important, because of what it is— a nation of mainly Islamic 
faith that is secular, democratic, and modernizing— Turkey must be a 
leader and can be a role model for a large swath of the world.
(Blinken, 1999, cited in Altunisik, 2005, p.45)
Then in the mid- ’90s discussion of Turkey as a model faded once again due to 
weak governments, human rights problems and fighting in the southeast with 
Kurdish separatists, combined with the growing strength of Islamist political 
parties. During all these years, the “Turkish model,” when it became a sub-
ject of discussion, was considered to be Kemalism— a statist, authoritarian, 
secular order imposed “from above” with the goals of modernization and 
Westernization (Kubicek, 2013).
A new interpretation of the “Turkish model” arose in the 2000s, and was 
associated primarily with developments under the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) and the astonishing recovery of the Turkish economy. This time 
the model’s concept embraced a more moderate type of political Islam, exem-
plified by the ruling AKP. As Kubicek states, “Turkey demonstrates, at least 
potentially, that you can have it all: economic development, democracy, and 
political Islam, a form, perhaps, of ‘Islamic’ democracy” (Kubicek, 2013, 
p.169). In other words, this model is a combination of things that potentially 
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fit together poorly, but in the Turkish case not only combine consistently, but 
also contribute to boosting and maintaining development.
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the popularity of debates on the “Turkish 
model” has been increasing exponentially, while the tone of debates has 
almost always been very positive. According to Mango (2005, pp.17– 18), 
“the Republic of Turkey is a model of a secular, democratic, Muslim country 
aiming to achieve Western standards in partnership with the West by apply-
ing liberal free market policies.” “The Turkish model remains an example to 
observe, learn from, and emulate,” stresses Ibrahim (2013, p.5). Until very 
recently, assessments of the Turkish experience had traces of pathos: “the 
AKP led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the most charismatic Turkish leader 
since Mustafa Kemal, transformed Turkey into a stable political system and 
a dynamic market which attracted huge international investments as never 
before” (Magri, 2015, p.1, emphasis added). The degree of praise gradually 
increased; it transcended Turkey’s borders, acquiring a macro- regional or 
even global character: commentators— both in the West and in the Arab 
world— called Turkey a “bridge” between the Muslim world and the West or 
a “pivotal state,” and even a valuable “strategic asset” for preventing a clash 
of civilizations (Samaan, 2013, p.63; Sengupta, 2014, p.25).
It is amazing how quickly profound admiration changed to complete dis-
appointment. With regard to the Turkish present and future, the road from 
optimism to pessimism proved to be very short. Now observers claim that the 
country’s “golden years” are over, “the ‘Turkish model’ no longer looks as 
appealing as before” (Talbot, 2014, p.7) and “The successful cycle that wit-
nessed Turkey as an assertive regional player and a model for Arab countries 
in transition has come to an end” (Talbot, 2014, p.8). Experts say that Turkey 
failed (and this is already presented as a fait accompli) to consolidate a demo-
cratic political regime due to structural and deep- running causes: the imprint 
of authoritarian legacies, institutional imbalances privileging the executive 
branch against the legislative and the judicial, the dominance of the AKP that 
distorts political competition, and President Erdoğan’s divisive personality 
and leadership style (Bechev, 2015b).
Such abrupt change inadvertently makes one wonder whether the “Turkish 
model” really existed, or whether it was a case of wishful thinking, where a 
certain and short stage of the country’s development— its “golden years”— 
which was possible due to a unique combination of favorable internal condi-
tions and international environment, and which came to its natural end, was 
taken for a development model.
I do not have an answer to this question in the form of “this model did 
exist” or “it did not,” but I have my doubts that the model is stable and can 
effectively cope with internal and external challenges— which is what we 
expect from it. My doubts are fed by several considerations.
Right now Turkey is experiencing a painful restructuring of its military– 
civil relations; in fact, what is happening in Turkey is the revision of the social 
contract between the army and the state on Erdoğan’s initiative. In Turkey, 
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the military has traditionally played a crucial role in politics, and, as Shlykov 
notes, Turkish society is surprisingly loyal to this powerful social group. This 
is explained by geopolitical factors, as external threats create the need for 
trust in the army, as well as by institutional and historic ones— the army has 
played an important and somewhat constructive role in building the mod-
ern state in Turkey, and its constitutional development. The Turkish army is 
based on age- old tradition and its own value system. In addition, the national 
education system maintains the army’s popularity in the eyes of the younger 
generation (Shlykov, 2016a). However, since the 2000s the Erdoğan govern-
ment has begun to attack the army’s political position, and to try to change 
the balance between the army and civil servants (the state bureaucracy) in 
favor of the latter. The coup of July 2016 was an attempt by the military to 
regain its political positions, but its failure and subsequent repressions do not 
mean that the problem is over, and Erdoğan is trying to achieve a new equi-
librium in military– civil relations. His policy fits well with the AKP’s pattern 
of undermining secularism and promoting Islamization, as the military has 
traditionally been the main source of support for secularism in Turkey. The 
present situation is highly uncertain, and national reconciliation has not been 
reached.
The “Turkish model” necessarily presupposed sustainable economic 
growth, and indeed, Turkey succeeded in ensuring considerable, and more-
over, uninterrupted growth rates. However, experts say that the Turkish econ-
omy has now reached a new threshold, namely the middle- income trap, which 
necessitates new momentum to ensure high and sustainable growth rates. In 
this context one of the most urgent problems is declining economic growth 
in recent years (Kutlay, 2015, p.1). To overcome this challenge, transition to 
high value- added production is the sine qua non (Kutlay, 2015, p.2). However, 
whether Turkey is able to do this, and in what time frame, is not clear.
Another challenge for the national government is the emergence of a 
“fresh” territorial split (against a background of many others) relating to 
the fast rise of the “Anatolian tigers”— the conservative business middle 
class living primarily in Turkey’s southeast, in Anatolia. Anatolia, with its 
rural economy and patriarchal Islamic culture, was always considered as the 
“backyard” of the modern and advanced “other” Turkey. Yet in the last ten 
years, the region has witnessed an economic miracle, a sudden and power-
ful rise of entrepreneurial activity. Socially, however, Anatolia remains a con-
servative and religious society, undergoing what some call a “Silent Islamic 
Reformation” (European Stability Initiative, 2005). Gradually, the Anatolian 
Tigers have reached upper levels in national business associations and have 
even achieved a global reach. This change has not only broken serious taboos 
in the Turkish economy but also realigned Turkish businesses. The Anatolian 
Tigers now make up about 10– 11  percent of annual Turkish exports and 
about 10 percent of the gross domestic product (Tremblay, 2014). The Tigers 
support a shift of Turkish external economic relations toward the Middle 
East and Northern Africa, seeing these markets as the most promising due 
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to geographic proximity, cultural affinity and, most importantly, a relatively 
low level of competition. Indeed, Anatolian business plays the role of pro-
moter for Turkey’s rapprochement with these regions, while the question of 
EU membership is not a priority for them.
There have been deep changes not only in Turkish internal policy, but 
also in the external; the turning point for Turkey’s Middle East policy came 
with the outbreak of the crisis in Syria. Until then, the Turkish approach was 
based on the principle of “zero problems with neighbors,” with the aim of 
creating an area of stability and economic integration in the Middle Eastern 
region. With the crisis, Turkey moved to a policy of independence: its lead-
ership decided not to play a frontline role in the US coalition and not to 
allow the use of its territory and air bases for military operations against the 
Islamic State (IS). The US tried to press Ankara, but the latter’s priorities 
did not converge with those of Washington. The Turkish government’s pri-
ority was not the IS, but removing Bashar al- Assad’s regime and preventing 
the empowerment of Kurds in Syria (Talbot, 2014, p.2). The Turkish govern-
ment lost its “above the fray” position and became involved. Charges followed 
immediately: Turkey was accused of backing jihadist groups (something the 
government has consistently denied), and condoning illegal traffic across 
the country’s southern border and the passage of foreign fighters into Syria 
(Talbot, 2014, p.2). As Talbot (2014, p.5) argues, “Turkey has remained with 
no friends in its neighborhood, with the exception of the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, which surprisingly has become its best 
partner.” From the Turkish side, this warm friendship is based on its hope 
for access to the KRG’s energy resources. This situation of regional isolation 
is very new for the Turkish authorities— their policy of independence has, 
apparently, not been very successful.
Challenges and changes— these are what characterize Turkish develop-
ment for the moment. The challenges are serious and urgent, and the changes 
are not superficial, but structurally deep enough to pose questions about the 
end of the “Turkish model,” because the discussion is about changing its very 
basics.
Russia and Turkey: the “carrot and stick” policy
Russia and Turkey— the centers of once powerful continental empires— 
used to be the worst of enemies. The Russian and Ottoman empires fought 
more than a dozen wars. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and Turkey 
belonged to opposing coalitions. In the post- Cold War period and after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation changed drastically, and bilateral 
economic ties have been booming since the late 1990s, with the first sign being 
the Blue Stream pipeline that connected mainland Russia with Turkey across 
the Black Sea, delivering gas to the Turkish market.
By 2015, Russia was Turkey’s most important energy supplier, responsible 
for 55 percent of the Turkish domestic consumption of natural gas and crude 
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oil at a price of roughly $15 billion. This made Turkey Russia’s second gas 
export market after Germany. Turkish companies also sold up to $6 billion 
worth of food, chemicals, textiles and other goods to Russia (Aydintasbas, 
2016, p.4). Furthermore, Turkish construction firms were among the lead-
ing international contractors in Russia, and millions of Russian tourists vis-
ited Turkey every year, making Russia the number two source of tourism to 
Turkey (after Germany). If  these economic relations were able to develop in 
a vacuum— without interference from geopolitical considerations— then the 
idyll between the two countries would be broken only by bargaining over 
prices. But in reality the situation is not idyllic at all.
Unlike with post- Soviet countries, Russia has no way (even hypothetically) 
to draw Turkey into its orbit and play a dominant role in authority relations 
with it. Russia can only trade and bargain with Turkey, punish Turkey by 
using coercion in the form of economic sanctions and rejection of previously 
agreed projects, and reward it by lifting sanctions and launching new projects 
favorable for Turkey. In this context, the collapse of the “Turkish model” is 
in Russia’s interests for at least two reasons— the collapse means Turkey’s dis-
tancing from the EU as well as from the movement toward liberal democracy. 
The strengthening of authoritarian trends in Turkey places relations between 
Putin and Erdoğan in a format familiar to the former, where he feels confident 
since the relations are “free” from discussions of human rights, the rule of law 
and the like. As Göksel (2014, p.5) argues, “in … Russia, Turkey stands to 
derive benefits from not jumping on the European bandwagon in areas such 
as human rights advocacy and democratic reform.” Moreover, Russia’s anti- 
Western state ideology, with its focus on the Russian Orthodox Church, shows 
a surprising similarity to the Islamic- conservative project of the Turkish AKP 
(Alaranta, 2016, p.7). The leaders’ leadership styles and concerns are also 
similar in both countries, which are led by popular figures increasingly con-
cerned about mass protests challenging their centralized statehood projects.
In 2010, Turkey and Russia agreed to establish the High Level Cooperation 
Council (HLCC), an intergovernmental mechanism designed to monitor 
mutual collaboration and establish a coherent practical framework for its sup-
port and further enhancement. At the first HLCC summit in Ankara numer-
ous cooperation agreements were signed, two of which were highly important: 
Russia and Turkey agreed on the construction of a nuclear power plant in 
Mersin Akkuyu (Turkey) and on visa- free travel (which was implemented in 
less than a year, further increasing the already powerful tourist flows from 
Russia to the Turkish coasts [Gürel and Tzimitras, 2015, p.29]).
Under the conditions of Turkey’s dependence on Russian natural gas for 
more than half  of its consumption, Turkish companies having major con-
struction contracts in Russia, and incomes from agricultural export and huge 
tourist flows, it is hardly surprising that Turkey greatly appreciated develop-
ing economic relations with Russia— to such an extent that it was trying to 
avoid conflict arising from geopolitical reasons. At the same time, however, 
this policy did not prevent it from seeking to influence neighboring countries.
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Competition for such influence was taking place not only between Russia 
and the West, but also between Russia and Turkey. Thus, Georgia played a 
key role for the Turkish strategy in the South Caucasus, as the only country 
that lies between Turkey and Russia. It is the Baku– Tbilisi– Ceyhan pipeline 
that has delivered oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgian territory since 
May 2006. Turkey has also tried to launch another project, the Kars– Tbilisi 
railway intended to connect the railway systems of Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey (Aktürk, 2016, p.2). Georgia’s defeat in the “five- day war” in 2008, 
and the subsequent increase in Russia’s military presence in the region (within 
the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia), was a hard blow for Turkish 
plans for the integration process in the South Caucasus. However, Turkey did 
not support Georgia in this conflict in any way (Aktürk, 2016, p.3).
Ankara has also remained silent from the start of the political crisis in 
Ukraine at the end of November 2013 up to Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
in March 2014. It was the only NATO state that did not join the sanctions 
regime against Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. As Göksel (2014, 
p.2) argues,
when the issue of Crimea’s status came to the fore, Ankara abstained 
from overtly criticizing Russian aggression. Turkish authorities reiterated 
support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and underlined the need for a 
diplomatic solution. They limited their demand to Moscow guaranteeing 
the protection of Tatar rights in annexed Crimea. Turkish government 
ministers deliberately framed the crisis as a standoff between Russia and 
the West, keeping Turkey out of the crossfire.
In other words, the Turkish government consciously distanced itself  from 
Western efforts to “punish” Moscow. Moreover, Turkey benefited econom-
ically from Moscow’s decision to embargo food products from Western 
countries— due to increased exports of agricultural products to Russia— as 
a consequence of which Turkey appears to have effectively enabled Russia’s 
expansionism (Göksel, 2014, p.3). Experts began to speak of the probable 
emergence of a Russian- Turkish strategic alliance (Aktürk, 2016, p.2), exalt-
ing the unique cordiality of their top- level political dialogue, and “the long- 
established bonds of respect and even trust between Erdoğan and Putin” 
(Baev, 2014, p.46). In 2013, at the meeting of the High- Level Russian- Turkish 
Cooperation Council in St. Petersburg, Erdoğan asserted that other countries 
could envy the dynamics of Turkish- Russian relations.
Indeed, Russia royally rewarded Turkey for its loyalty. On December 1, 
2014, at a joint press conference with President Erdoğan in Ankara, President 
Putin made announcements that greatly pleased the Turkish government. 
Putin announced the cancelation of the South Stream gas project, which had 
been envisioned to carry Russian gas to Europe across the Black Sea. The 
explanations he gave were about resistance from the European Union that 
stymied the project and ultimately led him to drop it. South Stream is dead, 
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long live Turkish Stream: the gas intended for South Stream, according to 
Putin, would instead go to Turkey and onward to Southern Europe (this pro-
ject would allow Russia to bypass the territory of Ukraine). Putin said that 
Russia’s state- owned Gazprom and Turkey’s state- owned energy transporta-
tion company BOTAŞ had already signed a memorandum of understanding 
(Makovsky, 2015, p.1). A memorandum is not a binding legal agreement, so 
Russia or Turkey could change their intentions without legal effect or penal-
ties for nonadherence (as indeed happened a little later). Pipeline projects are 
born and die— for instance, in 2013 the Nabucco- West pipeline was canceled 
after more than a decade of planning and discussion at both political and 
commercial levels (Makovsky, 2015, p.3). Still, Russia’s intention to launch 
Turkish Stream perfectly matched Turkey’s ambitions to become an import-
ant energy transit state, or even an energy hub, in order to enhance its global 
strategic importance.
Despite the fact that the project was not formalized at all, Ankara began 
to bargain hard for a price discount on future gas purchases from Russia. 
Makovsky (2015, p.5) tells this story:
Putin pre- emptively announced a 6 percent discount for Turkish Stream 
gas on December 1, 2014, increasing that discount to 10.25 percent in 
February 2015. Turkey has not accepted these offers, and is instead hold-
ing out for an even better deal, reportedly hoping to receive a 15  per-
cent discount on future Russian gas imports… It is unlikely that Turkish 
Stream will move forward before Turkey reaches an acceptable deal on 
gas prices.
However, Russia’s rewards for Turkey were not limited to the Turkish 
Stream; at the same press conference (December 1, 2014) Putin also claimed 
that Turkey and Russia were discussing a “free trade zone agreement” which 
would raise bilateral relations to a completely different level. In saying this, he 
apparently did not care whether it would be feasible: Turkey is a member of 
the EU Customs Union, and can enter into free trade agreements only with 
the approval of the European Union. This announcement was made purely 
for demonstrational effect.
And yet  all Turkish attempts not to spoil relations with Russia were 
in vain when the Russian military came dangerously close to Turkey’s 
core interests along the Syrian- Turkish border. From the very beginning, 
Syria was a thorn in Russian- Turkish relations. Aydintasbas (2016, p.6) 
argues that
Despite being unable to garner US support for toppling the regime of 
Bashar al- Assad, Ankara remained wedded to the idea of regime change 
in Damascus and continued to support Sunni opposition groups on its 
borders. Russia, on the other hand, was determined from the beginning 
not to let Syria become “another Libya,” where multilateral action led 
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to a regime change that was a step into the unknown, and remained 
unwavering in its support for the Assad regime.
Numerous high- level discussions between Turkey and Russia on a mutu-
ally acceptable solution to the war in Syria brought no result. Russia began 
its direct military involvement in Syria in October 2015, and when Turkey 
downed a Russian jet over Syria in November 2015, Russia’s reaction led to 
a sudden rupture in the Russian- Turkish bilateral relationship. Diplomatic 
ties were frozen and economic ties weakened sharply, though asymmetric-
ally. Russia imposed economic sanctions on Turkey, though with several not-
able omissions. Negotiations on the Turkish Stream project were temporarily 
suspended, though Russia did not declare it canceled. Russia still intended 
to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. While Russia enforced a harsh 
embargo on Turkish food exports, the sanctions did not target several prod-
ucts such as lemons or nuts (Newsweek, 2015). Tourism to Turkey was cur-
tailed, and Turkish construction companies blacklisted, though some of them 
continued to function on Russian territory. The most noteworthy is, however, 
that Russia refrained from using its most powerful coercion tool: it did not 
stop delivering gas to Turkey, which remained Russia’s second- largest gas cus-
tomer (Aydintasbas, 2016, p.4). All in all, Russia’s blows to the Turkish econ-
omy were meaningful, but not too destructive. In fact, its ideological blow 
to Turkey was more powerful than its economic one: Russia’s state media 
launched an aggressive campaign against Turkey. In December 2015, accord-
ing to research done for the independent Russian news channel RBC, Turkey 
overtook Ukraine, the US and even the IS extremist group as Russian news 
media’s public enemy no. 1 (Sharkov, 2015).
This situation, however, did not endure for long. Since spring 2016, the 
Turkish leadership has shown signs that it would like to restore its relation-
ship with Putin. In June, Erdoğan sent a letter to him expressing a wish for 
better relations. At first, Russia insisted on Turkey fulfilling three conditions 
before dialogue could commence: issuing a public apology, punishing those 
responsible for killing the pilot, and paying compensation (Aydintasbas, 
2016). However, after Erdoğan sent another letter to Putin and both presi-
dents began to talk over the phone, dialogue, or more precisely, bargaining, 
began. Putin was able to achieve what he wanted— to determine the conditions 
of restoration of relations with Turkey. The main subject of the negotiations 
is compensation, though there are many questions where a compromise must 
be found: how to lift sanctions, what to do with Turkish Stream (Gazprom is 
now suing BOTAŞ, its Turkish partner state company, in international arbi-
tration over undelivered discounts) and how to bring their positions closer on 
the Syrian crisis (Shlykov, 2016b).
There are no quick- fix solutions to Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia. 
But in Turkey’s case, Russia is using this coercive heavy- impact foreign policy 
tool with caution, even given that Turkey has no serious retaliatory measures 
at hand. Indeed, Moscow so far has not taken any steps to reduce the amount 
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of gas it supplies to Turkey, nor threatened to do so. In order to normal-
ize Russian- Turkish relations, experts propose to use a strategy of compart-
mentalization, which should enable the coexistence of political tensions with 
deepening economic ties by “compartmentalizing” (separating) economic 
issues and geopolitical rivalries in order to avoid the negative spillover of 
certain disagreements into areas of bilateral cooperation (Onis and Yilmaz, 
2015). The strategy necessarily implies that both sides consistently follow this 
“principle of compartmentalization,” but Russia has few incentives to do so. 
On the contrary, the penetration of economic issues into geopolitics, when 
economic coercion (real or in the form of threats) comes as punishment for 
undesirable behavior, would bring it more benefits.
There are no reasons to expect the emergence of a lasting alliance between 
the two countries, although scholars are trying to find some (Aydintasbas, 
2016, p.1). No one can guarantee that the restored relationship will not col-
lapse once again, with selective use of coercion and the rise of ideological 
hatred instead of statements of mutual respect.
EU and Turkey: Is the game lost? What next?
The history of the relationship between the European Union and Turkey is 
extraordinarily dramatic and complicated. It was assumed until quite recently 
that the Turkish leadership had bet on membership in the EU, and after the EU 
summit of 1999 that made this feasible, the EU became an anchor for Turkey’s 
political liberalization and reform process (Müftuler- Bac and Gürsoy, 2010, 
p.412). Experts have argued vigorously that for Turkey, Europeanization had 
become synonymous with modernization and development (Talbot, 2015b, 
p.85), while the Copenhagen political criteria constituted the leverage that 
was making Turkish modernization and democratization more pluralist, 
multicultural and consolidated (Aydin and Keyman, 2004, p.1). As Müftuler- 
Bac and Gürsoy (2010, p.411) note,
It is through the prospect of becoming an EU member state that the 
Turkish government initiated a series of political reforms from 1999. The 
EU’s political conditionality and the Turkish desire to fulfill these pol-
itical criteria in order for accession negotiations to begin became crit-
ical in triggering a vast political transformation in Turkey, which in turn 
impacted collective identity formation in Turkey.
Indeed, the “Turkish model” assumed rapprochement with the EU as its 
integral and important constituent element, so the model was based in par-
ticular on establishing sustainable authority relations between the EU and 
Turkey, manifested through Turkey’s consistent process of Europeanization. 
Although experts have regularly stressed the difficulties that awaited both the 
EU and Turkey on this path, nevertheless, the general belief  was that both 
parties were following this particular pathway of developing authority, and 
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not another. And some day (probably quite far in the future) this would cul-
minate in Turkey’s full membership in the EU, when Turkey would turn from 
being a subordinate country in authority relations to one of the dominants, 
the same as all other member states of the Union. Today this belief  has almost 
completely evaporated.
So what happened? Europeanization means changes, and indeed, in Turkey 
institutional and societal changes were recorded by experts (and changes are 
taking place right now as well, as Turkey is trying to meet the conditions for 
a visa- free regime with the EU). Perhaps these changes were not sufficient 
or not irreversible, and too fragile and unable to resist external shock in the 
form of a series of sudden and abrupt changes in the international environ-
ment? Or did the goal of membership cease to be profitable to the incumbent 
Turkish leadership?
The EU and Turkey established relations a long time ago, in 1963, with 
the signing of the Association Agreement; in 1995 they established a customs 
union. At the European Council’s Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey officially 
became a candidate country for EU membership, and this constituted the 
turning point in enhancing the EU’s influence over Turkey for inducing pol-
itical change, as formulated in the Accession Partnership Document issued 
by the EU in November 2000 (which was incorporated into the National 
Program adopted by the Turkish government in 2001). With the beginning 
of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005, this was considered “a historic 
step for Europe, for Turkey, and for the world” (Dervis, Emerson, Gros and 
Ulgen, 2004, p.108), and the EU’s impact on the Turkish political structures 
and norms was enhanced by EU conditionality. At that time, the Turkish gov-
ernment demonstrated a passionate desire for accession: as Erdoğan (2005, 
cited in Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012, p.12) expressed it,
Turkey should be accepted into the European Union. If  not, we’ll change 
the name of the Copenhagen criteria to the Ankara criteria and continue 
with the reforms. … There’s no turning back on the road that Turkey’s 
been taking to integrate with Europe, and there are no other alternatives.
(Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during an 
address to the Azerbaijani Parliament in 2005)
In its turn, the EU was struggling “to ‘sell’ Turkish accession to European 
voters” (Wolczuk, 2005, p.3).
A major obstacle on this path— and the most obvious one— was the 
Turkish responses to EU conditionality on Turkey’s Cyprus policy. The 
“Cyprus stalemate” emerged as Turkey refused to extend its customs union 
with the EU to Cyprus and to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot 
vessels and airplanes. Turkey does not officially recognize the Greek Cypriot 
administration as the official representative of the Republic of Cyprus; as 
such, it considered the opening of borders to Greek Cyprus to be its de facto 
recognition, something Turkey obviously did not want to do. However, this 
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was an open contradiction of the commitment undertaken with the signing 
of the Ankara Protocol in 2005. In response, in December 2006 the European 
Council halted eight negotiation chapters with Turkey. In 2009, the Cypriot 
government stated that it would not allow the opening of six negotiation 
chapters (Talbot, 2015b, pp.85– 86).
The EU member states were very much divided on Turkey’s accession; 
some preferred to consider the process of accession an “open- ended” one, 
meaning that membership would not necessarily be the final result. Among 
those who openly opposed Turkish accession were France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Austria. In particular, the German idea was to offer Turkey 
“privileged partnership” as an alternative to membership. Cyprus and France 
simply blocked certain negotiations chapters. There was also a general lack 
of support for Turkey’s membership among EU citizens, even where national 
government had been traditionally in favor of it, for instance, in Italy (Talbot, 
2015b, p.86).
Therefore, it was critically necessary for the EU to find convincing 
arguments— both for national governments and for the EU citizens— that 
Turkey deserved the “golden carrot” of membership. Here, the argument of 
Turkey’s titanic efforts to change in order to meet the EU criteria2 was one 
of the most powerful. Indeed, experts noted considerable changes in Turkish 
domestic and foreign policy.
From 2001 to 2004, various political reform packages were adopted in 
order to fulfill the EU Copenhagen criteria. Thus, on October 3, 2001, Turkey 
adopted a major constitutional package that addressed the articles on free-
dom of expression and revised the death penalty, with 34 amendments to the 
1982 Constitution. In 2002, three more packages of constitutional reform 
were adopted, abolishing the death penalty in peacetime, revising the Anti- 
Terror Law and allowing for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. 
The August 2002 package, in particular, was a major step toward fulfilling the 
political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria. After the AKP emerged as the 
victor of the November 2002 general elections in Turkey, it adopted several 
further major packages of political reform. In June 2004, the constitutional 
reform package removed the already abolished death penalty from the Turkish 
Constitution and changed Article 46 of the Penal Code by converting death 
penalty sentences to prison sentences (Müftuler- Bac, 2005).
Turkish foreign policy has also experienced a process of gradual 
Europeanization, specifically in procedural changes (as a reflection of reforms 
in civil– military relations in domestic policy- making) and the increased use 
of diplomatic and economic instruments, as opposed to the use of military 
instruments (Müftuler- Bac and Gürsoy, 2010, p.421). Turkey actively par-
ticipated in NATO missions in Afghanistan, in Lebanon in 2006 and in the 
EU- led operations in the Balkans, and all of this indicated Europeanization 
of foreign policy “where Turkey demonstrated its ability as a team player for 
the EU” (Müftuler- Bac and Gürsoy, 2010, p.412). It seemed that the Turkish 
general approach in foreign policy had undergone a conceptual change: a 
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coercive regional approach based on national security- centered understand-
ing was replaced by a zero problem policy toward neighbors, based on trust 
and cooperation in the economic and political spheres. This new approach 
translated into an active role in neighboring regions: Turkey played medi-
ation and peace- maker roles in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle 
East (Müftuler- Bac and Gürsoy, 2010, p.414). Thus, the conclusion was that 
Turkey had redefined its national interests, and, correspondingly, its foreign 
policy approach.
However, these remarkable changes in Turkish domestic and foreign pol-
icy proved to lack general sustainability. Thus, in domestic policy, growing 
authoritarian trends manifested in the erosion of the democratic process as 
well as the weakening of the country’s checks and balances system, which 
became a matter of serious concern for the EU (Talbot, 2015a, p.96). It would 
be wrong, however, to say that all domestic reforms were blocked or reversed, 
though these changes have definitely become more asymmetric across dif-
ferent policy dimensions. As Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, p.6) note, while the 
reform process has stalled in some areas such as the resolution of the Cyprus 
conflict or the recognition of the Armenian genocide, domestic change has 
continued with regard to minority rights and asylum policy.
At the moment, the issue of the visa- free regime with the EU is highest on 
the Turkish agenda. There are now seven benchmarks that Turkey must focus 
on to qualify for this regime, including ones it has not met so far: the imple-
mentation of the National Strategy and the Action Plan on the Fight against 
Corruption, signing and implementation of an Operational Cooperation 
Agreement with EUROPOL, and revising the legal framework regarding 
organized crime and terrorism in line with ECHR and European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, the EU acquis and EU member states’ 
practices.
As Ovali shows, the global financial crisis of 2008 led to the de- 
Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Not only did the crisis alter the 
course of Turkey– EU relations, it also impelled Turkey to solidify its position 
in the East and to rearrange its national priorities. Thus, Erdoğan reverted to 
a more nationalist position on Cyprus, Turkish- Armenian dialogue collapsed, 
and the Turkish- Greek rapprochement failed to produce lasting solutions to 
current problems (Ovali, 2015). However, this de- Europeanization of Turkish 
foreign policy did not come only as a result of an external shock, but was 
caused by the change of incentives for the country’s leadership. As Börzel 
stresses, Europeanization, and the speed and the depth of corresponding 
reforms across different policies, can be explained by domestic actors’ survival 
strategies; in other words, Europeanization is more likely to occur when the 
reforms overlap with the existing agenda of domestic political actors (Börzel, 
2012). As scholars argue, domestic actors (ab)use the EU as a “legitimiza-
tion device” (Tsarouhas, 2012) to push their own political interests (Ademmer, 
2011; Ademmer and Börzel, 2012; Börzel and Pamuk, 2012), and “domestic 
change in Turkey is less driven by the EU and its fading conditionality, than 
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by the political agenda of the Turkish ruling elites and their preference for 
consolidating their political power” (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012, p.16).
Börzel and Soyaltin have shown how this worked in Turkey. Between 1999 
and 2002, the coalition government in Turkey initiated some political reforms, 
but at the same time resisted Europeanization pressures in sensitive areas 
related to the Copenhagen political criteria (minority rights, judicial reform, 
asylum policies, the fight against corruption), where EU policies challenged 
the very foundations of  the Turkish polity and the political agenda of  the 
ruling elites. The next AKP government had a more reformist stance, though 
in a rather utilitarian way: it instrumentalized the promotion of  EU acces-
sion to widen its support base, but again left untouched the areas that were 
key to its political agenda, e.g., the resolution of  the Cyprus and Armenian 
conflicts, the promotion of  freedom of expression, or the reform of the Law 
on Political Parties. For the AKP government, the EU has provided it with 
legitimacy, helping to overcome the resistance of  veto players in the state 
apparatus (like the military and large parts of  the judiciary and bureaucracy 
[Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012, p.13]). But “since the AKP gained electoral sup-
port and the membership perspective became less credible in the post- 2005 
period, the EU has lost relevance for domestic institutional change” (Börzel 
and Soyaltin, 2012, p.14).
As Talbot (2015b, p.89) concludes,
Today Turkey is farther away from fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria 
and EU standards than it was in 2005, in particular, as far as the rule of 
law, civil liberties, the principle of separation of powers, and the demo-
cratic process are concerned.
Moreover, the current “refugee crisis” and the urgent need to cope with this 
challenge has added a new, unexpected and unpleasant note to EU– Turkey 
authority relations, which are already losing credibility. After the summit of EU 
leaders on October 15, 2015, German Chancellor Merkel made an emergency 
trip to Turkey, where she and President Erdoğan agreed to set out an “action 
plan,” under which Ankara blocked refugee flows across the Aegean to Greece 
in return for financial aid of €3 billion, visa liberalization and pledges to accel-
erate Turkey’s EU accession negotiations (Mcdonald, 2015). Commentators 
suspect this deal to be based on an unprincipled approach that disregards the 
proper requirements and procedures of the accession process. The EU claims 
it to be a risk for its influence over Turkey’s domestic politics (Han, 2015, p.3), 
which signals a general degeneration of EU– Turkey authority relations.
There are also other signals for the EU that relations with the Union are los-
ing their priority character for Turkey. According to Turkey’s New European 
Union Strategy released in September 2014, Turkey’s EU accession is still “a 
strategic goal which is pursued with determination” (Turkish Ministry for 
EU Affairs, 2014, cited in Karbuz, 2014, p.3). However, during 2012– 2013, 
President Erdoğan spoke on several occasions about his willingness to end 
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Turkey’s bid for EU membership if  the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), headed by Russia and China, were to grant Turkey membership. 
Erdoğan actually compared the Organization favorably with the EU, evaluat-
ing it as “better and more powerful” (Keck, 2013) and claiming that Turkey 
and the SCO states share “common values.” So far Turkey is not welcome in 
the SCO— three times it has been rejected for “guest membership,” and its 
status is as a dialogue partner, which groups it with Belarus and Sri Lanka, a 
level below the observer status granted to Afghanistan, Iran, India, Mongolia 
and Pakistan (Makovsky, 2015). But this situation could change, and the SCO 
could look at Turkey through a different lens, especially taking into account 
that for Turkey, becoming a full member of the EU would be “something 
close to a miracle” (Karbuz, 2014, p.4).
The limits to swinging, or who wants Turkey
Turkey belongs to the club of  “rising powers,” although, together with 
Mexico, it is considered second- tier. There is no reason to expect a sudden 
collapse of  Turkey’s “rising” status; however, its long- term sustainability 
could be problematic, as the task of  maintaining this status is in no way 
easier than the task of  achieving it. As such, its main strategic goal is clear— 
to convert the country’s “gross” advantages (territorial size, large economy, 
young population, etc.) into long- term sustainable development, transition-
ing to a model based on sustainable domestic consumption, high- quality 
services and high value- added manufacturing. So far, as with all emerging 
markets, Turkey is essentially playing catch- up, trying to close the gap with 
the advanced economies of  the world. Thus, the main challenge for the coun-
try is to reroute growth from a catching- up process into value- added, effi-
cient production- oriented growth (Busygina, 2017). This is a grand goal; at 
the moment, however, the task of  national reconciliation is the most urgent. 
Whether Erdoğan survives in a polarized and antagonistic domestic environ-
ment remains an open question.
But Turkey belongs not only to the “rising powers” group; it is also one 
of the “global swing states” together with Brazil, India and Indonesia, and 
this classification allows us to draw attention to another important Turkish 
feature. All these countries have large and developing economies, strategic 
geographic locations and have made a political choice in favor of democracy 
(though, in Turkey’s case, an extremely illiberal one). What is critically import-
ant is that the position of these states in international relations is not defined 
with certainty, but is swinging. And it is these swinging political orientations 
that give them more weight and significance than we might expect based on 
their population size and the size of their national economies (Kliman and 
Fontaine, 2012). In other words, it is swinging that gives these states “added 
value” and increases their role in global affairs. These states swing not because 
they are weak, but because they consider this to be their most profitable strat-
egy. At the same time, however, in the Turkish case the “swinging strategy” 
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inherently undermines the “Turkish model” based, in particular, on the excep-
tional Turkish orientation in authority relations with the EU.
Indeed, the “Turkish model” as we knew it is over. Turkish “swinging” in 
recent years has been very noticeable, the main foci located in relative geo-
graphic proximity. Turkey has swung between regions including the Middle 
East, Russia, the SCO (to a lesser extent) and, of course, the EU. How much 
profit has this strategy brought Turkey? Turkish active involvement in Middle 
Eastern affairs has so far been unsuccessful, and led to its isolation rather 
than to the expansion of its influence as a regional power. The SCO so far 
does not want Turkey, and this is understandable: there are two hegemons 
in the organization already— Russia and China— which makes its function-
ing very difficult. The emergence in the SCO of another major power, and a 
member of the NATO alliance at that, would with high probability lead to its 
collapse.
Russia and Turkey are similar in many aspects: both countries have imperial 
legacies, and both perceive themselves as decisive regional and global actors in a 
way which does not correspond to their actual capabilities. As Önis and Yilmaz 
(2015, p.2) note, this element of mismatch between expectations and capacity 
clearly distinguishes both Turkey and Russia from many other emerging pow-
ers. Russia, however, has larger- scale ambitions and more room for maneuver 
in using power instruments, particularly coercion. Russia is not going to make 
a “perfect enemy” out of Turkey (or out of Ukraine); this role is reserved for 
the EU. With regard to Turkey, it is much more profitable for Russia to play the 
“rewards and punishments” card as it has before— using economic coercion 
(sanctions) as punishment and their lifting as reward. Despite any declarations 
that could come from the Russian leadership in the future, it would be unrea-
sonable to count on the emergence of a Russian- Turkish strategic alliance, at 
least for as long as current political regime in Russia is preserved.
As for EU– Turkey relations, there is reason to expect that these relations 
will change— from predominantly authority to predominantly partnerships. 
In principle, this is not new for EU– Turkey relations: it was the too- slow pace 
of the accession process that made the EU launch the “Positive Agenda” in 
2012 to complement and enhance the negotiations by fostering cooperation in 
a number of areas of joint interest (Karbuz, 2014, p.7). One of these areas will, 
naturally, be partnership on energy issues. In its 2013 Enlargement Strategy, 
the European Commission (2013) stressed that “given Turkey’s further devel-
opment potential as an energy hub and the common energy challenges it 
shares with the EU, it is important that the enhanced dialogue develops on all 
issues of joint interest.” Bechev (2015a, no pagination) emphasizes that
as its Energy Union is starting to take shape, Europe should involve the 
Turkish government, e.g. through an institutionalized dialogue. As energy 
consumers, the EU and Turkey share an interest in the stability of supply 
and lower prices, including through the completion of the Southern Gas 
Corridor.
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The notions of “cooperation” and “dialogue” may become more widespread 
in EU- Turkish relations than they previously were, at the expense of the author-
ity power language of “conditionality” and “rules and norms transfer.” Using 
the authority tools at its disposal, the Union has already acted as a significant 
player in Turkish economic and political transformation. To date, the EU has 
basically reached the limits of its power to transfer its rules onto Turkey, and 
this is felt by both parties, although neither the EU nor Turkey is willing to 
make the first move to stop the “game” and abandon the accession process 
(Karbuz, 2014, p.4). This can be explained by multiple factors: the lack of a 
power differential between the EU and Turkey (Müftuler- Bac, 2016), which dis-
tinguishes the Turkish situation from those of Central and Eastern European 
countries; the probable challenge to, or even undermining of, Turkish state-
hood by the EU authority tools (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012) (while in the cases 
of other member states, candidates and neighboring countries the EU has, on 
the contrary, strengthened rather than weakened state capacity [Börzel, 2011; 
Börzel and van Hüllen, 2011]), which force the Turkish leadership to try alter-
native survival strategies not solely attached to the EU; and lastly, the EU’s 
decreasing attractiveness to Turkish citizens, with frustration and the belief that 
the EU “no longer provide[s] comfort, prosperity and wealth to its citizens” 
(Vachudova, 2005, cited in Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012, p.16).
Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, p.16) see the future of EU- Turkish relations 
thusly: “Similar to the European Neighborhood Countries, we are likely to see 
at best a ‘Europeanization à la carte’, where Turkish incumbent elites will pick 
and choose EU policies to satisfy their constituencies and consolidate their pol-
itical power.” Besides this selective Europeanization, there will be areas where 
the relations rest not on power, but on equal cooperation and partnership. This 
is definitely not what the EU and Turkey wanted in 2005, but it is far from the 
worst possible scenario. However, recent statements by Erdoğan show that he 
is turning further and further away from the “European choice”: thus, he has 
accused the European Union of funding terrorism in his country and stated that 
he does not care if the West brands him “a dictator” (Christys, 2016). At the same 
time, for practical reasons, he is turning to Russia— in November 2016 Turkey 
and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement on the construction of the 
Turkish Stream gas pipeline (RusCable.ru, 2016b). Russian experts consider the 
project to be equally beneficial to both countries: the Turkish government wants 
to make the country the world’s main hub for oil product sales, while for the 
Russian Gazprom, the recovery of the gas exports lost over the last 15 years is a 
matter of highest priority. Russia’s further strategic task is to abandon the transit 
route that goes through the territory of Ukraine (RusCable.ru, 2016a).
Notes
 1 All rising powers are large in territory, have a large (or very large) population and 
(relatively) strong national economies as well as large domestic markets. They are 
rich in mineral resources or workforce or both (Turkey, incidentally, has the most 
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valuable natural resource a country can have: a young population). Rising powers 
are important players in global politics. When listing rising powers, experts usually 
include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), as well as second- 
tier powers— Turkey and Mexico (Tank, 2012).
 2 The accession process involves a set of intergovernmental negotiations in 35 policy 
areas, known as “chapters,” of the acquis communautaire, the total body of the 
EU law.
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Conclusion
Russia’s “coercive attractiveness” 
and the EU’s “global mission” in 
maintaining authority relations
The contemporary world is the world of power; to say that “power matters” in 
international relations is to strongly downplay its significance— what else mat-
ters besides power? There is a permanent struggle for power, there is a struggle 
between powers for power, and there is a struggle for power between powers 
using different forms of power. This book is about the last of these: the main 
aim of the book was not to show the evolution of the Russia– EU relations 
and of the relations between these major powers and neighboring countries, 
but the interrelation between various forms of power and the choices made 
in favor of this or that power instrument. Following Lake, I defined the main 
distinction between forms of power in international relations as the distinc-
tion between coercion and authority (keeping in mind that coercive relations 
can imitate authority and authority relations are built on some coercion).
The spaces between Russia and the EU, as well as these two powers them-
selves, were the grounds for my research; I suggested that within these terri-
tories the choices, possibilities and constraints with regard to using coercion 
or authority, by two major powers that can neither distance themselves from 
each other nor from their “common neighborhood” countries, should be very 
demonstrative. And this was indeed the case.
Russia’s objective characteristics— huge territorial size, abundance of nat-
ural resources, nuclear weapons and, finally, its Soviet imperial legacy— create 
a potential predisposition to using coercion in foreign policy. It is these fea-
tures that confirm Russia’s “great power” status in the eyes of the country’s 
political elite; thus, these features are “embodied” in the state that is under 
construction in Russia. Through the state- building process, Russia’s features 
are converted into revisionism in foreign policy and various manifestations 
of coercion. Unlike Russia, the EU has none of the abovementioned “advan-
tages”; the Union is severely constrained in its use of forms of power in exter-
nal relations. Thus, its predisposition to using authority follows not only from 
the EU’s norms and values, but also from objective constraints imposed by 
multilevel governance. The use of authority instruments in building relations 
with neighboring countries has its advantages— it allows the EU to establish 
long- term relations and create “zones of security” by decreasing the degree of 
uncertainty and instability in the long run.
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Coercion is attractive as a form of power. Obviously, coercive diplomacy 
needs resources, political will and sometimes even courage— but if  it can be 
made to work, it has the potential to achieve foreign policy objectives quickly 
(at least, much faster than authority). It can serve not only externally, but 
also domestically, in particular for increasing the legitimacy of the political 
incumbent at home, supporting his strategy of state- building. Coercion is far 
from primitive, its forms are constantly being improved, and it can be used 
in different sectors of the target country— economic, political, military, dip-
lomatic and informational. Moreover, coercion implies not only actions, but 
increasingly works with perceptions. Indeed, to convince the target country 
to change its behavior or to not resist the actions of the sender country, it is 
possible not only to use direct coercion, but to shape in the target country 
perceptions profitable for the sender about its willingness and ability to use 
“real” coercion.
Both democracies and autocracies use coercion; the main difference 
between them lies in the grounds that they consider compelling for recourse 
to this form of power vis- à- vis other countries. With regard to autocracies, the 
distinction should be made between the declarations that their elites make to 
legitimize the use of coercion, and their real reasons for using it. The declara-
tions can include, for instance, the argument of “the need to ensure the rights 
of compatriots abroad,” though the real reason for using coercion may be 
very different. Another difference between democracies and autocracies lies in 
their ability for fast and active reaction to nonstandard situations. Freedman 
(2014, p.13) argues that
many commentators have given Western countries poor marks so far for 
their crisis management over Ukraine. It must be doubted whether liberal 
democracies can ever be adept when trying to keep up with fast- moving 
events. It is in their nature to be distracted, risk- averse and superficial 
when assessing developing situations, and then to appear to be at a loss 
when they are caught by surprise. Autocratic governments have a nat-
ural advantage, especially when executing a dramatic move for which they 
have all the capabilities in place.
With the crisis in Ukraine “the attractiveness” of using coercion in inter-
national relations has increased considerably. Indeed, not all national crises 
provoke such serious implications for wider regions as the Ukrainian one 
that has shown the highly incomplete nature of post- Cold War resettlement 
in Europe, while one of the main consequences of the crisis was the rise of 
realism, in particular, in academic and expert circles. The famous article of 
Mearsheimer demonstrates this well enough: he argues that these are US and 
European liberal politicians that share most of the responsibility for the crisis 
(Mearsheimer, 2014, p.1). According to Mearsheimer, these liberals tended to 
believe “that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty- first cen-
tury and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal 
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principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy” 
(Mearsheimer, 2014, p.2), and this was their strategic mistake. Therefore, real-
ism should be returned to the discourse about European security. This rise of 
realism has at least two implications. First, it postulates that world politics 
belong to major powers, and that the role of smaller countries is principally 
marginal. Mearsheimer openly defends this approach:
This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its foreign policy 
choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right when great- power 
politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self- determination are largely 
meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states.
(Mearsheimer, 2014, p.11)
Second, the rise of realism means the rise of coercion in international rela-
tions and points at ineffectiveness of authority tools both now and in the 
future.
In the Ukrainian crisis Moscow has from the beginning appeared to have 
the initiative; its turn to coercion in international relations was and continues 
to be Russia’s means of practicing its revisionist approach in foreign policy. 
Russia’s policy towards Belarus, Georgia and Turkey shows that coercion can 
be very fruitful, at least in the short and medium term. Within European soci-
eties there are (and there always will be, as the price of diversity) groups which 
consider Russia’s way of achieving results in external relations attractive and 
prefer to ignore violations of commitments, support for insurgents within the 
territory of a sovereign country and annexation of a piece of said territory. 
Some say that “it is necessary to understand Russia’s natural interests” (which 
is to say understanding and prioritizing their own economic interests), while 
others are fascinated by Russia’s “great power” concept (velikoderzhavnost’) 
and disappointed in the European idea. These groups are and will be Russia’s 
“points of entry” to European societies. However, considering matters 
 strategically, Russia’s coercion produces short- term results and long- term 
costs, both material and reputational. Through extensive use of coercion, the 
country sends a specific signal to the outside world, a signal that will work, 
shaping perceptions about Russia not only today but also in the future. In 
other words, by using coercion today, you to a certain extent lay the founda-
tions for relations in the future. As for the material side, it is very difficult (if  
not impossible) to calculate the volume of resources that a country will need 
in order not only to act in a coercive way, but to keep paying the price “won” 
by coercion.
While instruments of coercion can be sophisticated, to describe authority 
power I would use the term “delicate.” Authority relations are very compli-
cated by definition; they do not “like” crisis situations, being designed for 
a stable and long- term relationship between superordinate and subordinate. 
Authority relations don’t work (or work badly) when the subordinate has 
shown a lack of state capacity as the country’s elite is simply not capable of 
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launching and then supporting necessary reforms; this problem is crucial for 
Ukraine and its relations with the EU. As Georgia’s case demonstrates, since 
all authority instruments function slowly, authority relations are in jeopardy 
when a new leader comes to presidential office and, being under pressure from 
another major power, starts questioning the external priorities of the previ-
ous leader. These relations also have practically no chance to develop when 
the subordinate country is “monopolized” by another major power and is 
completely dependent upon it. Under such conditions, the superordinate has 
simply no “points of entry” into the subordinate, even if  the leadership of the 
subordinate indicates that it would be eager to develop (some) authority rela-
tions. The case of Belarus presents this situation well enough. Finally, the very 
distinctive case of Turkey illustrates that insufficient difference in “potentials” 
between superordinate and subordinate can place serious constraints on 
authority relations between the two. Furthermore, despite Turkey’s several 
decades of rapprochement with the Union with the possibility of full mem-
bership, the EU seems to have reached the limits of its authority power with 
regard to it, and Turkey has had to abandon its previous model (one that 
presupposed, in particular, a clear choice in favor of Europe by the elites) and 
turn to selective and opportunistic cooperation with Russia.
All in all, unlike coercion, authority relations are not self- sustaining; 
they require a whole range of conditions, and, as authority instruments are 
designed for the long term, these conditions must not only exist at the moment 
when relations are initially established, but must be preserved over a longer 
period of time. Furthermore, authority relations include a significant element 
of social innovation— Europe once “invented” the nation- state, and now it 
is “inventing” authority. When Taleb (2012, p.5) writes that “The process 
of discovery (or innovation, or technological progress) itself  depends on … 
aggressive risk bearing rather than formal education,” this is, unfortunately, 
not applicable to the EU’s authority— that is principally fragile. And still the 
EU develops these “difficult” relations— both internally and externally— and 
as I have attempted to show in the book, this is not luxury or whim, but the 
EU’s fundamental mode of existence.
Experts often pose the question of the number of superpowers in the con-
temporary world, and in its future. In fact, the question is “To which super-
powers will the future belong?” Some think that the United States will stand 
alone as the sole superpower, while others, pointing to the rise of China (and 
sometimes India) consider the future to be multipolar. Moravcsik supports 
this idea of multipolarity, but stresses Europe’s role in the geopolitical bal-
ance. He earnestly argues that
The world today has two global superpowers. One is the United States— 
the other is Europe. Europe is the only region in the world, besides the 
United States, able to exert global influence across the full spectrum of 
power, from “hard” to “soft.” And European countries possess a range 
of effective civilian instruments for projecting international influence that 
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is unmatched by any country, even the United States. These tools include 
European Union enlargement, neighborhood policy, trade, foreign aid, 
support for multilateral institutions and international law, and European 
values.
(Moravcsik, 2010, p.91)
And further: “The EU has emerged as the most ambitious and successful 
international organization of all time, pioneering institutional practices far in 
advance of anything seen elsewhere” (Moravcsik, 2010, p.92). The list of the 
EU’s instruments (and these are authority instruments) shows that the EU is 
very distinct from the other superpower, the US. There is indeed little likeli-
hood that such a distinctive power could be replicated elsewhere in the world 
any time soon (Moravcsik, 2009, p.413). What could be replicated, however, is 
the type of power relations that the EU establishes externally. Therefore, for 
me the crucial question is not about the number and the names of current and 
future superpowers, but about the type of power relations that will structure 
the system of international relations in the future.
In recent years the EU has been much concerned with the development of 
its Global Strategy. The term “global” indicates the scale of its operation, so 
the EU Global Strategy could be defined as the use of power to secure the 
existence of the Union, and the ways of projecting EU influence globally. 
Interestingly, not all major powers have global strategies; as Ian Bremmer 
argues, the only country in the world with a global strategy right now is China 
(Business Insider, 2015). Whether the EU, being not a state but a union, needs 
a Global Strategy is an open question. Certainly, the European Commission 
thinks it does: in her foreword to the document “Shared Vision, Common 
Action: A  Stronger Europe. A  Global Strategy for the European Union’s 
Foreign and Security Policy,” Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, states that
the idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian power” does not do just-
ice to an evolving reality. For instance, the European Union currently 
deploys seventeen military and civilian operations, with thousands of 
men and women serving under the European flag for peace and secur-
ity— our own security, and our partners’. For Europe, soft and hard 
power go hand in hand.
(The European Commission, 2016, p.4)
It follows from this statement that the key priorities of the EU are maintain-
ing security and peace, and indeed, the EU has been eminently successful 
in this regard, as since the late ’90s it has contributed to the political and 
economic stabilization of over a dozen of its neighbors. However, the tone 
of the statement and of the whole document creates the impression that the 
Commission, at least by implication, is copying the rhetoric and the language 
of state. Moreover, at the expert level it has often called for “a more realistic 
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approach to reconciling values and interests in order for Europe to be able to 
shape the future global order” and argued that “a ‘global reflex’ across all EU 
institutions is needed to strengthen the Union as a ‘comprehensive power’” 
(Raik, Helwig and Iso- Markku, 2015, p.3). In my mind, the EU is not and 
will not be able in the future to keep pace with other major powers (states) in 
using coercive instruments in external relations. Its Global Strategy should 
reflect its global mission, and that is not to give up, and to step up efforts in 
developing innovative forms of authority relations— for the sake of its own 
self- preservation and for the sake of the whole world.
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